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While the problem of cyclical joblessness dominates public 
policy discussion at the present time, structural unemploy 
ment is being increasingly recognized as one of the nation's 
most serious domestic problems. Persistent high levels of 
"prosperity" or structural unemployment are attributable to 
seemingly intractable structural imbalances within the 
economy. As Professor Pierson notes, the key policy prob 
lem centers on the use of aggregative and structural policies 
to reduce total unemployment to the 4-5 percent range and to 
bring the hard-to-employ into the economic mainstream 
without inducing increased inflation.
This study focuses on the role of the federal government in 
reducing persistent joblessness that prevails at relatively high 
levels even during periods of high employment or prosperity. 
Professor Pierson concludes that, while differing in degree, 
both cyclical and structural unemployment should be ad 
dressed in periods of high as in periods of low employment. 
The author concludes that the most critical issue to resolve is 
how to balance short-run and long-run goals for the 
economy in the selection of public policy alternatives.
Facts and observations expressed in the study are the sole 
responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not necessar 
ily represent positions of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research.
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Dimensions of the Problem
In the last decade, unemployment has again become one 
of the country's most serious unresolved problems. Mass 
unemployment as it was known in the 1930s can perhaps no 
longer be considered a serious threat, an outcome for which 
Keynes and his followers deserve primary credit. The full 
employment prospect implicit in their doctrines, however, 
has faded. The broad consensus among economists today is 
that if reliance is placed on Keynesian macro-expansion 
policies alone, the jobless rate cannot be pushed below 5 per 
cent, perhaps not even below 6 percent, of the nation's labor 
force without unleashing severe inflationary pressures.
Compared to the Great Depression such projections hard 
ly appear alarming, but the economic and social repercus 
sions of even small changes in the jobless rate can be ex 
tremely serious. A rise in the jobless rate of one percentage 
point, say from 4 to 5 percent, would add about a million 
persons to the jobless rolls and, barring temporary offsets, 
would reduce real GNP by nearly 3 percent. More serious 
still, the kind of unemployment that persists into periods of 
general prosperity falls much more heavily on certain groups 
than on others: those with low incomes, few skills, and little 
education. In addition to the loss of their output, society 
must also bear the heavy direct and indirect costs of the add 
ed welfare expenditures, police protection, and
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neighborhood deterioration associated with concentrated 
joblessness of this type. Most damaging of all, persons who 
cannot even find stable jobs in boom periods can hardly be 
blamed for becoming completely discouraged and defeatist 
about their personal worth as well as their role in the life of 
their communities.
This study is primarily addressed to the problem of pros 
perity, as opposed to recessionary, unemployment. The 
former is attributable to persistent structural imbalances 
within the economy, the latter to either cyclical or longer 
term shortfalls in aggregate demand relative to aggregate 
supply in the economy as a whole. The distinction between 
structural and aggregate demand joblessness has admittedly 
become quite blurred since failure on either front greatly 
complicates effective action on the other. To the degree ag 
gregate imbalances prove intractable, structural imbalances 
will become more serious, and if the latter prove to be 
unyielding, the task of aggregate demand management 
becomes correspondingly more difficult. Parallel action on 
both fronts is, therefore, clearly required if success on either 
is to be achieved. Nevertheless, the corrective measures to be 
taken at the structural and aggregative level will differ 
radically.
Prosperity Unemployment
Controversy soon emerges when discussion of these two 
aspects of unemployment goes beyond the level of 
generalization. The crux of the question is how can ag 
gregative and structural policies be meshed so that 
unemployment can be brought down to the 4-5 percent 
range. The usual answer is that, on the aggregative level, the 
economy has become increasingly inflation prone and, on 
the structural level, larger sections of the nation's labor force 
have become increasingly cut off from stable job or career
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opportunities. The main purpose of this study is to assess the 
merits of this pessimistic but widely accepted view and, more 
particularly, to examine its implications for public policy.
The pessimists' view has now become part of the conven 
tional wisdom, so much so that only the briefest summary is 
needed here. If, as recent experience attests, prices begin to 
rise sharply even when the unemployment rate is as high as 6 
percent or more, the scope left to fiscal and monetary policy 
as a means for reducing unemployment will be sharply 
reduced. Indeed, to the extent serious inflation has become 
permanent and essentially irreversible over a given two- or 
three-year period, any effort to lower unemployment by ex 
pansionary fiscal-monetary means will, in this view, tend in 
the longer run to raise rather than lower the jobless rate.
The alternative approach to the prosperity unemployment 
problem, directly attacking major structural barriers to jobs, 
has led to a hardly less pessimistic conclusion. While differ 
ing in emphasis and specific findings, the conclusion of most 
investigations is that the many public and private efforts 
since the early 1960s to remove such barriers have yielded but 
the barest results. The main differences among these in 
vestigations depend on the weight which is placed on improv 
ing existing job market conditions as opposed to more far- 
reaching reforms, the former relying chiefly on private 
market processes and the latter on various types of govern 
mental intervention. Both seem generally agreed, however, 
that the problem itself lies beyond any quick or even distant 
solution.
The upshot is that the trade-off between unemployment 
and price stability, the well-known Phillips Curve, is now 
seen to be much more adverse, not only in terms of its shape 
but in terms of its location as well, than when first developed 
in the mid-fifties how adverse, however, remains an unset 
tled question, with most estimates of the minimum level to
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which unemployment can be reduced by aggregative and 
structural policies without setting off a serious rise in the in 
flation rate ranging from 6 percent to as low as 4 percent. 
The choice of public policy measures for dealing with 
unemployment that persists into periods of general prosperi 
ty largely turns on where the effects of fiscal-monetary ex 
pansion are assumed to fall within this range of values. The 
general conclusion emerging from the discussion of this issue 
in the following chapter is that the inflationary impact of 
macroeconomic measures to achieve and maintain full 
employment, as the latter term is usually defined, has been 
exaggerated and that, quite aside from efforts to remove 
structural barriers to employment, there is good reason to 
believe that the jobless rate could be reduced by such 
measures to 5 percent or even less without affecting the rate 
of inflation in any significant way.
This finding, if valid, puts the question of the structural 
barriers to unemployment in a quite different light from the 
way it is usually viewed. Since the unemployment-prone 
groups, consisting of lesser skilled, lesser educated workers, 
are especially benefitted by any general lowering of the 
unemployment rate, structural unemployment could be ex 
pected to fall by well over one-half if it turned out that the 
national jobless rate could be reduced to 5 percent by 
macroeconomic demand policy without incurring serious in 
flationary consequences. This in turn would mean that ef 
forts to bring the hard-to-employ into the mainstream of job 
opportunities could be concentrated much more intensively, 
and presumably more successfully, on the needs of the par 
ticular groups involved. An evaluation of these efforts, con 
sidered from this perspective, constitutes the chief subject of 
this inquiry.
Dimensions of the Problem
Dimensions of the Problem
The basis for the view that the unemployment problem has 
become largely intractable rests largely on the belief that 
various forms of governmental intervention, however well 
intentioned or even justified in any given instance, have been 
carried to the point where, in the aggregate, full utilization 
of the nation's labor force on a sustained basis has become 
impossible. In part, this view rests on the belief that the 
general role of government, particularly in its fiscal and 
monetary policies, has been highly unstabilizing, so much so 
that any short-run efforts to offset such unstabilizing effects 
have proved ineffective and actually exacerbating. More 
recently, criticism has centered on governmental interven 
tions in individual markets or broader sectors of the 
economy whether aimed at protecting certain producer 
groups or the general public. Increasingly, investigators of 
both a conservative and liberal persuasion have come to 
question whether the net effects of governmental regulation 
in such fields as railroads and trucking, or its efforts to con 
trol environmental, health, and safety hazards in a variety of 
industries have not pushed up costs unduly, thereby serving 
to restrict output and employment and thus contributing to 
both more inflation and more unemployment.
A similar shift in sentiment has occurred among in 
vestigators of government efforts to improve the perfor 
mance of particular labor markets and to protect certain 
vulnerable worker groups. Again, rather than stressing the 
beneficial aspects of such efforts, increasing emphasis has 
come to be placed on their deleterious effects. Some of the 
policies that have been most widely criticized on this score 
are federal laws stipulating minimum wages and maximum 
hours, protection of union organizing and strike actions, and 
provision of unemployment benefits and welfare benefits. 
The danger of these policies, while sometimes viewed in ex-
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treme categorical terms, is more often seen as one of degree, 
with the argument often turning on how far is it possible for 
government to go in providing special safeguards of these 
sorts without adversely affecting the functioning of labor 
markets. A major purpose of this study is to review the 
available evidence concerning this important issue.
While the majority of professional investigators have 
become increasingly skeptical about governmental aggregate 
demand policies and individual market approaches to the 
problem of prosperity unemployment, an important minori 
ty hold to the view that the problem of persistent unemploy 
ment can be traced not to particular government policies but 
to various fundamental changes in the economy. At the ag 
gregate level it is argued by members of this minority group 
that pressures arising from international economic im 
balances, domestic interest group demands, changes in 
market trends and requirements, and shifts in factor supply 
conditions have made it more difficult to maintain non- 
inflationary expansions. At the individual market level it is 
argued further that certain employees, most notably teenage 
minority workers in inner cities and the least skilled, least 
educated workers in economically depressed industries and 
areas, have become effectively cut off from all worthwhile 
job opportunities. In part, these barriers are said to be the 
result of deliberate discriminatory practices but in greater 
part they are felt to be the product of general cultural in 
fluences and long-standing institutional relationships. Pro 
ponents of this position share much of the skepticism of the 
majority group regarding the effectiveness of government 
measures to deal with the problem of persistent unemploy 
ment but for diametrically opposite reasons. The majority 
view is that the economy is generally capable of providing 
adequate job opportunities if only the government would 
adopt less sweeping programs and give unregulated market 
processes freer rein, while the minority holds that the im-
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balances and conflicts within the economy are so serious they 
will not be resolved unless there are far reaching changes in 
the economy.
It is not possible within the confines of this study to make 
an adequate appraisal of either of these polar positions since 
both are wide ranging in nature and pertinent data are not 
readily available. Rather, this investigation is limited to a 
review of the public policy implications of the findings of 
both groups of observers as judged by the record of prior ef 
forts to deal with the problem of unemployment in periods 
of high employment or prosperity. 1 To this end attention 
first centers on identifying the more important 
characteristics of this type of unemployment and on setting 
forth the major questions that remain unanswered about it.
Four Aspects of Prosperity Unemployment
The first and probably the most important dimension of 
this kind of unemployment is that it is largely confined to 
certain groups and geographical areas. Viewed in 
demographic terms, joblessness in high employment periods 
is concentrated among youth, women, and older workers (54 
years and over), particularly the nonwhite members of these 
groups. Viewed in locational terms, this type of unemploy 
ment is centered in certain long-depressed areas such as the 
Appalachian Region, and more massively in the inner areas 
of some of the country's larger cities. The same demographic 
groups are dominant in the geographical concentrations of 
joblessness, reflecting the more basic forces which lie behind 
persistent unemployment of this sort. It should be noted that 
adult white males can also find themselves without jobs in
1 In this study the terms high employment and prosperity unemployment are used inter 
changeably to denote the kind of persistent unemployment that continues at relatively high 
levels even in periods of sustained business expansions
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boom times but only in unusual or temporary cases. Thus 
prosperity level joblessness can be viewed as largely an age- 
sex-race problem, and policy proposals should be for 
mulated accordingly.
Related to this dimension of the problem is the fact that 
many of these workers face severe labor market initial-entry 
or re-entry difficulties in getting stable, career-related jobs. 
The key issue, particularly in generally prosperous en 
vironments, is not one of finding a job as such, but rather 
one of getting work with promise of some permanence and 
longer term career potential. Indeed, the salient 
characteristic of this type of unemployment is not so much 
long periods of joblessness as short periods occurring be 
tween relatively brief spells of employment. Whether such 
highly unstable patterns of work stem from low productivity 
because of poor work habits and inexperience, or from 
discriminatory practices and institutional arrangements, or 
even from personal life styles and preferences of the workers 
themselves, it is clear that the most critical difficulties in 
dealing with prosperity level unemployment occur when 
workers initially enter or re-enter the labor market. For 
many, indeed the great majority, steady work is eventually 
found, albeit with a trial and error period of "shopping 
around" often involved; but for a substantial minority, 
steady work in anything approaching a career framework is 
not attained. These are the workers in the dead-end jobs who 
constitute the bulk of the so-called permanently unemployed 
(or the "permanently-temporarily" unemployed) and pose 
the most intractable aspect of the problem for policymakers.
Unemployment among older workers follows a quite dif 
ferent pattern. Once having achieved relatively permanent 
job status, a person typically remains at work until age 65 
unless he or she chooses earlier retirement, and recently 
enacted federal legislation extends protection from dismissal
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for older workers until their seventieth year. Unemployment 
rates for such workers are comparatively low, generally run 
ning below 3 percent. If, however, they lose their jobs, the 
resulting unemployment is likely to prove of much longer 
duration than for younger persons.
A second dimension of the prosperity unemployment pro 
blem is that in the course of a broad business expansion an 
increasing percentage of the unemployed population is likely 
to consist of persons with loose or marginal labor force at 
tachments. Teenagers, women, and workers with minimal 
skills or limited work experience tend to move in and out of 
the job market much more frequently than other worker 
groups, entering the labor market in relatively greater 
numbers in upswings and leaving in relatively greater 
numbers when job market conditions turn less favorable. To 
the extent this two-way movement occurs, it serves to hold 
up the overall unemployment rate in expansions and lower it 
in contractions. It also means that the unemployment that 
persists into expansion periods will increasingly consist of 
persons close to the margin between looking and not looking 
for work. While hard to quantify, it is obvious that this 
aspect of prosperity unemployment requires much more 
selective policy approaches than the type of unemployment 
that is predominant in periods of contraction.
Among workers close to the working-nonworking margin, 
two general categories call for special attention by 
policymakers: those who can readily find stable jobs or can 
take the necessary steps to qualify for such jobs if they 
choose to do so, as opposed to those who for personal or 
other reasons beyond their control cannot. The well- 
educated, experienced job seeker who is the second bread 
winner in a family clearly requires quite different assistance, 
if indeed any is required at all, from the poorly educated, in 
experienced job seeker who is the sole breadwinner in a low
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income, nonwhite family. Within each of these two 
categories, as discussed more fully later, other subgroupings 
need to be recognized. One of the important tasks of 
policymakers is to identify the various groups involved more 
carefully and fashion policy measures appropriate to each.
A third dimension of the prosperity unemployment pro 
blem, which bears directly on the one just noted, is the in 
creased emphasis that needs to be placed in periods of broad 
expansion on job opportunities in the private as opposed to 
the public sector. It is in such periods that the private sector, 
which in any event normally provides about 80 percent of all 
jobs, is in the best position to train and take on hard-to- 
employ workers. It is in such periods that private employers 
will be most likely to have unfilled vacancies in the higher 
paying, more desirable lines of work. The public sector can 
be expected to continue its role of maintaining essential 
training of certain low skilled workers and of providing jobs 
on at least a temporary basis for such workers, but the prin 
cipal aim of policy would need to shift to inducing private 
firms to take on workers from the hard-to-employ category. 
This is a critically important positive factor because it means 
that normal market processes can be relied on to achieve 
most of the tasks of bringing excluded, unemployment- 
prone workers into the mainstream of employment oppor 
tunities. The major difficulty besetting efforts in this direc 
tion in periods of business slack is that the job needs of 
employers are too limited to make effective action possible, 
with new placements to a considerable extent simply taking 
the place of other economically vulnerable groups of 
workers. As labor supply conditions tighten, however, the 
focus of policy can shift from the much more difficult objec 
tive of creating new job openings to facilitating the training- 
recruiting process of filling already existing openings. It 
would be naive to argue from this that the plight of the 
jobless can be largely forgotten in periods of general pro-
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sperity, but it would be equally unrealistic to formulate a set 
of policies that does not take this as its central starting point.
Within the public sector itself an analogous shift in policy 
away from federal to state and local government employ 
ment would also be appropriate in periods of sustained ex 
pansion. Opportunities for stable work in such periods are 
more likely to be concentrated at the local rather than na 
tional government level. Federal direction and support 
would still be needed but implementation would be required 
at the individual community, or even individual 
neighborhood, level. This would in turn mean placing even 
more responsibility on local public sponsors and ad 
ministrative units than is provided under present federal 
legislation, however difficult the meshing of centralized and 
decentralized requirements is likely to be.
A fourth dimension is that the job needs of workers re 
maining unemployed even in generally prosperous times will 
not be met unless both they and their potential employers are 
induced to participate in broadened hiring and training pro 
grams in response to specific incentives and penalties. The 
type of economic and social behavior sought cannot be 
achieved by invoking appeals to conscience or the mere 
likelihood of eventual success. The advantages and disad 
vantages of the proposed patterns of action must be seen to 
be reasonably immediate, clear, and assured to both the par 
ticipating workers and the employers; otherwise, the kind of 
sustained response necessary for the success of the program 
cannot be expected. This requirement for effective action, 
however, conflicts with another equally important require 
ment: since the factors giving rise to the problem of prosperi 
ty unemployment are deeply imbedded in the society's 
economic and social institutions, the results of even the best 
conceived policies are apt to be quite long delayed. Perhaps 
the most important issue facing policymakers in this area is
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how this conflict in requirements can be reconciled or at least 
substantially modified.
These four dimensions, along with the aggregate relation 
ships adverted to earlier, constitute the principal considera 
tions which need to be kept in focus in evaluating proposals 
for bringing down the basic or minimum unemployment rate 
in this country. Other considerations will be touched on at 
later points: the rapid increase during strong expansion 
periods in the labor force participation rates of certain 
groups in the population (including illegal aliens!); the 
lessons from English, Swedish and other European coun 
tries' experiences; and the importance of such "indirect" ap 
proaches as improved investment incentives, area develop 
ment programs, and lowered barriers to product market 
competition. Main attention in this study, however, centers 
on the behavior of labor markets in periods of expanding 
business and on the various direct approaches which have 
been attempted or suggested for improving the performance 
of such markets. The evaluation of these approaches will 
turn on how effective they are in meeting the four dimen 
sions of the problem outlined above.
Chapter 2
The Shifting Limits of 
Demand Management
As in other aspects of modern life, the pace of change in 
economic ideas has greatly accelerated in recent years. In no 
other area of the subject is this more apparent than in 
prevailing attitudes towards unemployment. After World 
War II, a jobless rate of 3 percent or less was a generally 
agreed-upon goal. In the course of the 1950s and 1960s, a 
figure of 4 to 4.5 percent came to be accepted as at least an 
interim target. In the early 1970s, the most widely cited 
figure fell in the range of 5 to 5.5 percent, but the present ad 
ministration, as required by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, 
has set its sights on the more ambitious goal of 4 percent by 
1983. To realize the latter figure would require an average 
annual increase in real GNP of about 4.5 percent over the in 
tervening period, a decidedly optimistic assumption.
Similar changes have occurred in public attitudes towards 
a second major objective of economic policy: stability of the 
price level. In the early postwar period, after the inflationary 
outburst attendant on World War II, the idea of a zero an 
nual rate of price increase was widely and seriously discuss 
ed. During the 1950s and early 1960s the most generally ac 
cepted goal came to be about 2 or perhaps 3 percent. Today, 
in the wake of Vietnam and the inflationary surge of the 
middle and late seventies, the target has risen to well over 4
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percent even though this is the limiting figure set for 1983 by 
the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.
Explanatory Factors
These two objectives of economic policy have had to be 
scaled back over the postwar years because in both respects 
actual performance over this period has been generally 
disappointing. Except in times of war or the aftermath of 
war, the unemployment rate has kept above 4 percent in 
every year since World War II, and, more typically, at or 
above 5 percent. More striking still, even in the years of 
vigorous peacetime prosperity, the jobless rate has generally 
held above the 4 percent figure, remaining especially high in 
peacetime cyclical upswings in the late 1950s and again in the 
early 1970s. The annual rate of increase in consumer prices, 
on the other hand, has kept below 2 percent in most 
peacetime years during this period. It is only since 1968 that 
the yearly rate of increase in prices has jumped to much 
higher levels. Between 1974 and 1976 the rise in consumer 
prices fell from 12 percent to 5 percent per year, but a move 
back towards a much higher figure has occurred in recent 
years.
In good part, the lowering of the nation's sights with 
respect to unemployment and inflation is simply an accep 
tance of what has occurred and a tribute to the stubbornness 
of the problems involved. It is a reflection, too, of the belief 
that the two goals are in conflict with one another and that 
some kind of compromise within the extremes is necessary. 
This is the dilemma embodied in the Phillips Curve which 
has recently become the center of sharp controversy among 
professional experts. The great majority of economists, 
however, would agree that, barring drastic institutional 
changes, a reduction of the unemployment rate to the 4 per 
cent level would lead to a rapid rise in the price level; in fact,
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many economists hold the view that even bringing down the 
rate to 6 percent would result in an observable though not 
necessarily marked rise in the rate of inflation. 1
The other side of the coin, whether lowering the annual 
rate of price increases to 4 percent or less would adversely af 
fect the jobless rate, is less clear although, again, the majori 
ty of economists would lean toward the affirmative position. 
The basis for the latter view is that the restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policies which would be needed to achieve such a 
modest rate of price increase would choke off job expansion 
well below full employment, pushing up the unemployment 
rate to unacceptable levels. As a result, pressures to avoid the 
adverse consequences of unduly low rates of either 
unemployment or inflation have forced a compromise 
somewhere in the 4 to 6 percent "middle range" of target 
figures in the unemployment-inflation relationship.
Thus, the principal factor underlying the postwar uptrend 
in unemployment and the acceptance of higher unemploy 
ment goals over this period lies in the fact that the American 
economy, along with the other advanced industrial societies 
in the free world, has become increasingly inflation prone. 
The implication for policy generally derived from this fact is 
that the recurrence of severe inflationary episodes in the 
postwar period can largely be attributed to governmental ef 
forts to achieve lower levels of unemployment. This latter 
proposition, while enjoying wide acceptance, is open to 
serious criticism as the later discussion shows.
The dominant issue, however, confronting 
macroeconomic policymaking in recent years is the 
emergence of stagflation: high inflation coupled with high 
unemployment. Instead of the either-or choice originally
1. See, for example, Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, 7th ed 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p 216.
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posed by the Phillips Curve, the "new" curve points to 
adverse changes on both fronts and, as a consequence, a no- 
win position for policymakers. If, for example, consumer 
prices are rising at an annual rate above 6 percent and 
unemployment has also moved above this target figure, 
should monetary and fiscal policies be made primarily 
restrictive or expansive? If a decrease in the unemployment 
rate results from an expansionary demand policy, will this 
merely accentuate inflation and in the longer run force the 
unemployment rate back up again? If, on the other hand, in 
flation is slowed by a restrictive demand policy, will this 
simply push up the unemployment level still higher? In the 
context of the "new" Phillips Curve, can it even be argued 
that a fall in aggregate demand will in fact significantly 
reduce the pace of inflation? While clear-cut answers to these 
questions are certainly not to be expected, a discussion of 
some of the issues they raise is necessary to an understanding 
of the problem addressed in this study.
The Unemployment-Inflation 
Relationship Since World War II
The outstanding feature of business expansions in the 
period since World War II was the impact of war and its 
aftermath on the unemployment-inflation relationship. It 
was only in war-dominated environments that the unemploy 
ment rate fell below 4 percent. True, there were two 
peacetime expansions, one in 1954-57 when the rate fell to 
4.1 percent by the fourth quarter of 1956, and another in 
1961-65 when it fell to 4.5 percent by the fourth quarter of 
1965, but the rate only declined into the 3 percent-and-less 
zone under war or war-related conditions. It is also worth 
noting that the wartime unemployment lows were closely 
geared to the relative domestic impact of the different con 
flicts: in World War II the unemployment rate fell to 1.2 per 
cent in 1944, in the Korean War it fell to 2.9 percent in 1953,
Limits of Demand Management 17
and in the Vietnam War it fell to 3.5 percent in 1969. While 
the view that genuine full employment can only be achieved 
in this country under wartime conditions is frequently 
criticized, the postwar record at least lends it prima facie 
credence.
The other side of this view, that major upsurges in prices 
are also a product of war, seems hardly less plausible. The 
financial excesses and economic strains associated with wars 
have had profound effects on prices, wages and costs which 
extend over long periods of time. The inflationary forces 
unleashed by the successive surges in wartime expenditures, 
and to a less extent by the continuing cold war outlays, gave 
a pronounced inflationary tilt to the economy during the 
postwar years. Between 1945 and 1972 there were four 
periods when the Consumer Price Index rose at a faster an 
nual rate than 2 percent: 1945-48 (+11 percent), 1950-52 
( + 6 percent), 1956-58 ( + 3 percent), and 1965-72 (-1-5 per 
cent). In terms of percentage point increases, as shown in 
Table 2-1, these four periods accounted for roughly 84 per 
cent of the increase in consumer prices in the 1945-72 period, 
providing the major explanation of the inflation during these 
years.
Three of the four intervals were dominated by wartime or 
immediate postwar developments. If inflation as a serious 
problem is defined as a rise in prices in excess of 2 percent 
per year, it is clear that in the 1945-72 period it was almost 
wholly a war-related phenomenon, the one exception being 
the 1956-58 episode. It follows that the full employment 
achieved in the war periods was gained at the cost of serious 
price-wage instability later on. Over this twenty-five year 
period, on the other hand, the pursuit of full employment in 
peacetime environments did not generate serious inflationary 
pressures. Thus the onset of such pressures was due to the ex- 
egencies of wartime which in turn generated full employment
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or over full employment conditions. Aggregate demand in 
the latter sense needs to be viewed in quite a different light 
from aggregate demand which results from a full employ 
ment policy pursued in peacetime if for no other reason than 
that the positions and future outlooks of business, workers 
and the buying public are so different in the two en 
vironments.
Table 2-1





























during selected periods - 60 84
Total increase over entire
1945-72 period 54-125 71
*Differences in figures due to rounding
Source: U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The view, therefore, that demand management can no 
longer be used as the major weapon for bringing down the 
unemployment level in this country rests almost wholly on 
the experience of the relatively few years that have elapsed 
since 1972. Not surprisingly, scholars remain divided as to 
the weight that should be given various factors in explaining 
the emergence of stagflation, the persistence of severe infla 
tion in the face of relatively high levels of unemployment, 
during this period. Two general explanations have received 
the most attention. The first holds that the federal govern 
ment's fiscal and monetary policies have proven seriously 
unstabilizing, leading to excessive expansions as in 1972 and
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1978 followed by contractions as in 1974 or slowdowns as in 
1980. These cyclical distortions, it is argued, have fed into a 
longer-run type of imbalance in which workers, firms and 
other major groups come to expect a continued rise in prices 
and act accordingly, thereby building a rising inflation rate 
into the system even when market conditions have become 
quite negative. While the term full employment is often used 
rather loosely, the thrust of this line of argument is that the 
government's pursuit of this objective during these years and 
earlier has been the chief cause of the country's economic 
difficulties.
The other general approach stresses influences stemming 
from both long and short term changes that have occurred in 
supply and cost conditions. A number of investigators, 
notably the late R.A. Gordon and George Perry, uncovered 
convincing evidence that since the mid-1950s the composi 
tion of the nation's labor force has shifted towards a higher 
percentage of unemployment-prone groups: young and 
female workers, particularly the nonwhite members of these 
two groups. These investigators concluded that this shift 
alone would explain a rise of as much as a full percentage 
point in the minimum unemployment rate at which infla 
tionary pressures on wages and prices would begin to mount. 
More recently, national attention has centered on the 
dramatic increase in energy prices which occurred in 1974 
and again in 1979 as a result of actions by the OPEC coun 
tries. Poor harvests combined with rising world demand for 
food and other raw material supplies have also generated 
powerful inflationary forces in recent years. Additional up 
ward pressures on unit costs have been felt in a number of in 
dustries because of the spread of environmental, health, 
safety and other types of regulations. As a result of these and 
related developments, costs have risen in a variety of fields, 
outlays for new equipment have slackened and the trend in 
labor productivity has become distinctly less favorable.
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The two approaches entail radically different methods for 
dealing with persistent unemployment in the face of rapidly 
rising prices, the first emphasizing the need for throttling 
down the expansionary demand policies of government and 
the second, removing supply bottlenecks and cost-raising 
practices resulting from governmental action. Lacking any 
clear-cut basis for choosing one approach over the other, 
policymakers can be expected to move along both lines, with 
major stress on demand restraint as labor and product 
markets become increasingly tight and a cyclical peak in the 
economy emerges, or shifting major attention to cost- 
reducing measures if, as seems likely, long-run inflationary 
pressures become the dominant problem. Beyond this rather 
bland finding there are certain features of recent experience 
with respect to the persistence of unemployment in strong ex 
pansion periods that are worth noting.
First and most important, aggregate demand policy was 
sufficiently expansionary in the 1975-78 period to bring the 
unemployment rate down from 8.5 percent to 6 percent of 
the civilian labor force, with total civilian employment rising 
by nearly 10 million over the three-year period. When infla 
tion accelerated in 1979, demand policy became increasingly 
restrictive but not so aggressively as to cause a rise, at least in 
the short run, in the unemployment level. Maintaining a 
relatively steady uptrend in aggregate demand after 1975 
proved more effective in opening job opportunities for non- 
white males 20 years of age and older than any other 
demographic group, reducing their unemployment rate by 
three percentage points from 11.7 to 8.6 percent between 
1975 and 1978. There was also a three percentage point drop 
during these years among nonwhite females in the 16-19 year 
age range, but among the other unemployment-prone 
groups, white and nonwhite females 20 years old and over, 
the drop in unemployment during this cyclical expansion 
period was disappointingly small. As in previous upswings,
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the vital role played by expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies in bringing down both the overall jobless rate and 
the jobless rate among the structurally unemployed was 
clearly evident.
Second, as the workings of the Phillips Curve would 
predict, the same expansionary policies served to heighten 
the inflationary surge in prices that occurred between 1976 
and 1979, but how much of the inflation should be attributed 
to the fiscal and monetary policies of the federal government 
as against external shocks to the economy remains a matter 
of controversy. The clearest instance of the important role of 
aggregate demand policy came in 1978 when the annual rate 
of increase in consumer prices other than for food and 
energy, the so-called basic inflation rate, jumped from 6.4 to 
8.6 percent, a rise of some two percentage points over the 
previous year. Actually, both fiscal and monetary policies 
moved towards restraint during 1978 but it is generally 
agreed that the expansionary moves of the three preceding 
years had their major inflationary impact in the 1978-79 
period. It was during this period that markets for certain ma 
jor types of labor became quite tight and upward pressures 
on wages relative to productivity became more pronounced.
As the foregoing indicates, the hardest argument to 
answer against using demand expansion policies to push the 
unemployment rate below 6 percent, but also the vaguest, is 
that the impact of such policies can be long delayed and that 
their ultimate effects may prove to be cumulative in nature. 
This line of contention is sometimes broadened to suggest 
that, in the face of these policies, the attitudes of workers, 
employers and consumers towards inflation change and the 
entire wage, price and spending level increases as a result. 
Whatever the precise explanation, it is obvious that in view 
of recent experience, policymakers will have to give much 
more weight to longer-run effects of aggregate demand 
changes than previously thought.
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Third, and this sharply modifies the point just noted, the 
inflation which took hold in this country in the course of the 
1970s appeared to develop a life of its own quite unrelated to 
any short term countermoves in aggregate demand policy. 
Whether such countermoves would prove an effective, much 
less an efficient, way to reduce the inflation rate even in the 
longer-run is open to serious question. The weight of opinion 
among investigators is, in fact, it would not. Differences in 
emphasis abound, with some investigators stressing the im 
portance of worker, employer and public expectations about 
the future course of prices while others stress the after effects 
on unit costs and per capita real incomes of past increases in 
prices. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that the in 
flation of the 1970s got built into the economy in a way that, 
short of severely restrictive fiscal and monetary policies 
maintained over several years, could perhaps be slowed but 
certainly not reversed by usual demand management. George 
Perry, for example, in his investigation of the problem, con 
cluded that if unemployment were raised 1 percent above the 
5.5 percent level and if there were no serious external shocks 
to the economy, it would take three years to reduce the infla 
tion rate by one percentage point, and the extra point of 
unemployment would cost over a million jobs and some $60 
billion in real output each year. He concluded:
The evidence is that inflation would slow only 
gradually in response to holding back aggregate de 
mand, and that the cost in lost employment and output 
per point of disinflation would be large. 2
The economic and political difficulties besetting contrac 
tions in aggregate demand as a policy for bringing down the 
inflation rate are widely recognized, but precisely why this is 
so remains a matter of controversy. A key element in this
2. George L Perry, Slowing the Wage-Price Spiral: The Macroeconomic View, Brookmgs 
Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1978), pp. 285-286.
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controversy is whether the American economy has entered a 
long term slowdown in investment, technological im 
provements and labor productivity, or whether the rise in the 
inflation rate is due to shorter term, ad hoc supply-cost in 
fluences such as shifts in the relative size of demographic 
groups or the price actions in 1973 and 1979 by OPEC. In 
any event, the record is clear that during most of the 1970s 
the basic inflation rate was on an upward trend that would 
have continued for a number of years even if aggregate de 
mand policy had been considerably less expansionary. The 
upshot was that any additional inflationary influence at 
tributable to demand policy expansion came on top of an 
already high basic inflationary rate, thereby pulling the 
overall rate up to an unacceptable level. This in turn led to 
increasing pressure to rein in any expansion in aggregate de 
mand well before full employment, as usually defined, was 
attained. As a consequence, the sustained rise in aggregate 
demand that was needed to draw down the major categories 
of structural unemployment was effectively precluded.
Fourth, the previous analysis suggests that since a step-up 
in inflation on top of an already high basic rate of price in 
crease can occur at almost any level of unemployment, the 
effort to identify some minimum noninflationary unemploy 
ment rate becomes largely beside the point. Despite repeated 
efforts to determine what this minimum figure is, compared 
to what it was, say, twenty years ago, the estimates remain 
too imprecise to serve as a guide to fiscal and monetary 
policies. The principal difficulty is that there is no way of 
determining the effect of shifts in labor force participation 
rates, the so-called "interaction" effect. 3
3 According to a review of recent studies of the subject, the interaction effect accounts for 
as much as one-half of the total increase of about 1 percentage point that appears to have 
occurred in the 1976 vs. the 1956 unemployment rate. Joseph Antos, Wesley Mellon, and 
Jack E. Tnplett, "What is a Current Equivalent to Unemployment Rates of the Past," 
Monthly Labor Review, March 1979, p. 39
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Even more important, in an environment like the 1970s, 
the pace of inflation may prove as unacceptably high when 
the unemployment level is 7 percent as when it is 5 percent. If 
the long term trend in inflation holds to 6 percent or more, 
almost any degree of aggregate demand stimulus will be seen 
as inducing serious inflationary pressures even if unemploy 
ment is running well above 6 percent. Supporters of this view 
will doubtless argue, and with considerable justification, 
that it is extremely difficult to determine when cost-push as 
opposed to demand-pull price pressures are the dominant 
factor in determining the pace of inflation. Given this uncer 
tainty it would be only prudent to avoid any sharp upward 
moves in the fiscal and monetary aggregates even though 
labor and product markets remain relatively loose. Indeed it 
follows that policy should aim at decreasing the rate of in 
crease in demand expansion before the point is reached 
where a cost-induced inflation becomes converted into a 
cost-and-demand one.
The case for beginning to taper demand expansion 
relatively early on in cyclical upswings also rests on the fact 
noted earlier that the effects of restrictive demand policies 
are often long-delayed and, more particularly, if the restric 
tions are both too late and too sweeping, the economy can be 
forced into a severe recession. Contrariwise, if total demand 
rises slowly and begins to taper early, the necessity for a 
sharp cutback later becomes less likely.
This approach to demand policy, of course, has to be ap 
plied somewhat flexibly, depending on the type of cyclical 
expansion involved and on the longer term prospects for the 
economy. In line with traditional macr economic analysis, 
the closer the economy approaches its full employment 
potential, the stronger the case becomes for slowing the pace 
of demand expansion. Reliable estimates of the economy's 
short term potential at any given moment of time are admit-
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tedly hazardous, whether expressed in terms of the minimum 
inflation level of unemployment or the gap between actual 
and potential production. At the same time, the implication 
for demand management of a given jump in the annual rate 
of inflation certainly differs if the unemployment level is in 
the 6-7 percent as opposed to the 4-5 percent range.
The other side of this approach to policymaking, however, 
is no less important: demand expansion, while slowing, 
would need to continue at a sufficiently high rate to prevent 
any significant rise in the general unemployment level and, 
even more, to induce a significant reduction in joblessness 
among the structurally unemployed. If demand in later 
phases of an expansion is not maintained close to rates 
prevailing in earlier phases, effective action to reach the 
hard-to-employ is likely to prove abortive, since their job 
status largely depends on the length and strength of a par 
ticular expansion. This could mean using demand stimulus 
to push the overall unemployment rate as low as 5 or even 4 
percent, a policy that would only be defensible if employed 
under special circumstances and with a great deal of care. 
The fact that there is no clearly defined noninflationary 
minimum level of unemployment adds considerably to the 
flexibility of aggregate demand policy but certainly does not 
lessen the need for restraint in such policy as low levels of 
unemployment are approached. As developed in later 
chapters, this is clearly not a sufficient condition for dealing 
with the problem of structural unemployment, but it is a 
necessary one. It underscores, too, the point noted earlier 
that a given rate of inflation calls for very different demand 
management policies if labor markets become extremely 
tight from those called for if they remain relatively loose.
Conclusion
In recent years there has been increasing acceptance of the 
view that government demand management has proven
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singularly ineffective as a means for reducing unemployment 
without causing serious inflation. This view rests on a series 
of assumptions which, to varying degrees, remain largely un- 
proven.
First, it assumes that any significant rise in the rate of in 
flation is attributable to an increase in the level of aggregate 
demand. Careful investigations of inflations, especially 
those of recent origin, do not support this simple type of ex 
planation. Increasing weight, instead, is being given to 
developments on the supply side such as adverse cost trends 
and external shocks to the economy. While aggregate de 
mand is still given a prominent role, exclusive attention to 
this aspect of the inflationary process is now considered 
quite misleading.
Second, it assumes that the continuation of an inflationary 
process, quite aside from its sources of origin, is the result of 
an increase in aggregate demand. Recent investigators, 
however, have shifted the focus of attention to certain long 
term influences such as trends in labor productivity and the 
emergence of institutional arrangements with respect to 
wage-setting which have given inflationary developments a 
life of their own. Again, this serves to break any close link 
between upward or downward shifts in aggregate demand 
and the underlying, largely predetermined rate of inflation. 
To this extent, expansionary aggregate demand policy can be 
given a broader, not a narrower, role in bringing down the 
unemployment rate.
Third, this view assumes that any significant rise in the in 
flation rate has been caused by overstimulative fiscal or 
monetary actions of the federal government. Even if ag 
gregative demand changes are seen as controlling in this 
regard, it does not follow that such changes are solely or 
even primarily the result of federal countercyclical demand 
policies. Other sources of demand influence may be no less
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involved, among them budgetary actions on the part of state 
and local governments, policy moves of private lending in 
stitutions, business decisions with respect to inventory ac 
cumulations and capital projects, household spending deci 
sions and shifts in international financial relationships. 
Whether a particular change in federal fiscal and/or 
monetary policies should be viewed as the crucial variable 
among all the welter of determinants, both public and 
private, bearing on the level of aggregate demand calls for 
careful appraisal of any given situation or period. Unless it is 
argued that the federal government, in failing to take suffi 
cient corrective action, is responsible for every marked in 
crease in the inflation rate, whatever its source, a much more 
guarded explanation is indicated.
Fourth, this view assumes that in undertaking an expan 
sionary demand policy, the federal government's only goal is 
to achieve full employment. While the rhetoric surrounding 
some fiscal and monetary moves lends a certain plausibility 
to this interpretation, other purposes such as a stronger 
defense posture, aid to farmers, slum clearance, an improved 
highway system and protection of small business are in the 
aggregate likely to be of equal or greater importance. The 
fact that a full employment condition, induced by expan 
sionary moves to achieve purposes of the latter sort, may 
have serious inflationary consequences needs to be clearly 
distinguished from a full employment policy in which none 
of these purposes is necessarily involved. Seen in this light, 
the effort to achieve full employment has been widely 
criticized on grounds that are not actually deserved.
The conclusion emerging from this discussion is that ag 
gregate demand policy, if implemented along lines outlined 
earlier, can reduce the unemployment level to at least the 5 
-5.5 percent range without inducing serious inflationary con 
sequences. While not markedly less than the usual estimates
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made by others, the difference is large enough to have im 
portant implications for policies aimed at the problem of 
prosperity unemployment. The reasons for this conclusion 
will be made clear in succeeding chapters.
Chapter 3
Reducing Frictional and 
Seasonal Unemployment
Unemployment not attributable to a general deficiency in 
demand can be divided into structural and frictional types of 
joblessness. Chief attention in terms of policy has quite ap 
propriately centered on the structural elements of unemploy 
ment, but the frictional elements also deserve consideration 
in any analysis of the prosperity unemployment problem.
Even under a condition of full employment in which total 
job openings equal total job seekers, some unemployment 
will exist because the matching of job openings and job 
seekers is not instantaneous. The time it takes for an 
employer and a job applicant to find each other and agree on 
terms entails temporary periods of joblessness which at any 
one time will affect millions of workers, perhaps as many as 
2 or 2.5 percent of the country's labor force. The total size of 
this group of workers apparently does not vary much over 
the cycle, but its composition and character changes sharply 
as the economy moves from low to high levels of activity.
It is generally accepted that labor markets in this country 
do a relatively poor job of matching job seekers and job sup 
pliers. In a number of other countries, notably England, 
Germany and Sweden, the process of allocating workers to 
available job openings is handled with considerably more ef 
ficiency than here. These countries are much smaller than the
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United States, their economies less diverse, their populations 
more homogeneous, and the role of government con 
siderably more important. Whether because of these or other 
factors, workers and employers in these countries are much 
readier to rely on public administered labor exchanges to fill 
new jobs than in the United States.
Particularly in the case of Sweden, a quite comprehensive 
set of policies has emerged over the past thirty years to assist 
unemployed or underemployed workers find openings, 
secure mobility grants, and thus iron out employment be 
tween areas and industries. These selective measures are 
often addressed to both structural and aggregate demand 
types of unemployment, but their main purpose is to reduce 
frictional unemployment.'
In the 1960s, turnover rates in manufacturing (total 
separations per 100 employees) ran 70 percent to 100 percent 
higher in this country than in West Germany, Great Britain 
or Italy. In the boom year of 1973, employment in the 
United States averaged 84 million persons per month, but 
about 100 million persons worked at some time during the 
year. During the same year, unemployment averaged 4 
million persons per month, but more than three times this 
number experienced some unemployment in the year. 2 While 
an inescapable feature of changes in methods of production, 
in the needs and preferences of both workers and employers, 
and in the search times involved in reconciling their 
preferences, this extremely high movement into and out of 
jobs and into and out of the labor force seems both 
economically and socially wasteful. Indeed, if the average 
job search-recruiting period could be cut from four weeks to
1. For an illuminating account of Swedish experience in this regard, see the essay by Rudolf 
Meidner and Rolf Andersson in Manpower Programs in the Policy Mix, Lloyd Ulman, ed. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), Ch. 5.
2 Economic Report of (he President, 1975, pp. 88 and 101.
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two weeks through improved matching procedures, the 
amount of frictional unemployment would be cut in half.
The case for action along these lines is especially strong in 
periods of prosperity when the role of demand deficiency as 
a determinant of unemployment lessens, and the relative im 
portance of the frictional component in whatever unemploy 
ment still obtains necessarily increases. George Perry has 
estimated that, at a national unemployment rate of 6 per 
cent, a prime age male (twenty-five to thirty-four) would 
take an average of 6.6 weeks to find a new job, but an 
average of only 4.3 weeks if the national unemployment rate 
were 3 percent. 3 Since there is little prospect of the national 
unemployment rate even approaching the latter figure in 
peacetime, careful consideration should be given to adopting 
measures deliberately aimed at improving the job search- 
worker recruiting process at higher rates of unemployment.
Characteristics of Frictional Unemployment
As the foregoing suggests, the nature of frictional 
unemployment changes as the national unemployment rate 
varies. At the 2-3 percent level, vacancies approach or even 
exceed the number of job applicants at prevailing wage rates. 
In a dynamic economy where job seeking and worker recruit 
ment are largely a matter of individual choice, imbalances in 
labor markets will still obtain even in these highly favorable 
circumstances, but most such imbalances will be temporary 
and limited. Even if particular workers are involuntarily 
displaced, with a modicum of search effort they will be able 
to find comparably attractive openings; so it is largely a mat 
ter of personal preference which of a variety of openings 
they choose. Employers, on the other hand, will face
3. George L. Perry, Unemployment Flows in the U.S. Labor Market, Brookmgs Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2 (1972) cited in Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, p. 
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somewhat longer search times than in periods of looser 
markets and may have to lower hiring standards accordingly. 
The imbalances occurring under these conditions constitute 
frictional unemployment in its pure form, and, so far as 
public policy is concerned, can be largely left to the deter 
mination of market influences.
Especially in prosperities, much of the mobility is essen 
tial, in both a short-run and long-run sense, to the 
economy's effective performance. One of the striking 
features of the long expansion of the 1960s was the fact that 
the voluntary quit rate in manufacturing rose from 1.3 per 
100 employees in 1960 to 2.7 in 1969 while the layoff rate fell 
from 2.4 to 1.2 over the same period; in the recessionary 
years after 1969 the opposite pattern developed. 4 The limited 
data available indicate that rates of voluntary quits do not 
become very high even in prosperities, but to the extent inter- 
job movements are genuinely voluntary, they play a crucially 
important role in the economy.
As unemployment rates rise above this minimum level, im 
balances are not ironed out so quickly. As soon as the jobless 
rate begins to move up and labor markets loosen, in 
terferences begin to appear in the matching process. The 
resulting unemployment can still be appropriately classified 
as frictional as long as the number of vacancies and job ap 
plicants remain, on an overall basis, roughly equal, but the 
matching task now becomes subject to a variety of tem 
porary and minor impediments. The need arises for fuller 
and more extensive information on job openings, for longer 
commuting trips to places of employment, and for rather 
different combinations of skills on the part of job ap-
4. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings, Vol. 11 (June 1965), Table D-1, 
p. 55, and Vol. 22 (May 1976, Table D-1, p. 109, cited in Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R 
Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations, 8th ed., (Homewood, IL- Richard D. Irwm, 
1977), p. 243.
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plicants. It is not possible to determine exactly when such in 
terferences no longer are frictional and become structural in 
nature, but as long as they are readily removable they can 
still be treated as falling in the former category.
A chief factor explaining why it is so difficult to bring 
down the frictional unemployment rate relates to the nature 
of the search-recruitment process itself. Job matching in 
labor markets is often a complicated, highly personalized 
procedure affected by a variety of conditions, requirements, 
prospects and individual worker-employer preferences. This 
is reflected in the diverse, often individualized, ways 
employers and job seekers "find" each other. A survey of 20 
middle-sized cities during the last six months of 1974 found 
that 80 percent of all job finders applied directly to 
employers, while 70 percent spoke to friends and relatives 
and 60 percent consulted with business associates. The 
Employment Service, on the other hand, was consulted by 
only 28 percent of all job finders. 5 The very variety of 
methods characteristic of labor markets in this country 
would make it extremely difficult to achieve much more 
orderly patterns of job search even under the most pros 
perous conditions.
A principal theme of recent investigations of frictional 
unemployment is that this type of unemployment is marked 
by a continually changing composition of workers who 
either have recently been employed or have just come into 
the labor force. The flow of workers into and out of employ 
ment of this nature gives rise to, and is the product of, a two- 
sided search process which incurs important costs for both 
the job seeker and the hiring firm but which provides impor 
tant mutual benefits as well. The principal question facing
5 U.S. Department of Labor, Recruitment, Job Search, and the United States Employ 
ment Service, R & D Monograph 43 (1976), pp. 1-57. A job finder typically used more than 
one method of search.
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the job seeker is whether the gain that may derive from a 
longer and wider search will more than outweigh the lost 
earnings, travel expenses and other costs involved. Similar 
considerations having to do with costs of recruitment, 
screening and placement versus the expected productive 
value of the individual who is finally hired apply to the 
employer's search.
Viewed in this light, unemployment of a frictional nature 
is a valuable, indeed necessary, component of labor market 
activity. Since, according to this view, a major part of the 
unemployment experienced in periods of prosperity is of this 
nature, the concern of public policymakers in such periods 
should, it is argued, be limited to making the search process 
as effective and efficient as the added costs entailed would 
justify: more complete data on job opportunities and job ap 
plicants; readily accessible facilities for bringing "buyers and 
sellers" together; and fuller information on other possible 
openings and applicants as well as on less immediate con 
siderations such as commuting costs, industry prospects and 
labor supply trends.
It follows from this view, too, that most unemployment in 
periods of prosperity is a matter of personal choice on the 
part of the workers and employers involved: job applicants 
who cannot find suitable work in an acceptably short time 
will either have to cut back their asking wage or remain out 
of work; employers who cannot find suitable workers in an 
acceptably short time will either have to raise their wage of 
fers or not secure the additional workers they desire. Since 
job vacancies tend to rise in prosperous periods relative to 
unemployed workers and job applicants, it follows that the 
search process will on average entail less time in such periods 
than when business conditions are generally slack.
While providing important insights into labor market 
behavior and the nature of unemployment, this view has led
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to few if any useful recommendations for public 
policymakers. In the first place, the data reveal a marked dif 
ference between workers with limited skill, education and 
job experience as against those with more of these attributes. 
For the former, a pattern of frequent job changes, punc 
tuated by periods of unemployment or withdrawal from the 
labor force, is much more typical than for the latter. In his 
study of the relatively prosperous 1972 economy when 
unemployment averaged only 5 percent, George Perry found 
that teenagers of either sex experienced an average of nearly 
two jobless spells a year as against men over 45 who had an 
average of only one spell every four to five years. Between 
these two extremes the frequency of unemployment spells 
declined steadily as the age of workers of either sex increas 
ed, but the average duration of such spells varied in the op 
posite direction. 6
It could be argued that a worker experiencing such fre 
quent spells of joblessness is following a perfectly rational 
procedure: sampling different jobs until the best available 
opening is found, a condition that is most likely to obtain 
when business activity is at a high level. This doubtless ap 
plies to considerable numbers of teenagers. A roughly 
similar line of argument appears to hold good for employed 
women since they move into and out of the labor force more 
frequently than men and labor force entry and re-entry in 
volves a high probability of becoming unemployed. 7
On the other hand, such rapid movements into and out of 
unemployment may well be involuntary in the sense that the 
workers are subject to insurmountable barriers which limit 
them to some one, low-level type of work. In such instances,
6. Perry, Unemployment Flows in the Labor Market, p. 260.
7. S.T Marston, Employment Instability and High Unemployment Rates, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1976), pp 170-178 His data cover the relatively pros 
perous years from 1967 to 1973.
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job turnover entails little or no cost either to the workers or 
employers involved since in market terms the jobs, work en 
vironments and workers themselves tend to be almost com 
pletely homogeneous at the very lowest skill levels. Abnor 
mally high rates of job turnover of this sort, therefore, are 
likely to reflect structural limitations surrounding the job 
search process rather than frictional elements as normally 
defined.
Quite aside from these considerations, serious question 
has recently been raised about the importance of frictional 
unemployment in relation to total unemployment. Earlier in 
vestigations had suggested that much of the latter consisted 
of persons suffering relatively frequent but brief spells of 
joblessness. A recent study by Kim B. Clark and Lawrence 
H. Summers, however, revealed that in 1974, when the 
overall unemployment rate was relatively low, only 36 per 
cent of unemployment was attributable to persons finding a 
job within three months. Indeed, when account is taken of 
movements into and out of the labor force, these in 
vestigators concluded that the average person unemployed at 
a point in time in this kind of economic environment will ex 
perience almost six months of joblessness during a year. 
Finally, they concluded that, rather than being widely 
dispersed among the population, unemployment is highly 
concentrated, with over half of all joblessness traceable to 
persons out of work for more than six months in a year. 
Thus, the concentration of joblessness is far greater than 
would be expected from normal turnover; according to the 
Clark-Summers study, the latter "accounts for at most 1.5 
points or about 25 percent of unemployment at high employ 
ment levels." 8 Based on a detailed review of the evidence, 
they concluded that if the counting of the unemployed were
8 Kim B Clark and Lawrence H. Summers, Labor Market Dynamics and Unemployment: 
A Reconsideration, Brookmgs Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1979), pp 16-17. The term 
"high employment" refers to an unemployment rate of 6 percent
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limited to all those persons with less than five weeks of 
unemployment during the year, the measured unemployment 
rate would fall only from 6 percent to 5.75 percent, but if the 
counting were limited to those with six months or more 
unemployment, the jobless rate would fall from 6 percent to 
3.5 percent. 9
This finding is admittedly somewhat altered, however, 
when the evidence is put into a cyclical as opposed to a non- 
cyclical context. Thus, in 1969 when the overall unemploy 
ment rate was only 3.5 percent, unemployment per person 
averaged a little over 12 weeks per unemployed person as 
against nearly 19 weeks in 1975 when overall unemployment 
was 8.5 percent. Similarly, the proportion of the labor force 
unemployed for only one to four weeks stood at approx 
imately 3.5 percent in both 1969 and 1975 but the proportion 
unemployed 15 weeks or more came to only 2 percent in 1969 
as against 9.1 percent in 1975. Not surprisingly, the data for 
1974, when unemployment was 5.6 percent, fell roughly mid 
way between the 1969 and 1975 patterns. 10
Much of the controversy over the distinction between 
voluntary, short term and involuntary, long term unemploy 
ment turns on where the minimum non-inflationary rate of 
unemployment proves to be; if the minimum level, for exam 
ple, turns out to be as low as 5 percent, the part played by 
voluntary unemployment resulting from interjob movement 
would account for a much larger proportion of total 
unemployment than if the level turns out to be as high as 6 
percent. As indicated in the preceding chapter, the relative 
importance of voluntary unemployment in the frictional, job 
search sense, as opposed to involuntary unemployment due 
to limited aggregate demand and/or structural barriers, can
9 Ibid , p. 72
10. Ibid., Table 4, p. 36
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be significantly affected by small changes in the non- 
inflationary minimum unemployment level.
Since it is highly probable that the minimum sustainable 
unemployment rate will remain above 5 percent for the 
foreseeable future, it follows that public policy should 
primarily be aimed at reducing the barriers which result in in 
voluntary unemployment among particular demographic 
groups. This does not mean that efforts to improve the short 
term allocation performance of labor markets should not 
continue but that the major thrust of policy should be 
directed towards the elimination of more permanent and 
fundamental barriers to employment over which severely 
disadvantaged job seekers have no control.
Regarding the latter objective, the characteristics of an ef 
ficiently functioning system of labor markets open access 
to job opportunities, active bidding by both buyers and 
sellers, shifts in demand and supplies in response to changes 
in market conditions and the other features of a fully com 
petitive environment provide a sound framework for 
public policymaking. Indeed, the principal guide to such 
policy might well be to make it possible for those members of 
disadvantaged groups who are now largely excluded from 
most of the established labor markets to become active par 
ticipants in them. The salient feature of such markets, 
especially in periods of general prosperity, is a widening of 
opportunities for upward mobility on the part of workers, 
whether employed, unemployed or outside the labor force, 
who have the qualifications, incentive and initiative to take 
advantage of them. In periods of sluggish business when ap 
plicants are running ahead of vacancies, programs designed 
to help workers meet these requirements are likely to face 
almost insurmountable difficulties; it is in periods of sustain 
ed expansion, as already indicated, that such programs have 
the greatest chance of success and should be pressed most
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vigorously. While higher skill levels would be involved, prin 
cipal attention would need to center in these circumstances 
on helping workers overcome barriers to first-level, relatively 
unskilled jobs which are likely to lead to stable, long term 
careers.
Policy measures aimed at promoting the upward, or in 
deed lateral, mobility of disadvantaged groups would need 
to be closely integrated with general programs designed to 
promote the more efficient allocation of labor, on the one 
hand, and specific programs to help disadvantaged workers 
overcome structural barriers to employment on the other. 
This twofold aspect of the work of the Employment Service 
and other agencies seeking to improve the performance of 
labor markets is examined in the next section of this report.
Role of the Employment Service
Most discussions of efforts to improve job allocation pro 
cedures in this country center on the limitations of the 
federal-state Employment Service (ES) and how it might be 
strengthened. Many of the problems besetting the Service 
can be traced to the fact that, while funding is provided by 
the federal government, day to day administration rests with 
the states subject only to general federal guidelines.
Historical reviews of ES emphasize that, since its 
establishment in 1933, it has been subjected to a bewildering 
series of policy mandates ranging from helping employers 
find qualified workers, to providing manpower information 
and services to a broad spectrum of workers, to providing a 
still wider range of services to the lowest qualified category 
of workers. These changing goals have been superimposed 
on its responsibility, established in the 1930s, to administer 
the work test for unemployment insurance claimants. Given 
these changing, and to a considerable extent overlapping, 
mandates it would be surprising if it could be shown that ES
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has had any observable effect on the level of unemployment, 
the one policy goal under consideration here. There are cer 
tain functions of ES, however, which clearly bear on this 
goal, especially in periods of prosperity, so the question of 
whether these functions might be strengthened deserves at 
tention.
The relevant ES activities are (1) providing workers and 
employers with basic current information on job openings 
and job applicants, (2) assisting workers in choosing careers 
and implementing career plans, (3) referring workers to job 
and training opportunities in the public sector pursuant to 
the WIN welfare and other government programs, (4) serv 
ing as a link between schools and other community institu 
tions on the one hand, and job and training opportunities on 
the other. Besides the obvious difficulty that in many states 
and localities ES has not been given adequate funds and per 
sonnel to carry out these and other responsibilities effective 
ly, are there other steps that could be taken to make ES more 
effective in lessening frictional unemployment?
The central problem facing ES is that it has not been able 
to win wide acceptance among company recruiters and job 
applicants, a result that can be attributed chiefly to the fact 
that it has become so closely identified with the handling of 
unemployment insurance claims and with the placement of 
unemployed, lower skilled workers in entry-level jobs. 
Ironically, by concentrating so much of its attention on 
unemployed and unemployment-prone workers, ES has 
tended to undercut its capacity to deal effectively with the 
more general jobless problem. Under present circumstances, 
recruiters looking for applicants for higher level jobs largely 
rely on other avenues of search. Especially in periods of 
prosperity, the rate of decrease in unemployment largely 
depends on how rapidly and how extensively job vacancies at 
these better levels are filled. As noted earlier, the effec 
tiveness of public policy in reducing frictional unemploy-
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ment under these circumstances largely depends on whether 
upward mobility can be extended to workers hitherto exclud 
ed from entering stable, career-related jobs. If the ES is to 
play an effective role in dealing with the kind of unemploy 
ment that persists into expansions, it will need to focus in 
creased attention on this aspect of labor market activity.
Recent developments give little grounds for optimism on 
this score. The rapid rise in ES job placements from under 2 
million in fiscal year 1971 to over 3 million in fiscal 1974 was 
interrupted in the 1974-75 recession, resuming, but at an ap 
parently lower rate, during the subsequent expansion. In 
upswing periods, as noted in the 1977 Employment and 
Training Report, "ES job applicants are more likely to be 
young, inexperienced, economically disadvantaged, or older 
workers categories that are hard to place." 11 Under the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 
passed in December 1973, chief responsibility for administer 
ing training and related services was delegated to local and 
state governments. Not surprisingly, the latter are relying ex 
tensively on the ES offices to secure jobs for disadvantaged 
workers. Specifically, this has meant that ES is heavily in 
volved in referring workers under various recently authoriz 
ed public employment programs, the same role it was earlier 
assigned under the WIN program. The work requirement 
emphasis in the recently proposed welfare reform legislation, 
if enacted, will have a similar impact on the activity of ES. 
Important as these responsibilities are, they clearly do not 
lead to greater ES acceptance by recruiters and applicants 
concerned with better quality jobs and personnel.
The conflict between the needs of the lowest and highest 
(or lower and higher) qualified job applicants will probably 
never be wholly resolved for the ES, at least given its present
11. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977 (Washington Government 
Printing Office, 1978), p 75
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limited resources. If it is required to assume both roles, as 
now seems likely, every effort should be made by ES to 
distinguish applicants at all levels the least as well as the 
most experienced and/or qualified and to handle referrals 
accordingly. Employment Service offices try to do this now, 
even with respect to applicants within the least-skilled 
category, but few if any have the staff resources to carry out 
this function effectively. If it is assigned still broader respon 
sibilities with respect to the lowest skilled category of job 
seekers without corresponding additions to its resources, 
general acceptance of the ES by employers and higher skilled 
workers will inevitably lessen still more.
Job Banks
The principal approach adopted by ES for dealing with 
this dilemma is to develop computerized job bank systems in 
major localities, an effort that was launched in Baltimore in 
1968. Under these systems, job orders submitted to ES are 
accumulated daily and published in a job-bank book the next 
day, thus making information on reported openings current 
ly available on a wide basis. In the early 1970s steps were 
taken to develop a nationwide job-bank network and, what 
is much more ambitious, to establish computerized job 
matching systems which would match up the characteristics 
of workers and the requirements of jobs; implementation of 
the latter program, however, has thus far been confined to 
only a few states.
By computerizing job information in this way, ES hopes 
most job seekers will be able to find suitable openings on 
their own, permitting its staff to concentrate more attention 
on difficult individual cases. The danger is that, instead of 
insuring that employers will find better qualified applicants 
coming from ES as a result of this systems approach, they 
will find just the opposite. Much of course depends on how
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far ES can go in developing adequate counseling and other 
individualized methods for dealing with the needs of dif 
ferent job seekers. In good part, the outcome will depend on 
whether ES can develop tighter evaluation criteria for mak 
ing referrals or whether it continues to place major emphasis 
on sheer numbers of placements.
Even if ES achieves marked progress along these lines in 
matching up job seekers and company recruiters, the barriers 
to steady employment confronting many disadvantaged 
workers would remain largely untouched. To get at this 
underlying issue more far-reaching measures than merely 
facilitating the employment matching process will be needed, 
measures which ES is generally precluded from undertaking. 
There is one crucial function in this connection, however, 
which is largely disregarded and which ES is in a better posi 
tion to perform than any other agency: identifying 
unemployed and otherwise severely disadvantaged workers 
in need of individual counseling and personalized support 
who should be referred to special training or other types of 
programs and whose subsequent progress should be followed 
on a continuing basis. Responsibility for this coordinating- 
referral-follow up function is loosely handled or overlooked 
altogether under present circumstances. ES has taken limited 
steps in this direction in some localities; in other instances, 
other agencies have made a few efforts in this direction. 
Broadly speaking, however, this vitally important function 
has received little attention.
An individualized program of this sort would necessarily 
be limited to a relatively small number of workers. At first at 
least, careful procedures would be needed to determine who 
should be admitted to this special program, how relation 
ships with cooperating agencies could best be implemented, 
and what methods of evaluation should be applied. The 
focus would presumably be on those workers, mostly young, 
inexperienced or with a modicum of skills, who are most
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likely to be lost sight of as they move between home, school, 
training center or other public agency, and temporary or per 
manent jobs. Because of the formidable difficulties confron 
ting any program of this sort, strict limits would have to be 
set on the number of participants, particularly since its main 
objective would be to help disadvantaged workers secure not 
just any type of employment but rather jobs with definite 
career potential.
Commuting and Relocation Subsidies
One of the proposals that is frequently suggested for 
reducing frictional unemployment is to make it possible for 
displaced or other unemployed workers to commute greater 
distances or relocate in other communities where job open 
ings are available. This is an important feature of employ 
ment policies in a number of European countries, most 
notably Sweden. Little, however, has been done along these 
lines in the United States.
Insofar as local commuting systems are concerned, the 
reason for this lack of attention is apparent. Adequate com 
muting facilities for jobless workers is but one aspect of a 
given community's transportation needs. It would be a most 
unusual circumstance where a major addition or change in a 
local transportation system could be justified on the needs of 
such workers alone. Special situations of this sort might well 
be allowed for, nonetheless. A community which could 
demonstrate that changes in its transportation facilities 
would significantly broaden job opportunities for an impor 
tant group of disadvantaged workers should be able to apply 
for special federal funding; similar provision could be made 
for special situations where commuting fares would be sub 
sidized in the interest of broader access to particular job 
markets. Such efforts, however, could only be undertaken 
on an individual, locality-by-locality basis.
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A more practical approach, which has only been tried on a 
limited basis in this country, is to help jobless or 
underemployed workers through job information, resettle 
ment assistance, and training find positions in other 
localities. Such efforts as have been made along these lines, 
unfortunately, have proven rather disappointing. The initial 
emphasis in the 1960s was on bringing new capital and ser 
vices to high unemployment areas; thus, the focus of the 
Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 was 
on extending public works grants (highways, schools, health 
facilities and the like) to low-income communities and on 
giving employers financial inducements to move into such 
depressed areas. Effective implementation of this program 
was undercut by several factors, the chief one being that 
pressures to spread available funds widely in order to include 
localities other than low-income areas proved too strong.
Because of the difficulties encountered, the focus soon 
shifted to providing job opportunities in nearby growth 
centers and helping stranded workers find jobs in such 
centers through job information, resettlement assistance, 
and training. As matters turned out, funds available to the 
Economic Development Administration were far from ade 
quate in many areas; most of the cities selected were below 
200,000 in population, the minimum considered necessary 
for self-sustaining growth; other nearby cities which showed 
more growth potential had to be excluded; and funds ex 
pended on brick and mortar could probably have been better 
devoted to training, health care and the like. 12 Admittedly, 
experience has been largely limited to relocation efforts in 
rural localities, most notably some 60 pilot mobility 
assistance projects authorized by the Manpower Develop-
12. Miles Hansen, "Growth Centers, Human Resources and Rural Development" (Univer 
sity of Texas, Rural Labor Market Strategies Project, 1971), cited in Sar A. Levitan, Garth 
L. Mangum, and Ray Marshall, Human Resources and Labor Markets (New York Harper 
and Row, 1972), p. 538.
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ment and Training Act between 1965 and 1969 to help 
relocate more than 14,000 unemployed or underemployed 
workers and their families, chiefly from depressed rural 
areas and small towns.
Despite two recommendations to the contrary by the 
Department of Labor, Congress did not appropriate any 
separate funds for these projects after 1969, but several were 
carried forward with regular MDTA experimental and 
demonstration funds. The main aim of the projects was to 
help jobless, chiefly disadvantaged, workers in labor surplus 
areas overcome geographical distance barriers in finding 
work in strong job markets. The cost averaged about $800 
per family, including about $300 for moving and settling in. 
While no systematic cost-benefit analysis has been under 
taken, the cost level appears to be "relatively low compared 
with the possible cost to society of maintaining people in an 
unproductive situation." 13
If relocation assistance grants were to be made widely 
available, a number of serious hurdles would have to be 
overcome. Care would have to be taken that jobs are 
available in the destination locations that would be in line 
with the abilities and needs of the relocatees. Workers 
recruited for the program should not be at such high skill 
and experience levels that relocation aid would be un 
necessary nor at such low levels that the aid could not 
possibly lead to permanent moves. Provision would have to 
be made for a variety of supportive services, especially in the 
case of severely disadvantaged workers, including help in ob 
taining housing, arranging for transportation to worksites, 
securing health care and accommodating to wholly new com 
munity environments. Close links would have to be worked 
out between the implementing organizations (presumably the 
Employment Service offices) at both ends of the moves and
13. Manpower Report of the President, 1971, p. 137.
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among the relevant manpower and community service bodies 
at the receiving end. The active cooperation of the hiring 
firms would of course be essential. 14 Any serious effort to 
use relocation grants as an important means for dealing with 
hard core unemployment in inner cities, as opposed to rural 
areas, would face even more formidable difficulties.
Despite the limited success of previous efforts in this direc 
tion and the complications besetting them, a resumption of a 
program of mobility aids deserves serious consideration. 
Carefully drawn criteria, plus continuous and careful 
monitoring along the lines indicated above would be essen 
tial. This approach, being highly selective, could not be ex 
pected to effect any marked improvement in job matching 
processes in labor markets generally. Its importance would 
increase, however, as job vacancies rose and instances of 
labor market supply tightness multiplied. While a program 
of mobility grants could probably never be a major answer 
to prosperity unemployment, it deserves a place in any 
serious attack on the problem.
The Carter Administration recently proposed a return to 
the approach undertaken in the early 1960s under which 
federal aid would be made available to localities in the for 
mat of investment tax credits and business credit supports, 
but this time the distribution of the funds would be limited to 
"distressed communities" or pockets within such com 
munities alone. It is estimated that only about a third of the 
nation's communities would be eligible for help under this 
proposal but this would include most of the country's largest 
cities. That Congress will go along with the effort to limit the 
program in this way seems doubtful. 15
14. Ibid , p 138; see also Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall, Human Resources and Labor 
Markets, pp. 539-547.
15 New York Times, May 25, 1978
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Seasonal Unemployment
A number of important industries are subject to seasonal 
fluctuations in employment due to intrayear shifts in either 
supply or demand. The annual rise and fall in the teenage 
population entering and leaving the labor force with the clos 
ing and opening of schools is the principal seasonal influence 
operating on the side of labor supply. Changes in climatic 
conditions account for most of the seasonal instability in 
agriculture and construction. Other industries such as 
automobiles and clothing are affected by seasonal changes in 
demand which in turn result from custom, habit or style fac 
tors. While there is some indication that the seasonal element 
in unemployment in a number of industries has lessened 
somewhat since World War II, it still accounts for an impor 
tant segment of the nation's jobless. Indeed, because of the 
seasonal supply pattern of young job seekers, the overall im 
portance of seasonal unemployment has probably increased 
since World War II.
Calculations of the seasonal factor in unemployment are 
necessarily rough. With respect to the peak prosperity year 
of 1969, R.A. Gordon has estimated that seasonal 
joblessness accounted for about one-fifth of the nation's 
total unemployment or about 0.7 of that year's overall rate 
of 3.5 percent. 16 Using data on layoffs in manufacturing be 
tween 1958 and 1969, the only sector for which data are 
available, Daniel Hamermesh found that the seasonal factor 
accounted for about 31 percent of the total variation in 
layoffs or roughly .62 percentage points of an unemploy 
ment rate of 4 percent. 17 When the national unemployment
16 Lloyd Ulman, ed., Manpower Programs in the Policy Mix, essay by R A. Gordon, p. 
25 The estimate was based on a method previously developed by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.
17. Daniel S. Hamermesh, Jobless Pay and the Economy (Baltimore. Johns Hopkms 
University Press, 1977), p 71.
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rate is higher, the relative importance of seasonal unemploy 
ment would be less, although the absolute amount of 
seasonal joblessness would be somewhat greater than these' 
estimates would indicate.
Any private or public effort to reduce seasonal unemploy 
ment would have to come to grips with the fact that the 
sources of this type of employment instability are diverse and 
are the by-product of long-standing conditions and prac 
tices. The seasonality factor in major branches of retail 
trade, automobile manufacture, clothing and the like have 
become imbedded in traditional patterns of the production 
and distribution system. Hiring practices in the longshoring 
industry based on the daily shape-up and reliance on casual 
labor, for example, contributed to the high degree of 
seasonability of employment in this field; it took many years 
of union pressure before recruitment was decasualized and 
employment in longshoring became stable. The problems 
besetting such stabilizing efforts are well illustrated in con 
struction, a field long plagued by seasonal unemployment.
While weather conditions are the principal element bear 
ing on the seasonality of construction employment and 
unemployment, other influences such as annual "moving 
days" and the presence of many small, weak firms incapable 
of using advanced building methods, are also important. The 
custom of fixed leasing dates and the practice of letting con 
tracts in the spring have also been cited in this connection. 18 
The technology and administrative skills are available to 
reduce seasonality in employment in the industry, as World 
War II experience made clear, but short of extreme shortage 
conditions, the higher costs of winter operations and the like 
pose serious barriers to improvement. In a careful study of
18. William Haber and Harold M Levmson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the 
Building Trades (Ann Arbor, MI: Bureau of Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 
1956), Ch 4.
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the industry, Daniel Mills emphasized the importance of job 
opportunities for construction workers in other industries 
during the winter months, as well as in the construction in 
dustry itself; he concluded that reductions in seasonality oc 
cur when construction demand is high and labor supply con 
ditions generally are tight, a largely unintended outcome 
resulting from peak season shortages and delays. 19
Any serious effort to reduce seasonality in construction by 
increasing the level of work done in winter months would re 
quire changes in collective bargaining agreements, contrac 
tor practices and architects' specifications, as well as in con 
tract enforcement activities on the part of the unions and, in 
the case of public works, on the part of the government. 
Mills argues that the most promising approach is for public 
owners to require, except in unusual cases, that work pro 
ceed through the winter months and to adopt appropriate 
specifications for temporary heating, lighting, and 
enclosure. A similar effort, after being reconciled with col 
lective bargaining agreements, could be made in the private 
sector so that the requirements and specifications for winter 
work would be included in bid documents. 20
The example of construction makes clear why attempts to 
reduce seasonal unemployment have yielded such meager 
results. While an aspect of frictional unemployment, the 
sources of seasonal joblessness differ from industry to in 
dustry and any serious effort to limit this type of unemploy 
ment would require collaborative effort by the particular 
employers, unions and public bodies involved. No overall 
national program which attempted to cover all major in 
dustries would seem feasible. Where conditions in particular 
industries give promise of success, efforts to reduce seasonal
19. Daniel O. Mills, Industrial Relations and Manpower in Construction (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1972), p. 129.
20. Ibid., pp. 129-132.
Frictional & Seasonal Unemployment 51
unemployment would of course deserve public support, but 
it would not be appropriate to make such efforts a major 
focus of policy action with respect to the problem of persis 
tent unemployment.
Conclusion
With certain reservations, the policy conclusion reached 
about seasonal unemployment can be applied to frictional 
unemployment generally. In part, this is due to the highly in 
dividualized and varied nature of this type of unemploy 
ment; in part, to the voluntary, "bettering myself" element 
that is frequently involved; in part to the influence of deep- 
seated characteristics of labor markets which frequently lie 
behind the more pathological patterns of frictional 
unemployment.
This is not to deny that certain measures could be taken to 
improve the matching process in job markets in this country, 
measures such as stronger support for the Employment Ser 
vice, more detailed, individualized information on job open 
ings and job applicants, better counseling and coordination 
of efforts to help disadvantaged workers quality for career- 
oriented jobs, and expansion of programs to provide mobili 
ty assistance grants. These, however, are not policies which 
would get at the essential characteristics and underlying con 
ditions of persistent unemployment outlined in the opening 
chapter. Much of frictional unemployment, especially in its 
more pathological forms, is an outgrowth of what are actual 
ly structural barriers to employment, and it is the elimination 





Structural unemployment, the principal subject of this 
study, has been the source of much controversy partly 
because it defies clear-cut categorization. Indeed, some 
highly respected economists question the validity of the con 
cept altogether, viewing all unemployment that is not the 
result of a deficiency in aggregate demand as falling in the 
frictional category.
Unemployment can be said to be structural in nature if ag 
gregate demand is high enough to provide jobs at prevailing 
wages for everyone seeking work but job openings remain 
unfilled because of a persistent mismatching of skills or 
geographical locations. If the mismatching is resolved volun 
tarily through mutual search by workers and employers in a 
reasonably short period of time, say eight or ten weeks, the 
resulting unemployment falls in the frictional category. The 
unemployment becomes structural, however, if the mis 
matching cannot be resolved by such voluntary action and 
the job seekers are required to develop new skills or change 
their place of residence but are effectively precluded from 
doing so. In the former instance the workers choose to re 
main unemployed because of the likelihood, hopefully, of 
finding suitable work, while in the latter their unemployment 
is involuntary in the sense that they cannot overcome the 
barriers that bar them from such work.
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The traditional view is that any unemployment resulting 
from mismatching within a given labor market, assuming an 
adequate level of aggregate demand, would be frictional in 
nature whereas it would be structural if the mismatching 
were between markets. While a useful distinction, it should 
be kept in mind that even within a given market, in 
terferences and barriers having to do with lack of requisite 
skills, personal attributes, restrictive practices or even inade 
quate commuting facilities, may result in structural im 
balances between buyers and sellers. The main point, 
however, is that even though job seekers may only be subject 
to frictional unemployment within a given market, they may 
be faced with structural unemployment between markets. 
While obviously not always precise, the distinction can be a 
crucially important one, particularly in the case of workers 
in the lowest skill, poorest paid occupations. Movement be 
tween jobs requiring little education, specialized training and 
prior work experience in a particular locality may only entail 
frictional unemployment in this sense, but if the workers are 
effectively confined to this relatively narrow, lowest skill 
type of work by reasons of barriers they have little or no 
hope of overcoming, structural unemployment, or more ac 
curately, structural misallocation of employment, is present 
between markets. It is structural barriers resulting in 
misallocations of this sort which are of central importance to 
dealing with the problem of prosperity unemployment.
The unemployed inner city teenager who lacks basic 
educational skills and any meaningful work experience, or 
the one-time textile worker who has been left stranded in a 
New England town, are prototypes of this type of 
joblessness. But what of the Grade-A Machinist who cannot 
find work at his customary level but would do so if he were 
willing to accept a Grade-B classification or move to a dis 
tant city? Presumably the answer would turn on whether the 
barrier is surmountable by action of the individual involved,
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but this often involves a qualitative judgment. If oppor 
tunities are present to choose among a roughly homogeneous 
cluster of jobs, or to acquire the necessary qualifying skills 
and experience to do so within a feasible period of time, no 
structural component is involved; a structural component is 
only present when the means for making such choices, while 
perhaps available to some, are not available to others.
The clearest examples, of course, are those in which the 
two groups of job seekers are indistinguishable from one 
another except for some characteristic unrelated to actual 
job performance (color, sex, religion), but the exclusion can 
be basically structural even though performance-related dif 
ferences are present if the means for overcoming or bypass 
ing such differences are not available. Indeed, the principal 
feature of structural unemployment is not that certain 
workers are blocked from job opportunities within a 
specialized field of competence or limited geographical area 
but that they are effectively precluded from taking the 
necessary steps to gain access to a somewhat broader field or 
market area. While difficult to identify, this distinction is 
crucial to an understanding of structural unemployment.
A related source of ambiguity grows out of cost and pro 
ductivity considerations. If particular workers are excluded 
from certain jobs even though cost and productivity com 
parisons are in their favor, a structural imbalance would 
seem evident. What if, however, the cost comparisons are 
unclear, or the excluded workers can be brought up to the 
productivity norm only after expensive training outlays are 
made, or the adverse cost comparisons are due to the at 
titudes of fellow workers, to considerations of plant morale, 
or other such semiobjective factors? In these circumstances, 
the important test is whether the excluded workers are given 
meaningful opportunities to prove their immediate and/or 
potential worth. If restrictive or screening procedures are
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adopted which, in effect, preclude certain workers from 
showing what they are capable of doing, a structural im 
balance is involved since concrete evidence of their relatively 
poor performance or limited potential is lacking.
Even if there is such evidence, further questions need to be 
asked as to whether the resulting comparisons are themselves 
the product of basic structural barriers of one kind or 
another. From the viewpoint of the individual employer, the 
inferior-superior performance test may well be decisive 
unless offset by public subsidies, tax credits, and the like, but 
from the viewpoint of society, the issue of why this outcome 
occurred, and whether the personal or social benefits which 
would be derived from resolving the problem would 
outweigh the costs of doing so, still needs to be faced. Much 
would depend on the nature of the underlying im 
balance the deeper and more pervasive it is, the less likely 
corrective action would yield benefits in excess of costs. On 
the other hand, much would also depend on whether the 
society placed a high or low priority on the benefits sought (a 
problematic value judgment) and on whether the proposed 
corrective action would "work" (a problematic cost-benefit 
calculation). The difficulties posed by considerations of this 
sort need no underscoring.
Finally, while the unemployment resulting from structural 
imbalances is involuntary in nature, confusion often still 
arises as to where and how the line between voluntary and in 
voluntary unemployment should be drawn. One variation of 
the traditional or classical view is that the major cause of a 
continuing imbalance in a given labor market is simply that 
the wage rate is being held above the equilibrium level and 
that if suppliers were willing to reduce their wage offers, or 
were forced by competition or other influences to do so, the 
imbalance would be removed. This variation marks an im 
portant departure from the more general traditional view,
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noted at the outset of this chapter, that all unemployment is 
the result either of inadequate aggregate demand or fric- 
tional influences, a view that rests on the assumption that 
labor markets, and indeed all markets, function under condi 
tions of perfect competition; if it is assumed that non- 
competitive conditions, whether imposed by workers, 
employers or government, are present, limiting unemploy 
ment to these two categories becomes quite unrealistic for no 
other reason than that the element of voluntary choice on the 
part of job seekers is not likely to be present.
Without attempting to settle this highly abstruse point 
here, it is clear that wage distortion can be a serious impedi 
ment to achieving a balanced condition in particular labor 
markets. In fact, from the viewpoint of those workers for 
tunate enough to keep their jobs, high, rigid wage rates can 
serve as an exclusionary device to prevent competitive bid 
ding for any available openings by other workers, thereby 
perpetuating the favorable rates of pay. Whether this is a 
major source of structural unemployment is an issue taken 
up in the next chapter; the point emphasized here is that 
wage rates and related cost elements can be held at levels 
which, consciously or unconsciously, exclude certain 
workers from effectively bidding for jobs in just the same 
way as would outright bars to employment.
The other point deserving emphasis is that even though 
wage-distortion unemployment may in some sense be con 
sidered voluntarily induced, this is only likely to hold for 
very narrowly defined labor markets. Within such markets, 
as noted earlier, rapid turnover and frequent spells of 
unemployment can properly be viewed as voluntary, i.e., 
frictional, in nature. Between related markets or sub- 
markets, however, the barriers to mobility are much less like 
ly to be, in any meaningful sense, voluntarily maintained. If 
wage barriers are present, they are apt to be but external
58 Structural Unemployment
aspects of other types of market interferences, and it is only 
in this broader context that the relationships between wage 
costs and structural unemployment can be fully understood.
If effective steps are to be taken for dealing with this 
aspect of the prosperity unemployment problem, it is essen 
tial that the individuals involved be carefully identified so 
that their needs and abilities can be made clear. Given the 
complexities just described, however, it is hardly surprising 
that there is considerable confusion on this score. For one 
thing estimates of the extent of structural unemployment 
vary considerably depending on where the nonacceleration 
inflation level of unemployment is assumed to fall. Accord 
ing to Lloyd Reynolds, frictional unemployment at full 
employment can be assumed to be about 4 percent, and 
structural unemployment about 1 percent, of the nation's 
civilian labor force, with unfilled vacancies also amounting 
to about 1 percent of the labor force and the rate of price in 
crease holding steady at roughly 5 percent per annum. 1 In 
terms of 1980 labor force projections, this would yield an 
estimate of only a little over 1 million structurally 
unemployed.
Efforts to build up an estimate from major categories of 
structural unemployment are more firmly based but are still 
open to question. The first category consists of the long term 
unemployed; if this category is defined to include workers 
unemployed 27 weeks or more, there were only about 
300,000 structurally unemployed workers (roughly three- 
tenths of 1 percent of the civilian labor force) in the high 
employment year of 1973, but if the definition is limited to 
workers unemployed only 15 weeks or more, the total comes 
to about 800,000, roughly 1 percent of that year's civilian 
labor force. In the somewhat less prosperous year of 1978,
1. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, p. 132.
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the group unemployed 27 weeks or more came to a little over 
1 percent, and the group unemployed 15 weeks or more to 
nearly 2.5 percent, of the 1978 civilian labor force. 2
The second category consists of discouraged workers, 
those who have dropped out of the labor force because they 
have lost all hope of finding any suitable work. This type of 
unmeasured (as opposed to measured) unemployment, 
however, is associated almost wholly with periods of cyclical 
downswing and persistent business slack, not with periods of 
rising business and general prosperity. Indeed, in the latter 
periods the overall supply of labor increases rapidly as many 
persons who had previously not been working, chiefly 
women and teenagers, enter the labor force in search of 
employment. In the Vietnam War years between 1963 and 
1967, for example, it has been estimated that the additional 
workers drawn into the labor force totaled 1.9 million, of 
whom more than a million were women. Similarly, in the 
relatively prosperous years 1967-1971, the proportion of 
total unemployment accounted for by discouraged workers 
has been put at substantially less than 1 percent of the 
civilian labor force. 3 At a 5-6 percent level of unemployment 
it seems unlikely that, out of a total labor force of 100 
million, more than 700,000 would fall in the discouraged 
category.
Still a third category consists of part time workers who 
want full time work but cannot find it because of economic 
conditions. Since these workers do have jobs but are in 
voluntarily limited to less than full time work, the generally 
accepted procedure is to consider such workers as only half
2. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1980), Appendix Tables A-l and A-26.
3. William G. Bowen and T. Aldnch Fmegan, The Economics of Labor Force Participa 
tion (Princeton, NJ: Pnnceton University Press, 1969); Jacob Mincer, "Determining Who 
Are the Hidden Unemployed," Monthly Labor Review, 96 (1973), pp. 27-30.
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unemployed. 4 Again, as in the case of the discouraged 
category, this type of unemployment becomes relatively 
unimportant in periods of general prosperity; in 1978, for ex 
ample, it amounted to less than a fifth of a percentage point 
of the civilian labor force (see table 4-1). 5
The fourth and last category consists of workers who are 
involuntarily confined to low-level, unstable jobs and as a 
consequence have only intermittent work even in periods of 
high employment. Unfortunately, there are no published 
statistics on the extent of this type of work since the problem 
of measurement is virtually insurmountable. Many of the 
workers having these highly unstable jobs, especially white 
women over 20 years of age and white teenagers, hold inter 
mittent jobs of this sort voluntarily in the sense they face 
other virtually equivalent options and remain outside the 
unemployed category in the official figures. On the other 
hand, many others, especially nonwhites, have intermittent 
work and still fall within the official definition of measured 
unemployment in a given year. While adequate data are lack 
ing, there is little doubt that the uncounted portion of the 
"virtually unemployed" is of significant size even in periods 
of general prosperity.
Summarizing the available evidence, estimates of the total 
number of the structurally unemployed at the general jobless 
level of 5 percent fall between 2.5 and 3.5 million depending 
in large part on whether long term unemployment is defined 
as 15 weeks or more as against 27 weeks or more. However 
the outlook is viewed, it is evident that the problem of struc 
tural unemployment will continue to be a formidable one 
even in periods of high employment. It is no less clear that 
any attack on the problem, to be effective, calls for breaking
4. Julius Shiskin, "Employment and Unemployment: The Doughnut or the Hole?" 
Monthly Labor Review (February 1976), pp. 3-10
5 Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, Table A-33.
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Table 44
Categories of Unemployment, Selected Years 1973-78
Percent of
Thousands Civilian Labor Force 
1973 1975 1978 1973 1975 1978
Civilian Labor Force
Total unemployed
Unemployed 15 weeks 
and over























1/2 of unemployed part- 
time for economic 
reasons 1.3 1.9 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.7
Discouraged workers at 5 
percent unemployment -- -- .7 -- -- .7
Source: Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, Tables A-l, A-26 and 
A-33.
down this large demographic group into smaller, more 
homogeneous categories. While the preceding discussion has 
gone some distance in identifying the structurally 
unemployed and the severely disadvantaged employed, the 
workers involved form too large and ill-defined a group for 
policymaking purposes; further decomposition is therefore 
necessary even though quantitative estimates of their relative 
size are not possible.
The three groups who chiefly make up the structurally 
unemployed teenagers, women and adult males with 
serious background deficiencies, particularly the nonwhite 
and other minority members of these three groups possess 
a wide diversity of characteristics and capacities. The same 
holds true of other workers who confront special job finding 
difficulties and who form a fringe around these main groups: 
those 20-24 years old, those over 55 years old, the physically
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handicapped, and workers in isolated, depressed areas. For 
policy to be effective, attention needs to be given to the ways 
in which each of these groups is affected by the various bar 
riers limiting employment opportunities of the hard-to- 
employ. This study is largely confined to the first three of the 
groups just mentioned.
Four Barriers Confronting 
the Structurally Unemployed
The structurally unemployed are subject to a number of 
different barriers, some serious and at least in the short run 
quite irremovable, others much less difficult to surmount. 
The most important of these barriers are four in number: im 
pediments to competitive wage determination and disincen 
tives to work associated with nonwork sources of income; 
discrimination in hiring and promotion procedures; deficien 
cies in general education and in job or career training; and 
finally, lack of work experience. For policymaking purposes 
the most pressing need is to consider these four barriers both 
individually and as a group with a view to determining as 
clearly and as objectively as possible what is the relative im 
portance of each and how each can be most effectively ap 
proached.
The first barrier, distortions in wage rates and im 
pediments to effective job search, is easily explained, more 
difficult to identify and extremely hard to remedy. The 
assumption underlying this view of structural unemployment 
is that many of the hard-to-employ are quite ready and 
prepared to take on the responsibilities of a job but are 
discouraged or blocked from doing so by a variety of non- 
competitive, or explicitly anticompetitive, impediments: in 
flexibly high wage rates, restrictive hiring and promotion 
standards, overly generous inducements not to work and the 
like. It follows from this view that structural unemployment
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would be substantially lessened if these limitations on com 
petitive labor market behavior could be removed.
The second barrier, discriminatory labor market behavior, 
is far more complex and intractable than the first but at the 
same time much closer to underlying factors that give rise to 
structural unemployment. Sometimes it takes a clear, un 
mistakable form but more frequently it is intermixed with 
quite defensible purposes or needs; sometimes it is closely 
correlated with differences in worker efficiency, but more 
often the relationship to efficiency differences is extremely 
loose; even where efficiency differs, the effects of such prior 
"institutional" forms of discrimination as inadequate 
schooling or particular family backgrounds are clearly evi 
dent but extremely difficult to pin down. Since labor market 
discrimination has so many facets and is so deeply imbedded 
in historical developments and social attitudes, quick results 
from any effort to attack structural unemployment by this 
route can hardly be expected.
The third barrier, deficiencies in general education and in 
training in specific skill of job requirements, poses less dif 
ficulties than discriminatory labor market behavior, but far 
more difficulties than restrictive wage practices and job 
search disincentives. If structural unemployment were large 
ly limited to experienced workers who have been displaced 
by technological or other market developments, the assump 
tion which largely underlay the government's manpower 
programs of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the difficulties 
besetting the general education-specific training route would 
have been far less. Since it is now clear that this type of 
unemployment centers on persons who lack fundamental 
educational and work skills, the hurdles are seen to be far 
more formidable. Recent experience, as the subsequent 
discussion shows, points to certain promising lines of action, 
but the overall prospect is hardly reassuring.
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The fourth and final barrier, closely related to the one just 
noted, is lack of prior work experience. This is the most im 
portant immediate hurdle which new entrants to the labor 
market, notably teenagers just out of school, confront, but it 
also poses serious difficulties for adult women and older men 
who are seeking reentry to the labor market after long 
absences. It is sometimes argued that almost any kind of job, 
whatever its content, duration or source, can provide an 
essential first step in dealing with this barrier, but if the work 
is for only brief periods and makes little or no substantive 
demands, it is unlikely to provide any meaningful entry or 
reentry preparation. At least it is clear that for persons from 
severely disadvantaged backgrounds, work at this lowest 
level often proves to be dead-end in terms of any career 
potential. Thus for such persons it is now recognized that job 
experience alone, even if it entails some substantive 
elements, rarely provides entry to any longer term career op 
portunities.
A Possible Overall Strategy
All of the structurally unemployed face at least one of 
these four barriers and some, notably nonwhite teenagers, 
face all four. The critical issue confronting policymakers is 
how to devise an effective set of programs which can be 
adapted to the different and changing needs of these various 
groups. The closer the individual is to being fully job-ready, 
the more straightforward and immediate the policy approach 
can be; the further removed the individual is, the more com 
plex and long term the policy has to be.
Before turning to an analysis of specific policy issues, the 
question of how an approach along these lines can best be 
adapted to an environment of business expansion and high 
employment needs to be faced. As a starting point it is worth 
emphasizing that in any broad and sustained business expan-
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sion, increasing numbers of job opportunities at entry level 
and above are opening up for a widening spectrum of job 
seekers. Special measures are still required to bring the dif 
ferent structurally employed groups into the mainstream of 
employment opportunities, but the policies can be more 
limited and more closely linked to usual market requirements 
than in recessionary or even sluggish expansionist periods.
This not only means that such policies will be likelier to 
succeed in these circumstances but also as a practical matter 
that the test of meeting competitive, regular work re 
quirements in the private and public sector will become ap 
plicable to increasing numbers of the structurally 
unemployed. Likewise, as business conditions improve, the 
role of the private as opposed to the public sector can be ex 
pected to become increasingly important. This is not, 
however, a policy emphasis that can be adopted abruptly. 
Even in relatively strong expansions, special demand sup 
ports will be needed to meet the job needs of these different 
unemployment-prone groups.
Adapting such a strategy to structurally unemployed 
workers would entail difficult and controversial borderline 
decisions, but on both macro-stability and micro-efficiency 
grounds, the shift in policy emphasis indicated by an expan 
sionist environment seems clear and compelling. Under con 
ditions of general prosperity those workers who by reason of 
skill and experience are most job ready would increasingly be 
able to find openings with a minimum of assistance. In such 
cases, specialized training in a new skill, for example, or 
removal of an entry barrier to a particular line of work, 
would be all that would be necessary.
For those further removed from entry into regular work, 
considerably more effort would need to be expended in 
determining what barriers are involved and in carrying 
through effective support actions. Thus, for some, the dif-
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ficulty may have to do with a basic educational deficiency, 
for others with personal family problems, for still others 
with lack of physical proximity to any job opportunities. 
Once carefully examined and assessed, the difficulties beset 
ting job seekers in this intermediate group are apt to be 
relatively clear-cut since persons in this category possess the 
basic motivations and innate capacities to handle regular 
jobs. The benefits deriving from any supportive action, 
however, will probably take considerably longer to realize 
than in the case of the first group of job seekers because of 
the differing nature and scope of their difficulties.
Those in the third category, the still less job-ready group, 
are not only likely to confront at least some of the barriers 
facing the first two groups but also to lack essential 
psychological or intellectual attributes needed for regular 
employment. In their case, any effective remedial action will 
doubtless entail more long term, individualized treatment. 
Unless society were to decide to accept the risks and costs of 
disregarding the special needs of job seekers in this group, 
much preparatory effort would be required before they 
could move into regular work situations, and each of the 
preparatory steps would need to be closely monitored. The 
uncertainties and difficulties besetting any serious effort 
along these lines need no underscoring.
The final category are those workers who are subject to 
various types of discriminatory labor market practices. Since 
these practices are generally interwoven with such other fac 
tors as hiring test procedures, wage progression structures, 
and educational requirements, most of the workers subject 
to labor market discrimination are also in one or more of the 
other groups that are vulnerable to structural unemploy 
ment. Nonetheless, this aspect of their disadvantaged status 
warrants separate attention in any canvas of possible policy 
approaches.
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Under conditions of high employment, then, the case for 
greatly narrowing the focus of government efforts to deal 
with structural unemployment becomes very strong. These 
efforts could proceed along the following lines: first, identify 
those workers who are most in need, presumably chiefly on 
income-level grounds; second, group these workers by their 
degree of readiness to enter a career or to do regular work; 
and third, tailor the various subsidized training jobs and 
related approaches that now exist to the special needs and 
circumstances of each group. The important distinction to 
keep in mind is that in a high employment environment, a 
massive governmental attack on structural unemployment 
would be inappropriate; rather it would be more realistic to 
limit public effort to those workers in this category who can 
benefit from training and special work programs, relying on 
welfare or other forms of assistance to meet the needs of 
those who cannot meet this standard. Added perspective is 
given to these recommendations when viewed against the ex 
perience of other industrialized countries.
The West European Experience
In most respects, a public policy approach to structural 
unemployment along these lines would differ quite sharply 
from the pattern followed by most West European govern 
ments. Outwardly, the differences are not striking; as in this 
country, their programs are built around labor market infor 
mation systems, job placement and counseling, career train 
ing and development, subsidies to induce private employers 
to hire the hard-to-employ, and job creation aids largely 
oriented towards depressed areas and economically disad- 
vantaged groups. The underlying thrust of the West Euro 
pean programs, however, has been quite different. Until 
recently, government efforts to deal with unemployment in 
this country have centered almost entirely on aggregative de 
mand policies, with scant attention to removing structural
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barriers to employment. In the case of most West European 
countries, the overall unemployment rate has until recent 
years held well below the American rate, even to the point 
where large numbers of foreign workers have been brought 
in to meet unfilled demands. In those countries, such non- 
frictional unemployment as existed was clearly structural in 
nature, calling for intensive, highly individualized support 
measures in the case of very severely disadvantaged workers, 
and broad training or human development measures in the 
case of less disadvantaged groups. As a result, the overall 
coverage of their structural policies is considerably broader 
than in this country, eligibility requirements for participa 
tion are less stringent, and the content of their programs is 
more diverse and far-reaching.
The other striking difference grows out of the greater cen 
tralization of authority that has developed in West European 
countries both within major industries and with respect to 
the powers exercised by their central governments. 
Historically, there has emerged a much higher degree of 
coordination between employer and union policies than in 
this country, as well as a greater acceptance of government 
participation and leadership in the formulation of such 
policies. This has meant that the hard-to-employ are not 
treated as a group apart from the working population as a 
whole, the pattern prevailing in the United States, but rather 
as one of many groups needing special aids and general 
development measures. It is too early to judge whether the 
West European countries will meet the recent increase in 
their unemployment rolls by expanding these same human 
resource programs or by resorting to more sweeping ag 
gregate demand measures, but the evidence to date suggests 
that they will hold to the former course. 6
6. Recent European Manpower Initiatives, Special Report No 3 (Washington: National 
Commission for Manpower Policy, 1975).
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Should this country adopt essentially the same approach 
as West Europe to structural unemployment? Clearly, the 
differences in the two environments, both economic and 
social, are too great to make any such outcome possible. If 
the major recommendations developed,in this study were 
adopted, however, American policy would move a con 
siderable distance towards the West European pattern, the 
focus as at present remaining on the needs of the hard-to- 
employ but only as part of a more comprehensive and long 
range program of human resources development.
Five Policy Approaches
Public policy approaches to these four barriers are pro 
ceeding along five main lines, with some approaches overlap 
ping others in relation to a particular barrier. Even where a 
given approach is limited to a single barrier, it is now 
generally agreed, the results to date have at best been mixed. 
In at least a few instances, however, the criticisms appear to 
be too extreme.
Policy efforts addressed to the first barrier, formal and in 
formal noncompetitive impediments to job entry and work 
disincentives resulting from unemployment insurance and 
other income support programs, are beset with innumerable 
uncertainties and controversies in determining when such 
restrictions and practices are and are not justified. The sec 
ond policy approach, an outgrowth of the national effort to 
protect the civil rights of all the nation's citizens, is aimed at 
reducing and eliminating discriminatory barriers to employ 
ment, especially as they relate to women and minority 
groups. Recent experience indicates that the an- 
tidiscriminatory approach to the structural unemployment 
issue is beset with serious difficulties, raising the question of 
whether efforts in this direction, whatever their merits on 
other grounds, can ever provide a successful focus for effec 
tive action against structural unemployment.
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There remain three other major approaches: efforts to 
strengthen educational-vocational preparation for work 
careers, direct job creation efforts in the public and private 
sector, and finally, public and private training programs in 
specific skills and related job requirements. Each of these 
last three approaches typically contains elements of basic 
employment preparation, direct job training and work ex 
perience in various combinations and, taken togethei, have a 
direct or indirect bearing on all four of the barriers noted 
earlier. While each warrants separate discussion, in policy 
terms they have become so closely interrelated they form a 
single group; as such, they constitute the country's major 
thrust in dealing with structural unemployment among the 
seriously disadvantaged. The remainder of this study is ad 
dressed to an assessment of these five approaches to the 
problem.
Chapter 5
Noncompetitive and Work 
Disincentive Barriers
The simplest and in many ways most intellectually appeal 
ing explanation of unemployment in periods of general pros 
perity can be traced to traditional competitive market 
analysis. According to this view, if labor in a given market 
remains unemployed at existing wage rates, adjustments in 
those rates will insure that everyone looking for work will 
eventually find it, assuming incomes are determined by com 
petitive conditions alone. If such conditions do not obtain, 
either noncompetitive restrictions or nonmarket deter 
minants of income are presumably involved and may well 
call for corrective action.
Noncompetitive barriers in labor markets, the first of 
these two influences, take many forms. Union restrictions in 
the hiring and placement of workers may impede freedom of 
entry. Requirements in the way of prior experience and train 
ing may be set so high that many qualified job applicants are 
effectively excluded. Costs associated with private pension 
programs, health plans and other fringe protections, quite 
aside from similar benefits required by law, may also 
discourage new hires. High, rigid wage rates, whether posted 
by public or private action, can have a similar effect on job 
entry.
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Behind these direct impediments lie many more indirect 
and roundabout forms of interferences with competitive ac 
cess to job opportunities, including collusive price and 
market strategies of employers and government regulations 
which restrict competitive adjustments in rates and costs. 
Merely to enumerate some of the more important barriers 
that may develop in labor and related markets is enough to 
show how difficult any action along these lines, to be at all 
effective, must be. In good part, this follows from the fact 
that the results of such action, especially as they relate to 
structural unemployment, would probably not be evident for 
long periods of time. Indeed, other developments might well 
occur that would obscure their impact altogether.
Moreover, what may seem to be an arbitrary and unwar 
ranted restriction to a job applicant may appear to an 
employer or union as essential to maintaining minimum 
standards of performance or to meeting widely accepted 
criteria of equity. A limitation that was once needed, as in 
the 1930s, to prevent the complete demoralization of an in 
dustry's system of wage rates and working conditions may be 
rendered economically indefensible by subsequent shifts in 
production methods or consumer preferences. More impor 
tant, restrictions on job entry are apt to be the product of 
powerful but narrow group interests whose first obligations 
are to their own members. Exclusion of newcomers, if need 
ed to preserve hard-won gains, would therefore appear to 
these groups to be quite appropriate if not absolutely 
necessary.
In the face of these difficulties and uncertainties it is hard 
to see how this approach could be used as the center piece of 
any successful program for dealing with structural 
unemployment. Even if, for example, wage rate distortions 
could be shown to be a major cause of this type of 
unemployment, what criteria would be used to determine
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where and how such distortions should be rectified? If wage 
rigidities in certain industries, such as basic steel or 
chemicals, are part and parcel of an industry's system of 
pricing and marketing practices, would it be either sensible 
or feasible to limit remedial action to the wage element 
alone? If a broader strategy were pursued, would the effects 
filter through to affect job opportunity levels in any signifi 
cant way? Concerted attacks on even relatively clear-cut bar 
riers to job entry such as high fringe benefit levels, excessive 
hiring or performance standards, and direct labor supply 
restrictions would pose hardly less serious difficulties.
In deciding on any course of action along these lines, at 
tention needs to focus on those impediments to job entry 
which bear most heavily on the hardest-to-employ groups 
but which at the same time are most likely to yield to policy 
intervention in periods of general prosperity. Much attention 
of late has been given to possible adverse effects on employ 
ment of increases under the federal minimum wage law. 
Since this impediment bears directly on the job prospects of 
major groups of the structurally unemployed, it warrants at 
tention here.
Federal Minimum Wage Legislation
Ever since passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, controversy has continued about the possible 
dislocating effects of setting a national minimum wage. In 
itially the law set the basic rate at 25 cents per hour with time 
and a half for any work over 40 hours per week. The latter 
provision still obtains but the basic minimum has been 
periodically raised and in 1980 stood at $3.10 an hour. Under 
recent legislative action, the rate is scheduled to rise to $3.31 
an hour by 1981.
Equally important, coverage since the 1930s has been 
greatly expanded to include large numbers of workers in
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retail trade, services, agriculture and domestic work as well 
as all nonsupervisory employees of federal, state and local 
governments. The potential employment effects of raising 
the national wage minimum has obviously become more 
serious as the coverage of the law has been widened to in 
clude more low-wage workers. The 1966 amendment, for ex 
ample, extended coverage to an additional 8 million retail, 
hospital, hotel, restaurant, laundry and construction 
employees, while the 1974 amendment brought 1.5 million 
domestic workers and half a million additional retail and ser 
vice workers under the protection of the law. These fields in 
clude many traditionally low-paying firms that hire low- 
skilled workers, many of them teenagers and nonwhites who 
have little work experience and who suffer relatively high 
rates of unemployment. In total numbers, the 1974 amend 
ment extended the Act's coverage to some 56 million 
workers.
Two major criticisms are leveled against this legislation: 
first, it heightens inflationary pressures and second, it results 
in increased unemployment. The former issue, which can be 
touched on only briefly in this study, has received much at 
tention in recent years but little in the way of systematic 
analysis. 1 Such work as has been done indicates that the ef 
fects of increases in the federal minimum wage on the 
general price level have until recently been practically in 
discernible but that in the economic environment of the 
1970s this has become less true. As noted in chapter 2, the 
spread of government regulations, including those which in 
duce wage increases, has tended to make any inflation, once 
underway, more persistent. In early 1978, for example, wage 
increases accelerated markedly, though briefly, at a time 
when unemployment was still somewhat above 6 percent. In
1. Two long term projects sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research and the U.S Department of Labor should help meet the latter need.
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its analysis of this development, the Council of Economic 
Advisers concluded that the 15 percent rise in the minimum 
wage which occurred in January 1978 raised the rate of in 
crease of the adjusted hourly earnings index from 7.9 percent 
to 9.2 percent on an annual basis; the other main factor to 
which it attributed most of the upswing in the pace of wage 
increases in early 1978 was the speed in the increase in total 
employment along with the equally rapid drop in unemploy 
ment. For 1978 as a whole, compensation per hour went up 
from a 7.6 percent increase in 1977 to a 9.8 percent rate in 
1978. This step-up in the pace of wage increases, combined 
with a continued slowdown in the rate of increase in produc 
tivity, resulted in a substantial rise in unit labor costs, with 
the rate of increase of such costs in the private nonfarm sec 
tor rising from 6.3 percent in 1977 to 8.9 percent in 1978. 2 
These factors, among which the higher minimum was clearly 
visible if not central for the year as a whole, served to push 
up prices still higher and helped imbed the inflationary pro 
cess more deeply into the economy.
The conclusion seems inescapable that any serious effort 
to lessen inflationary pressures will require a significantly 
lower rate of increase in minimum wages than is provided 
under existing legislation. It also is evident that, to be effec 
tive, any such move would need to be coupled with similar 
cutbacks in a wide variety of other government regulations 
including: reductions in protective tariffs in steel, textiles 
and the like; elimination of regulations in trucking, shipping 
and communications; relaxation of price supports in 
agriculture and in subsidies for the maritime industry; and 
the dismantling of many other cost-raising types of govern 
ment interventions. Similar questions have been raised about 
government controls aimed at protecting not particular pro-
2 Economic Report of the President, 1979 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1980), pp. 52 and 66
76 Work Disincentive Barriers
ducer groups but the more general public such as those deal 
ing with environmental pollution, dangerous food additives 
and occupational hazards. In their case, the issues become 
far more complex, however, because of the important social 
benefits which these public-oriented types of regulations are 
felt to entail. The fact remains that if a broad scale attack on 
inflation is mounted, the rapid pace of increase in the 
minimum wage rate of the past few years would have to be 
reduced.
The second line of criticism, that this legislation has bar 
red hard-to-employ groups from jobs, bears directly on the 
problem of structural unemployment. In this regard, there is 
now virtual unanimity among investigators on two 
somewhat conflicting points: first, whatever other benefits 
may derive from this legislation, any substantial increase in 
the minimum wage relative to the general wage level tends to 
reduce employment opportunities for the least skilled and 
the least experienced; second, however, any decrease in the 
minimum wage relative to the general wage level, unless it 
were quite substantial, would have little effect on job oppor 
tunities for the hard-to-employ. The first point is especially 
applicable to periods of business contraction when demand 
for labor is generally shifting downward relative to supply 
while the second is most clearly evident in periods of business 
expansion. Both points, however, are by-products of the 
same underlying principle: the level of job openings for the 
least skilled, least experienced workers are far more depen 
dent on overall demand-supply conditions than on changes 
in the relative wage rate for this type of work. In expansions, 
the job finding prospects of such workers will largely turn on 
whether the rise in aggregate demand reaches a level at which 
employers are induced to take them on in substantial 
numbers. Contrariwise, their job finding difficulties in 
periods of general decline will largely turn on how far ag 
gregate demand falls below aggregate supply. In neither in-
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stance, barring the most extreme hypothetical assumptions, 
will a change in relative wages significantly alter the out 
come.
This leaves one general circumstance when the wage for 
this type of labor relative to other types has major employ 
ment effects, i.e., when longer term supply-demand condi 
tions for the least skilled, least experienced workers become 
markedly adverse. In this kind of a setting, employers face a 
more or less permanent rise in the relative cost of hiring such 
workers if their wage is forced upward through legislative ac 
tion. This is what has been happening for much of the past 
25 years. As often pointed out, this has been especially true 
of the 1970s when a sharp rise in the number of women and 
young people seeking jobs coincided with a marked 
slowdown in the longer term growth rate of the economy. 
The subsequent rise in unemployment among these hard-to- 
employ groups was largely the result of these two 
developments. The increases in the federal minimum wage 
which occurred during this period, while apparently not a 
major causal influence, aggravated an already difficult con 
dition.
Empirical Findings
Of the many statistical studies that have been made of the 
employment effects of increases in the minimum wage, 
almost all conclude that this legislation has made it more dif 
ficult for teenagers, nonwhites generally, and perhaps 
women to find work opportunities. At the same time, the 
majority of these studies conclude that other factors are con 
siderably more important in explaining the relatively high 
unemployment level among these groups.
One of the earliest studies to emphasize the adverse 
employment effects of minimum wage legislation was con 
ducted by Arthur F. Burns; he found that an increase of 25
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cents in the statutory legal minima is associated with a rise of 
8 percentage points in nonwhite unemployment. 3 In a later 
study, Jacob Mincer concluded, "No more than a third of 
the employment loss in the covered sector appears as 
unemployment, while the bulk withdraws from the labor 
force." 4 He found that the largest disemployment effects are 
observed for nonwhite teenagers, followed by nonwhite 
males (20-24), white teenagers, and white males (20-24).
In a careful review of a variety of statistical studies of this 
problem and his own analysis of the data, Edward Gramlich 
concluded that a 25 percent increase in the minimum wage 
would lower employment of low-wage teenagers (those 
receiving less than the minimum before the increase in ques 
tion) by 10-15 percent. Comparable effects would 
presumably be felt by other workers who had previously 
been receiving wages below the minimum. The impact would 
be substantially less on teenager employment as a whole or 
on other groups that are particularly prone to unemploy 
ment. 5
Except in the case of very marked increases, changes in the 
minimum wage have apparently had only minimal 
disemployment effects. This is due in good part to the fact 
that, while a higher minimum has had adverse effects on 
teenager employment, it has been followed by a rise in the 
number of full time jobs for women, suggesting that in these 
circumstances employers substitute unskilled women for 
teenagers. This is worth noting since women represent
3. Arthur F. Burns, The Management of Prosperity (New York- Columbia University 
Press, 1966), p. 48.
4. Jacob Mincer, "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages," Journal of Political 
Economy (August 1976), pp. 87-106.
5. Edward M. Gramlich, Impact of Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Employment, and 
Family Incomes, Brookmgs Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1976), pp. 409-451. For a con 
venient summary of recent studies, see American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, Minimum Wage Legislation (Washington 1977).
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roughly half of all low-wage workers, outnumbering 
teenagers in that category by a ratio of about 5 to 3. 6
In terms of policy choices, the critical relationship involv 
ed is the national minimum as a ratio to the average wage 
level or, what is often used in its place, to the average wage in 
manufacturing. This ratio, as indicated in Figure 5-1, has 
usually varied between 40 and 50 percent. As long as the na 
tional minimum is held towards the lower end of this range, 
few serious employment effects seem likely, but as it ap 
proaches the upper end, employment opportunities for low- 
paid workers, especially teenagers, would become fewer. 
While far short of a cure-all, there is little question but what 
the employment situation of teenagers and perhaps other 
low-wage workers would have been at least somewhat better 
if the increases in the minimum wage had been kept lower 
than those recently enacted. The case for these increases 
must therefore be made on other than employment- 
expansion grounds for the structurally unemployed.
These empirical findings, while generally supportive of the 
position that minimum wage legislation has been a relatively 
unimportant factor in explaining structural unemployment 
in this country, do not of themselves settle the issue one way 
or the other. There are further considerations, however, 
which go a long way towards doing so.
First, prospective population trends over the next 10-15 
years should gradually alter the unemployment problem 
among the hard-to-employ, especially young persons. The 
last of the postwar baby boom will pass through their 
teenage years by 1981 and the youth population will decline 
thereafter in relative and absolute terms through the 1980s.
6 Gramlich, Impact of Minimum Wages, p 443.
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Figure 5-1
Level of Minimum Wage
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In summarizing the projected trends, Adams and Mangum 
concluded:
The effect of this influx of young people, however, 
has already begun to dissipate and will largely disappear 
in the 1980s. The teenage labor force, in turn, is ex 
pected to decline from its level of 8.8 million to 7.9 
million in 1985. 7
This puts the issue of the employment effect of the 
minimum wage in a quite different light. During the 1960s 
and 1970s the ratio of youth to adult unemployment nearly 
doubled from its base of three to one which obtained during 
the 1950s. By 1975, the ratio of youth to adult unemploy 
ment already appeared to have returned to its historical base. 
The structural element in youth unemployment of course still 
remains, but any adverse effects attributable to minimum 
wage legislation have now been substantially removed and 
may soon disappear altogether.
Second, it can still be argued that the minimum wage has 
adverse employment effects with respect to particular low- 
wage groups such as young nonwhites, women or indeed any 
group whose wage is below the statutory minimum. This 
argument applies especially to young nonwhites since their 
numbers will decline only slightly during the 1980s and there 
is every indication their unemployment rate will remain inor 
dinately high.
A closer look at the labor force status of these different 
groups, however, raises serious questions about this line of 
analysis. With respect to women, for example, there is no 
evidence that their employment status has worsened as a 
result of the minimum wage; in fact, as already noted, it ap 
pears that the number of full time jobs for women has been
7. Arvil V. Adams and Garth L Mangum, The Lingering Crisis of Youth Unemployment 
(Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1978), p. 127
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increased rather than decreased by this legislation as 
employers have substituted unskilled women for teenagers. 8
As to young people generally, it is important to remember 
that, while over 40 percent are employed in any given year, 
the great majority are enrolled in school and any work they 
do consists of temporary jobs during the summer combined 
with part time work during the school year. The adverse ef 
fects of the minimum wage on such persons, if in fact they 
occur, constitute a far less serious cost than if they were full 
time workers. Unemployment among the latter group, 
especially among nonwhites in inner-city areas, poses ex 
tremely serious problems, but that the minimum wage is a 
major impediment even in their case seems unlikely. Lower 
ing the minimum wage would cut across the entire range of 
low-wage labor, not just young, out-of-school job seekers, 
so the latter would still be at the end of the labor queue in 
competing for available openings. Proposals to establish a 
special lower minimum rate for this particularly hard-to- 
employ group deserve consideration but, administrative dif 
ficulties aside, there is little evidence to indicate that merely 
reducing the applicable rate would alter their employment 
status to any significant degree. For young school dropouts, 
especially nonwhites in inner-city areas, the barriers to 
employment are the product of a complex of factors in 
cluding deficiencies in skill training, basic educational 
preparation and inadequate work experience, to say nothing 
of employer flight from particular localities and the general 
deterioration of whole inner-city areas. At the very least, 
even if a lower special group rate were established, emphasis 
would still need to be placed on dealing with these more fun 
damental factors.
Third, as suggested above, an effective attack on the pro 
blems of hard-core unemployment has to be carefully
8. Gramhch, Impact of Minimum Wages, p. 443.
Work Disincentive Barriers 83
tailored to the needs of the particular groups involved with 
sufficiently concentrated, sustained efforts regarding the 
most hard-to-employ to make meaningful outcomes possi 
ble. What the specific ingredients of such an approach would 
be is impossible to say if for no other reason than because of 
the varying characteristics of the different groups involved. 
The element common to the members of all these groups, 
however, is an inability to meet and maintain minimum per 
formance standards of employers, whether in the private or 
public sector. In a very short-run sense, the wage is of course 
one determinant involved, but the principal barrier in a more 
basic sense is a lack of essential employable qualities. In 
deed, this is precisely the factor that distinguishes the hard- 
to-employ from other unemployed groups. It follows that 
any program that does not make this factor its primary focus 
cannot hope to succeed.
The foregoing considerations apply with special force in 
periods of business expansion and rising employment. The 
main hope for the hard-to-employ acquiring stable jobs is in 
such periods which in turn makes it doubly important they 
can qualify for such openings as they develop. Seen in this 
light, emphasis on the applicable wage, whether determined 
by legislative action or other means, has little relevance to 
the central issues involved.
Work Disincentive Barriers
Increasing attention has been given in recent years to the 
charge that an important part of structural unemployment is 
attributable to government policies, particularly with respect 
to unemployment insurance and various assistance pro 
grams. This is said to follow from the fact that these pro 
grams make it possible for workers to "go on the dole" in 
stead of taking whatever jobs are available. As recent in 
vestigations make clear, this turns out to be a most com-
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plicated issue, making any sweeping conclusion impossible. 
Only a few of the most important findings can be noted here.
There is no question but what government income support 
programs tend to discourage job seeking and job holding 
among groups that are particularly subject to structural 
unemployment. Common sense leads to no other conclusion. 
If someone can receive a monthly check without working 
that is larger or even merely somewhat smaller than what 
could be gotten from working, why bother to look for a job? 
The issue, then, is how much of the country's unemployment 
can be attributed to this feature of the government's income 
support system.
A full answer to this question would require a detailed 
review of the present system of income supports in relation 
to incomes received from working and an analysis of how 
workers respond to this relationship under different cir 
cumstances. Before considering the unemployment in 
surance and public assistance programs in these terms, some 
general observations are worth noting.
As in most other aspects of the structural unemployment 
problem, the nature of this issue is greatly altered when the 
economy moves from low to high unemployment. When 
jobs become scarce and those that exist are not likely to last 
long, nonwork sources of income become the principal 
means of livelihood for increasing numbers of people. In 
ducements to seek out job openings decline while incentives 
to "stretch the rules" and qualify for some type of income 
support program become greater. The opposite tends to oc 
cur when job openings multiply and the unemployment rate 
falls. This is not to say that such programs do not aggravate 
the jobless problem in periods of low unemployment; in fact, 
their relative importance increases at such times because 
most of the unemployment that remains in prosperities is of 
a frictional and structural nature, the types of unemploy-
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ment most directly affected by income support programs. 
Nonetheless, it becomes far easier to prevent abuses of these 
programs when jobs are plentiful than when they are scarce.
Much controversy, however, exists over what constitutes 
abuses of the present system of supports and how far society 
should go in preventing them. Is a mother who is'the sole 
support of a couple of children under the age of six, or even 
ten or twelve, "abusing" the public assistance program by 
choosing to stay home rather than take a job? Is a person on 
unemployment insurance who holds out for a job offer at a 
wage rate comparable to what was received on the last job 
guilty of malingering? How detailed and intensive should 
government investigative efforts be in tracking down those 
who no longer qualify for benefits? The answers to these and 
similar questions turn largely on personal values and social 
outlooks, making clear that the country's income support 
programs will remain controversial simply because they 
reflect such a variety of personal views.
Any assessment of the effects on unemployment of these 
programs will largely depend on whether the issue is ap 
proached from the viewpoint of achieving more competitive 
labor market conditions or, alternatively, from the view 
point of achieving a higher minimum level of income for 
everyone, another instance of the perennial conflict between 
efficiency and equity. If efficient allocation of labor is the 
goal, the case for severely limiting the coverage of income 
support programs as well as the level and duration of 
benefits becomes very strong. If a "decent" minimum living 
standard for all is the goal, the associated costs of inefficient 
labor markets may well seem acceptable.
In recent years, however, a rather different approach to 
income support programs has emerged which should go 
some way at least towards reconciling these two objectives. 
According to this view, such programs need not necessarily
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discourage job seeking or work effort as long as care is taken 
to insure that incomes are significantly increased from work 
ing, even if some part of a person's income still comes from 
nonwork sources. Controversy continues over how high the 
income support minimum should be, how much net gain 
from working should be allowed, where the cutoff in support 
payments should come as incomes rise, and how much 
pressure or coercion should be brought to bear on "able- 
bodied" relief recipients to take jobs, but the basic idea of 
combining income supports and work incentives is now 
widely accepted. These considerations apply particularly to 
the country's welfare programs, which are taken up in the 
concluding section of this chapter, but they also have an im 
portant bearing on the possible work disincentive effects of 
the nation's unemployment insurance system.
Unemployment Compensation System
The country's first line of defense against the hardships 
associated with unemployment is the federal-state unemploy 
ment compensation system established under the Social 
Security Act of 1935. Historically, coverage was limited 
primarily to industrial and commercial workers, but protec 
tion has since been extended to include agricultural workers, 
domestics, and other groups as well. At the same time, as 
wages generally have increased, benefit levels have been rais 
ed through cooperative federal-state action. Even excluding 
the extra unemployment compensation attributable to the 
1973-1975 recession, unemployment benefits rose from $3 
billion in 1965 to $9 billion in 1977.
The major purpose and effect of the law is to lessen the 
impact of unemployment on those who involuntarily lose 
their jobs by providing them with cash benefits (usually 
about 50 percent of prior earnings) for relatively brief 
periods (usually about 25 weeks, though Congress has been
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quick to extend benefits during periods of rising unemploy 
ment). 9 One of the principal advantages of the system is that 
it is automatically countercyclical to the extent that benefits 
paid out increase in recessions and decline in expansions. 
Thus between 1973 and 1975 the number of first benefit 
recipients rose from about 5 to 11 million and total benefits 
from about $4 to $12 billion. 10 It has been estimated that 
unemployment insurance has cushioned about 10 percent of 
the declines in GNP that have occurred since 1948 and that 
the unemployment rate would have risen 3.63 percentage 
points, as against the actual rise of about 3.3 points that oc 
curred on average during these periods. 11 This estimate 
assumes that even though the taxes on employer payrolls that 
finance unemployment benefits tend to move procyclically, 
since in most states they are tied to individual company per 
formance by the so-called merit rating mechanism, the tax 
rate adjustments involved occur too slowly to have much of 
a destabilizing effect. While the main countercyclical effect 
of unemployment benefits was felt in recessions, especially 
steep recessions, this meant that the unemployment rate in 
the subsequent expansion periods was also probably 
somewhat less.
In recent years, a number of economists, notably Arthur 
Burns and Martin Feldstein, have argued that certain 
features of the unemployment insurance system have an 
adverse effect on the unemployment level. As already in 
dicated, their general finding that payment for not working 
lessens incentives to find new work is unassailable, but how 
important this effect is remains in doubt. After a careful 
review of the literature, Daniel Hamermesh concluded that if
9 In the 1970s, emergency bills extended the duration of benefits to as much as 65 weeks.
10. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, p. 270. Not all the increases 
were due to automatic adjustments in payments.
11. Hamermesh, Jobless Pay and the Economy, pp. 60-64
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the unemployment rate were 4 percent in the absence of the 
unemployment insurance system, the presence of the system 
raises the rate to about 4.5 percent. Other investigators put 
the effect at slightly under this amount. 12 Contrary to 
popular impression, however, this outcome cannot be at 
tributed to the rise in benefit rate levels; since 1956, the years 
when the level of unemployment in high employment periods 
rose markedly, the ratio of average unemployment benefits 
to average weekly earnings only increased by 2.7 percentage 
points. Essentially the same holds for the lengthening in the 
period unemployment benefits can be received which now 
stands at 26 weeks in most states and 39 weeks in a few 
others; extensions beyond 39 weeks have been permitted but 
only on a temporary basis and apply to periods of recession 
rather than to periods of high employment. Even assuming 
that the longer duration of benefits has served to increase the 
unemployment level in periods of high employment, it is im 
portant to consider whether lengthening search times for 
locating new and presumably "better" jobs do not carry im 
portant benefits for workers, employers and the general 
public. While some investigators have concluded that longer 
benefits to individuals have led to higher subsequent earn 
ings when employed, others are skeptical whether the rela 
tionship can be quantified. 13 All that can be safely concluded 
is that the benefits of longer job search offset some portion, 
conceivably all, of the adverse effects of the system on job 
seeking behavior.
The main adverse effects of the system on unemployment 
in high employment environments can be traced to the 
broadening coverage of the law, first in 1954, when Congress 
extended the size of covered employers to those with four or
12 Ibid , p 52. See also, Arnold Katz, ed , "The Economics of Unemployment Insurance- 
A Symposium," Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July 1977)
13. Katz, ed., Economics of Unemployment Insurance, pp. 433-434.
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more employees for 20 weeks a year, then in 1970, to covered 
employers of one or more employees for 20 weeks a year as 
well as to most nonprofit organizations and finally in 1976, 
to almost all of the remaining nonprofit organizations and 
even some agricultural workers and household domestics. 
Today, the federal-state unemployment compensation 
system covers over 95 percent of the country's employed 
wage and salary employees.
The result has been that many lower skilled workers in 
relatively unstable jobs are now eligible for unemployment 
benefits. As a consequence, so it is argued, more persons 
with unstable job patterns (i.e., who are jobless prone) have 
entered the labor force and thereby pushed up the unemploy 
ment rate. This again raises the vexatious question of the 
hitherto "discouraged workers" who become encouraged 
during periods of strong business expansion to seek paying 
jobs. The fact that many such workers become job holders 
and job seekers in such periods is clear enough, but whether 
the prospect of unemployment benefits plays an important 
part in their behavior is not. Lacking any evidence to the 
contrary, it seems likely that other and more immediate in 
centives such as next month's pay check play a far more 
significant role.
There is one aspect of the matter, however, which war 
rants special attention, namely the tendency of the 
unemployment insurance system to promote greater 
seasonal, and possibly even greater cyclical, instability in 
employment and output. This follows from the fact that 
both workers and employers can, at least to some extent, 
adapt their work behavior and production schedules to take 
advantage of the system's benefit provisions. Estimates of 
this effect are, however, subject to innumerable qualifica 
tions. On the assumption of an unemployment rate of 4 per 
cent, Hamermesh estimated that this feature of the system 
has increased the overall rate by about .075 percentage
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points. If firms were taxed exactly in proportion to their 
relative unemployment level (i.e., if the experience rating 
system were perfect), no increase from this source would oc 
cur. 14
Summing up, neither systematic research investigations 
nor recent experience support the view that the unemploy 
ment insurance system has significantly raised the country's 
unemployment level in high employment periods. Any pro 
nouncements or findings to the contrary call for most 
cautious treatment or as concluded in a recent symposium on 
the subject:
The apparently strong empirical evidence reported 
here that UI increases unemployment must be weighed 
against the many pitfalls and still unresolved conceptual 
issues encountered in measuring UI total benefits. 15
As regards the effect of specific features of the unemploy 
ment insurance system on unemployment, some further 
strengthening of the experience rating basis of taxing 
employers in the direction just noted and a general tightening 
of the work test requirements in a number of the states 
would seem in order. Similarly, any marked rise in high- 
employment periods in the present benefit-to-wage ratio 
would seem imprudent. On the other hand, such sweeping 
proposals as making unemployment benefits subject to tax 
or shifting the basis for experience rating from the firm to 
the individual would not be warranted. Not only would such 
moves be highly questionable on general economic and social 
grounds, but also when viewed in more narrow terms their 
contribution to lowering the unemployment rate would most 
likely prove insignificant.
14. Hamermesh, Jobless Pay and the Economy, p. 71
15 Katz, ed , Economics of Unemployment Insurance, p. 437.
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Income Support Programs
The effects on the unemployment rate of income support 
programs on behalf of the nation's poor are even more dif 
ficult to pin down than the employment effects of the 
unemployment insurance system. There are presently over 40 
programs which provide such supports. Broadly defined, aid 
to the poor should include social insurance and medicare, 
since they provide important benefits to low income groups, 
but attention here is limited to welfare or means-tested pro 
grams. 16
The current debate over the nation's welfare programs 
centers largely on the aid to families with dependent children 
program (AFDC), although the food stamps and medicaid 
programs have also been receiving increasing attention. 
AFDC rolls have swelled dramatically since the early 1960s; 
between 1965 and 1975, for example, total benefit costs rose 
five times and the number of recipients two and a half times. 
In July 1976, there were 11 million recipients of whom only 
about 5.5 percent fell in the unemployed-father category. 17 
In more recent years, however, there has been relatively little 
growth in the welfare rolls.
Three factors were primarily responsible for this increase: 
the number of families with children headed by women rose 
sharply, standards of eligibility were loosened, and the pro 
portion of those eligible claiming payments more than 
doubled. In fiscal 1977, total expenditures on AFDC came to 
about $10 billion of which a little over half was provided by 
the federal government and the balance by state and local 
governments. Since it is highly probable that the level of
16. In fiscal 1976 social insurance benefits including unemployment compensation con 
stituted over 50 percent of total income after taxes and transfers of the lowest quintile of 
the income distribution Joseph Pechman, ed., Setting National Priorities: The 1978 
Budget (Washington Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 252
17. Ibid., p 256.
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AFDC benefits will be raised still higher in the years ahead 
and that its coverage will be extended to include even more 
working persons on low incomes, the question of the effects 
of this massive program on the unemployment rate is of 
critical importance.
While a number of aspects of this issue remain unclear, the 
evidence on certain points is quite firm. First, a substantial 
proportion (probably over 60 percent) of individuals official 
ly defined as poor, are incapable of working, 44 percent be 
ing children, 11 percent aged, and 5 percent nonaged adults; 
beyond this is an additional percentage accounted for by 
women with very young children. 18
Second, poor people capable of working are prepared to 
work where there is some tangible gain involved and, in the 
case of welfare mothers, where minimum family needs can 
be met. Even under the existing welfare system, about 30 
percent of the families leave AFDC within a year and 60 per 
cent within three years. 19 In fact, 22 percent of the heads of 
poor families were found to have worked at least part time 
and 13 percent full time during the year in fiscal 1978. 
Moreover, even the proportion of working mothers on 
welfare who were in the labor force rose from 19 percent in 
1961 to 28 percent in 1973. Several controlled experiments in 
New Jersey and elsewhere have shown that work done by 
male heads of households would only be reduced by about 5 
to 10 percent with the introduction of cash welfare benefits. 
The reduction for wives and teenagers, however, two groups 
that are heavily represented among the structurally 
unemployed, would be considerably greater. 20
18 Ibid., p 258
19 Sar A Levitan, Martin Rein, and David Marwick, Work and Welfare Go Together 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkms Press, 1973), p. 50
20. Pechman, ed , Setting National Priorities The 1978 Budget, pp. 258-259.
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Third, the present structure of welfare aid in this country 
still discourages recipients of such aid from taking work. 
Since 1969 the states have been required to exempt earnings 
of $30 per month plus one-third of all additional income and 
work expenses in determining an AFDC family's needs. This 
leaves little incentive to seek earnings from work as a means 
of supplementing income from welfare, especially since such 
earnings are likely to be subject to Social Security tax, 
federal income tax and possibly state income tax, in addition 
to the possibility of disqualifying the recipient for any 
Medicaid benefits whatsoever. Analysis of preliminary data 
shows that a typical AFDC recipient who accepts a public 
service employment job, for example, is subject to a 61 per 
cent benefit reduction rate, meaning that after taking ac 
count of the reduction in AFDC, food stamps, and child care 
payments that result from taking one of these jobs, the recip 
ient stands to increase his or her family income by only 39 
percent over what would have been received in transfer 
payments. A major purpose behind the Administration's 
current proposals to establish a national income guarantee 
plan is to reduce these overlapping features of the present 
welfare system and, as a consequence, increase the incentive 
for recipients to seek work.
Those advocating that all able-bodied persons on welfare 
take jobs are faced with a formidable dilemma: any volun 
tary program, to be successful, would require relatively high 
and therefore very costly wages, while any involuntary pro 
gram would entail an excessive degree of coercion. A middle 
road requiring all applicants for AFDC to register in the 
Work Incentive Program (WIN) has been followed since 
1967. Those considered employable were ordered to be ready 
to go to work or, if no jobs were available, to take training to 
qualify for later jobs. Initially, emphasis was placed on the 
training element, but especially since 1971 the focus has been 
on the job placement provision. Helped by the general up-
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swing in business and, to a limited extent, by the more inten 
sive effort to increase job placements, the number of full 
time jobs obtained by WIN registrants rose from about 
170,000 in fiscal 1975 to nearly 300,000 in fiscal 1976; the 
total fell to a little over 250,000 by fiscal 1978. 21
Critics of the present work and training requirement fall 
into two camps. There are those who argue that the greatest 
possible emphasis should be placed on voluntary responses 
of welfare recipients. This would entail providing them with 
a wide range of job and training opportunities in both the 
private and public sector at prevailing market wages, oppor 
tunities that would be geared to the recipients' long term 
career needs and particular capacities. Estimates of the 
number of jobs that would be needed to provide work for 
every able-bodied person range from 2.5 to 5 million, de 
pending on the wage rate and comprehensiveness of the 
coverage. 22 The distinctive feature of this group's view is not 
so much the large number of jobs that would be required but 
the kinds of jobs and the levels of remuneration that would 
be entailed since the terms of employment would have to be 
sufficiently favorable to keep the program on a voluntary 
response basis.
At the other extreme are those who argue that every 
welfare recipient capable of working should be required to 
take a job or enter a training program even on terms that 
may be considered unacceptable to the individuals involved.
21. Since March 1976, AFDC applicants have been required to register at their state 
employment service office or (in the case of two states) a similar office, instead of their 
local welfare agency. This has had the effect of giving them more direct access to job open 
ings. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, p 58.See also the Work In 
centive Program 9th Annual Report to the Congress, WIN: 1968-1978 (U.S. Departments 
of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, 1979; processed)
22. Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, JOIN A Jobs and Income 
Program for American Families, Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 19 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 60
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They too emphasize the importance of getting people off 
welfare and into work or training, but they draw the line at 
providing opportunities that would attract AFDC recipients 
on a purely voluntary basis. This, it is felt, would entail enor 
mous expense, put people into jobs for which they are not 
qualified, and in all likelihood lead to a dangerous expansion 
in the role of government. The key difference in the two 
views comes in the degree of coercion that would be involv 
ed.
The issues raised in this controversy give no promise of be 
ing resolved in the near future, but there is a strong 
likelihood that a middle-road approach will finally emerge if 
for no other reason than that the practical difficulties of 
adhering to either of the extreme positions would be enor 
mous. Such an approach would aim at providing work op 
portunities for welfare recipients at whatever levels they are 
qualified for and, in the case of those who refuse the oppor 
tunities offered, require entrance into a training or work- 
training program designed to fit them for regular employ 
ment. This would involve a very substantial broadening of 
the WIN program with far greater emphasis than heretofore 
on making sure that job opportunities appropriate to the 
skills and personal situations of employable welfare recip 
ients are in fact present.
Viewed in this light the job and career needs of persons on 
welfare are essentially no different from those not on welfare 
who also suffer special difficulties in finding and holding 
jobs. In both instances, the critical questions to be resolved 
are the same: where are the job and career openings for 
which they might qualify and how can they acquire the skills 
and aptitudes necessary to perform these jobs and to enter 
some type of career? These two questions, to which the re 
mainder of this study is largely addressed, go to the heart of 




In contrast to wage and related forms of exclusion as well 
as work disincentives associated with income support pro 
grams, discriminatory practices barring certain groups from 
major lines of work because of their race, sex, age or religion 
are a key element in explaining the persistence of structural 
unemployment in periods of general prosperity. In fact, bas 
ed on certain definitions of the term, discrimination can be 
viewed as the single most important cause of such unemploy 
ment.
The clearest but least important forms of discrimination in 
the job market consist of explicit and direct bars to employ 
ment based on personal attributes wholly unrelated to per 
formance in the particular work involved, such as exclusion 
of qualified nonwhites from certain lines of factory or office 
work. A much more significant type of discrimination con 
sists of general institutional bars to employment which limit 
different groups of the population to certain fields of work, 
largely excluding them from most others. The latter barrier 
shows up in statistics on the occupational distribution of 
nonwhites and of women, the well-known phenomenon of 
"blacks' jobs" and "women's jobs," but its exact nature is 
hard to identify. A complete explanation would doubtless 
take account of a broad range of historical influences in 
cluding the heritage of the southern plantation system, the
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development of the family, the country's educational struc 
ture, the shift from a rural-agriculture to an urban-factory 
environment, and the like. Again, the exact extent of this 
barrier is hard to measure but there is no reason to doubt its 
pervasiveness and deep-seated character.
Confronted with these two types of limitations, nonwhites 
and women frequently face but two alternatives in a given 
labor market: either accept work in the narrowly defined 
lines that by longstanding custom have come to be 
designated for them, or subsist on income from unemploy 
ment insurance, welfare or a variety of borderline and even 
illicit activities. In tightly constricted environments of this 
sort, confirming attitude and behavior patterns are likely to 
spread, affecting broader groups of workers, employers and 
members of the general public. As a result, a virtually im 
pregnable set of barriers may emerge, cutting off many non- 
white and women workers from the broader labor market, 
and inducing either relatively high unemployment rates or in 
creased dropout rates from the labor force.
Despite these adverse circumstances, important progress 
has been made since the early 1940s in opening up career op 
portunities for nonwhites and women. The tight labor 
markets associated with World War II provided a powerful 
thrust in this direction. Later, with the long upswing of the 
1960s, both groups began to enter career lines that had been 
previously closed to them. Fewer than one out of five non- 
whites worked in white-collar occupations in 1964 but by 
1974 about one in three were in these jobs. During this 
period there was a significant drop in the proportion of non- 
whites in service occupations, particularly the private 
household category. Within the blue-collar field, there was a 
substantial shift among such workers from the unskilled into 
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Source: Manpower Report of the President, 1975, p. 34.
Note: The data for 1974 are not strictly comparable with those of 1964 as a result of 
changes in the classification of occupations to accord with the 1970 Census. Detail may not 
add to totals because of rounding.
Important as these gains are, nonwhites remain seriously 
underrepresented in the higher status occupations. In 1974, 
about 15 percent of white workers were in the professional 
category and 11 percent in the managerial and administrative 
category as against only 10 percent and 4 percent respectively 
of nonwhite workers (see table 6-1).
While nonwhites were scoring these relatively modest 
gains, women during this period achieved even fewer. Be 
tween 1947 and 1976 the proportion of women in the 
nation's civilian labor force rose from about 17 percent to 40 
percent but their concentration in the "feminine" jobs of 
secretaries and typists, retail clerks, bookkeepers, teachers
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and waitresses remained nearly as great as before. 1 Women 
have made some headway in breaking into such professions 
as accounting, where they constitute about 24 percent of the 
total, but still make up only miniscule proportions of such 
professional groups as physicians and lawyers.
During the 1970s there was some further improvement in 
the occupational status of nonwhites and women, particular 
ly if the comparisons are limited to relatively prosperous 
years when the unemployment rate stood at 6 percent or less. 
Between 1969 and 1978, for example, the proportion of non- 
whites (black and other) in the professional and technical 
category rose from 8.3 to 11.7 percent while the proportion 
in the managers and administrators category rose from 2.5 to 
4.8 percent. Similarly, the proportion of women in the 
former category rose from 13.8 to 15.6 percent and in the lat 
ter category from 4.3 to 6.1 percent over this same period. 
Similar shifts, though less clearcut, occurred in such blue- 
collar categories as craft and kindred workers. 2 These gains 
were especially noteworthy since, in relation to 1969, labor 
market conditions in 1978 were comparatively unfavorable. 
Again, however, the improvements did not alter the occupa 
tional distribution in favor of these groups in any fundamen 
tal way.
The fact that many nonwhites and women are effectively 
cut off from a wide range of employment opportunities 
because of their race and sex leads directly to more structural 
unemployment. Once employed, these workers are generally 
not allowed to compete for any openings other than in their 
restricted zones of work, even though many vacancies may 
have developed in other fields. The indirect, long term ef 
fects, however, are far more serious. Workers subject to
1. Manpower Report of the President, 1975 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1976), p 32.
2. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, pp. 261 and 263.
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labor market discrimination see little to be gained from ac 
quiring advanced skills if there is hardly any probability of 
their being used. Improved work habits, closer attention on 
the job, more readiness to cooperate with others these are 
attributes which are associated with stable work histories and 
a reasonable chance for career advancement; they have much 
less, if any, meaning where jobs are highly unstable and 
career progression very unlikely. In these circumstances, 
employer attitudes towards such workers tend to become in 
creasingly negative so that not even the first steps towards 
better training and improved job performance are likely to 
be taken. The attitudes of more experienced workers and 
even the general public become more negative and the circle 
of negative expectations and work-resistant practices is 
thereby made complete.
Reducing Discriminatory Barriers
The main effort to break through these barriers by legal 
means and open a wider range of job opportunities to the 
disadvantaged stems from the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Under Title VII of this law, a five-member Equal Employ 
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the responsibili 
ty of assuring that hiring, promotion and firing are on the 
basis of ability and qualifications without regard to race, col 
or, religious belief, sex or national origin. The main work of 
the Commission has consisted of investigating complaints of 
discrimination on a case-by-case basis and encouraging com 
pliance through informal conciliation procedures. In the 31 
states with Fair Employment Practices Commissions, EEOC 
must defer action for 60 days until the state or local unit has 
shown an inability to resolve the complaint. Prior to 1972, 
legal action to implement the terms of Title VII could only be 
brought by private parties or by the Justice Department, an 
especially expensive and formidable procedure from the 
viewpoint of lower paid workers. An important change oc-
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curred in that year when Congress authorized EEOC to bring 
civil suits on its own motion. Fear of legal action and the 
possibility of costly settlements has induced more willingness 
among employers to agree to voluntary settlements.
The trend was accelerated when EEOC became more ac 
tive in filing civil court class action cases. A significant turn 
ing point occurred in 1973 when American Telephone and 
Telegraph signed a consent decree providing $15 million in 
restitution and back pay for several classes of female 
employees and a $23 million promotion package for women 
and minorities. 3 Two other actions were: (1) the 1974 con 
sent decree entered into by nine major steel companies and 
the United Steelworkers granting 40,000 minority and 
women workers $30.9 million in back pay and establishing 
goals and timetables to increase the number of women and 
minority workers in areas in which they had been under- 
represented; 4 (2) the 1978 settlement agreed to by General 
Electric which provided $29.4 million in benefits to women 
and minority workers plus $3 million to improve affirmative 
action plans. 5
The Commission's impact on employment practices also 
increased as it developed more precise definitions and 
criteria in passing on discrimination cases. Thus, an 
employer was entitled to set tests or other objective stan 
dards for hiring but these must be related to job performance 
and not serve merely as a discriminatory screening device. 
Employers subject to Title VII are now prohibited from 
recruiting through their current employees or through the
3. In 1978, the Supreme Court left standing a lower court decision upholding this decree, 
thereby indicating support for affirmative action programs that remedy past discrimination 
in employment even when they conflict with established union seniority systems. New York 
Times, July 4, 1978.
4. Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall, Human Resources and Labor Markets, p. 454.
5. New York Times, June 16, 1978.
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union office if they get few black applicants and the racial 
composition of their workforce differs significantly from 
that of the community. 6 The courts have moved, though 
with less success, to establish similar criteria with respect to 
union participation in hiring and recruitment procedures, 
notably in the building trades.
The other main legal device for putting job opportunities 
on a nondiscriminatory basis is based on Executive Order 
11246 which was issued by President Johnson and which 
President Nixon allowed to remain in effect. The Executive 
Order is administered by the Department of Labor's Office 
of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC). The order covers 
all employers who have federal contracts and includes com 
panies with an estimated employment of 40 million persons, 
about two-fifths of the labor force. It not only forbids con 
tractors to discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, 
sex, or national origin, but also requires that they take "af 
firmative action" to guarantee equal access.
Under this requirement, companies must make an analysis 
of all major job classifications and provide an explanation 
for any underutilization of minorities; they must further set 
specific goals to remedy any identified shortcomings and 
supply relevant data to the appropriate government 
organizations on racial-occupational categories, racial 
backgrounds of job applicants, job progression charts and 
seniority rosters. Affirmative action under Executive Order 
11246 may in given cases require still further steps on the 
part of companies to increase and upgrade minority employ 
ment: recruiting visits to secondary schools with high black 
enrollment; advertising for employees in black community 
newspapers; and special training courses for the transfer and 
upgrading of black employees into all-white departments. In
6 See symposium, "Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964," Harvard Law Review (March 1971), p. 1114 ff.
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the case of the construction industry, minority employment 
goals, as opposed to quotas, have been set for individual 
crafts in some cities in accordance with the "Philadelphia 
Plan" concept (discussed below). It should be noted that Ex 
ecutive Order 11246, unlike Title VII, contains stiff sanc 
tions including cancellation, termination, suspension of con 
tracts and "blacklisting" of noncomplying companies. 7
The predominant view among impartial investigators is 
that, while significant in individual cases, these two legal 
devices have as yet had little observable impact on general 
hiring and employment practices. Stress is laid on the fact 
that the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division has a 
very limited staff assigned to this area of work, that the 
focus of both the EEOC and OFCC is still on case-by-case 
dealings with individual (usually large) companies and chief 
ly on mere appeals for voluntary cooperation.
In the case of EEOC, Congress has rejected efforts to 
amend Title VII so that it would have the power to issue 
cease-and-desist orders, thereby severely undercutting its ac 
tivities. While OFCC on the other hand has sanction powers, 
it has invoked them but rarely; moreover, its executive 
orders refer only to government contractors and do not 
directy affect unions even in situations where they are the 
major or exclusive sources of labor.
Critics have put greatest emphasis on the need for drastic 
administrative reforms. In late 1977, EEOC had a backlog 
of 130,000 unsettled cases and two years were required to set 
tle the average case. Since its inception in 1965, the agency 
has had seven chairmen, three in the three years ending in 
1977. OFCC also appears to have lacked any clear direction. 
Enforcement procedures have been particularly weak, with 
only fifteen noncomplying employers barred from getting
7 See Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations, pp. 
705-714
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more federal contracts in twelve years in the pre-1977 period. 
It is also charged that while these two agencies are mainly 
responsible for the government's antidiscrimination efforts, 
there are in fact twenty-five separate agencies, each with its 
own rules and procedures, operating in this field. In the 
words of a 1976 report of the House Labor Committee's 
Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities:
Our findings indicate a weak, uncoordinated and 
largely ineffective enforcement effort on the part of 
those agencies charged with preventing employment 
discrimination. 8
Since 1977, a determined effort has been made to reduce the 
backlog of cases at EEOC and to strengthen the enforcement 
procedures of OFCC, but much work remains to be done.
Antidiscrimination Policies 
and Structural Unemployment
While overhaul of the government's administrative 
machinery in this field is clearly called for, the question at 
issue here is whether even the most efficiently run program 
would make a major contribution to reducing structural 
unemployment within the foreseeable future. In terms of 
providing a general framework for effective action, the 
answer is definitely in the affirmative, but in terms of 
specific lines of action, the answer appears to be quite other 
wise. Except where explicit forms of discrimination are in 
volved, the issues are not clearcut enough to be handled by 
legal means. In attempting to apply uniform antidiscrimina 
tion requirements to widely diverse work situations, the 
limits where the rights and interest of injured groups also 
become involved are soon reached. Other factors having to 
do with the general level of employment, productivity dif 
ferences, and the like have a more direct bearing on the
8. Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1977.
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nature and extent of structural unemployment. Unless these 
direct factors can be substantially altered, attempts to reduce 
such unemployment by antidiscrimination directives are 
almost bound to fail.
What, then, are the conditions that would have to be met 
if an antidiscrimination program for dealing with structural 
unemployment were to be successful? First, as already in 
dicated, labor markets would have to be generally tight. As 
long as there is an overall slack in employment that affects 
even "fully qualified, fully acceptable" workers, those view 
ed as less qualified are apt to continue to be largely blocked 
from employment.
Second, where jobs are to be made available to workers 
who are viewed as being less qualified, certain economic in 
centives and perhaps penalties will be required. This may en 
tail subsidies and tax adjustments to induce employers, 
unions or particular worker groups to assume the added 
costs. Efforts to promote job entry by quota, however, will 
almost surely encounter severe resistance, so chief emphasis 
will still need to be placed on voluntary acceptance by the 
parties involved.
Third, explicit provision will be needed to insure that the 
productivity of such workers is brought up to the levels nor 
mally required of new hires. While it is clear that many of the 
factors determining job performance, such as one's 
neighborhood environment, quality of educational prepara 
tion, and type of previous skill training, may themselves be 
the product of discrimination, it is equally clear that direct 
ing employers to take on less productive workers without ex 
plicit recognition of the extra costs involved can hardly prove 
successful. Rather, the focus of public policy should be on 
giving discriminated workers as much opportunity to in 
crease their productive efficiency as workers generally, but 
not to guarantee job entry regardless of performance con 
siderations.
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Fourth, extensive governmental effort along a variety of 
related lines aimed at reducing other barriers to employment 
will be required if any real progress is to be made against 
discrimination in labor markets. In some communities, par 
ticularly in large metropolitan areas, a major overhaul in 
transportation facilities may be necessary; in some, extensive 
changes in housing patterns; in others, substantial infusions 
of capital in potential growth fields accessible to hard-to- 
employ groups; in still others, sustained campaigns to raise 
the quality of educational opportunities available to young 
people from disadvantaged families. Unless there is public 
acceptance of the need for strong (and costly!) actions along 
these lines, legal restrictions on discriminatory employment 
practices designed to reduce structural unemployment will 
prove largely fruitless.
Hiring Goals, Seniority 
and Apprentice Programs
The difficulties besetting present programs become clear 
when attention centers on particular issues, three of which 
will be noted here. The first is the use of specific goals and 
timetables as a means of raising the proportion of blacks or 
other disadvantaged groups in higher skilled occupations. 
This has remained a highly controversial issue ever since 
1967 when the Department of Labor's Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance sought to require building contractors 
in Philadelphia to commit themselves to specific goals of 
minority manpower utilization.
Rather than impose specific quotas, the government soon 
made clear that it merely required good faith effort on the 
contractors' part to meet their commitment to attain certain 
goals. 9 Similar efforts have been made in Chicago, Seattle
9 This was the federal district court's view of the Philadelphia Plan; see Contractors 
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Shultz, District Court, Eastern Pennsylvania 
(1970), the Supreme Court refused to review this case.
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and some twenty other cities, though with greater emphasis 
on voluntary agreements between union, contractor and 
minority group representatives. Even in the relatively pros 
perous pre-1974 years, however, a survey of 31 of 70 
government-approved plans showed that less than a third of 
the local unions had met their goals. Given continued slug 
gish conditions in construction, it is doubtful that this record 
has been improved subsequently.
However laudable their objectives, progress under affir 
mative action plans will necessarily be painfully slow except 
under conditions of extremely tight labor supplies. In looser 
supply situations, workers who long since achieved 
journeyman or related skill status will quite understandably 
insist on filling whatever openings may occur. To do other 
wise would mean, at least in the short run, supplanting the 
more experienced and presumably more skilled with the less 
experienced and the less skilled. Such bald displays of reverse 
discrimination could hardly provide a solid basis for public 
policy.
As to the strictly legal issues involved, much confusion ex 
ists over how far private parties or the government can go in 
this direction without causing reverse bias prohibited by the 
1964 Civil Rights Act or by the guarantees of equal protec 
tion and due process provided by the Constitution. Under re 
cent rulings of the Supreme Court the principle that affir 
mative action plans are legal is now quite firmly established. 
True, in the 1978 Alan Bakke case, the Court held by a 5 to 4 
vote that it was illegal for the University of California at 
Davis to reserve 16 of the 100 places in its medical school 
class for minorities, but in the 1979 Brian Weber case the 
Court, by a 5 to 2 vote, held that a voluntary affirmative ac 
tion plan reserving half the slots in a skilled-craft training 
program at the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation 
was legal. Moreover, in the 1980 Fullilove case the Court, by 
a 6 to 3 vote, upheld the constitutionality of Congressional
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legislation establishing a federal public works program in 
which 10 percent of spending was reserved for minority con 
tractors. 10 Whether the Supreme Court will follow the same 
reasoning embodied in the Weber and Fullilove decisions 
with respect to questions of hiring, layoffs and promotion 
remains unclear, but the widespread impact on affirmative 
action policies of these two decisions will doubtless be mark 
ed.
Even if the legal basis of such policies becomes firmly 
established, their effectiveness as a means for reducing struc 
tural unemployment would remain in doubt. Much would 
depend on how much emphasis is placed on specific restric 
tions and directives as against more positive, voluntary ac 
tions. If it is concluded that existing job holders will have to 
lose their positions to make way for minority workers, little 
observable effect can be expected. If, on the other hand, em 
phasis is placed on making sure that minority workers can 
qualify for any future openings that might occur, a signifi 
cant impact on the structural unemployment problem might 
well occur. To the extent that legislation provides the general 
framework within which employers, unions and local com 
munities work out their employment problems, an 
tidiscrimination laws are essential to effective action against 
structural unemployment, but little contribution can be ex 
pected if it means that existing job holders will be displaced.
A second issue leading to essentially the same result in 
volves restructuring seniority systems to eliminate 
discriminatory practices. In many firms, each department 
has its own seniority roster and since entry to departments 
with the better jobs was previously allocated along racial and
10 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 298 (1978), Steelworkers 
Union v Weber, 443 U S. 193; Fullllove v Klutzmck, Secretary of Commerce, No. 78-1007 
(July 2, 1980)
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sex lines, it becomes critically important whether departmen 
tal seniority will be allowed to continue. This, however, is 
just the first phase in what is frequently an extremely com 
plicated restructuring process. If a firm or a firm and union 
are required to shift to a plant-wide seniority system, should 
provision be made for redressing past patterns of discrimina 
tion? It could well be argued that simply permitting 
previously excluded workers to gain places, presumably near 
the bottom, in a broadened seniority system would not put 
them on an equal footing in competing for available jobs; yet 
how far should the courts go in ordering firms to give 
preference to these workers over other more experienced 
and, at least in an immediate sense, more qualified workers?
Thus far the courts have tried to follow a middle path 
through this labyrinth. Thus, they have generally struck 
down specific features of a seniority system that have the ef 
fect of excluding particular groups from jobs because of race 
or sex, e.g., unnecessarily long training periods or reductions 
in wages as a condition for transfers. 11 On the other hand the 
courts have held that no penalties can be imposed for 
discriminatory acts committed before the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. In what may prove to be a landmark decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently ruled that employees locked into in 
ferior positions because of pre-Act discriminatory seniority 
provisions could get no relief, but that for employees hired 
after the Act, complete relief, including retroactive seniority 
as far back as the effective date of the Act, is available. The 
Court based this finding on Section 703(h) of Title VII which 
it interpreted as meaning that Congress did not intend to 
make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to
11. U.S. v. United Paper Makers, Local 189, 71 LRRM 2005 (1968) and Hicks v. Crown 
Zellerback Corp , 69 LRRM 2005 (1968).
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continue to exercise those rights, even at the expense of pre- 
Act discriminatees. 12
However the question of segregated seniority rosters is ap 
proached, it is evident that the process of resolving the 
respective claims involved can only come slowly. No formula 
is at hand for cutting through the various interests at stake in 
any sweeping manner; a laborious and probably often 
frustrating case-by-case approach seems inescapable. To 
make this a major strategy for coping with structural 
unemployment, therefore, would not seem promising.
A third issue to be considered is the development of 
broader apprenticeship programs and (quite the opposite 
consideration) a general attempt to deal with the "over- 
credential" problem in employer hiring and promotion pro 
cedures. Both aspects of this issue bear on the role of educa 
tion and training in structural unemployment, the subject of 
the next section of this study. Here, attention is limited to 
any discriminatory elements that may be involved.
Apprenticeship programs, whereby trainees work with ex 
perienced journeymen for a stated period at lower wages 
while they acquire the necessary "outside" training, have 
largely been confined to construction, metal trades, printing 
and such occupations as meat cutters and telephone linemen 
and servicemen. As shown in table 6-2, the total number of 
apprentices registered under government sponsorship has 
come to a little under 300,000 in recent years as against about 
160,000 in the mid-1950s. While numerically still unimpor 
tant, apprenticeship training provides a clear-cut means for 
inexperienced workers with limited education to gain access
12. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court, Nos 
75-636 and 75-672, May 31, 1977 Section 703(h) reads in part. ". . . it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensa 
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
seniority . . . system, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to 
discriminate because of race . or national origin ..."
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to higher skilled, better paying jobs. Some progress has been 
made in achieving greater minority worker participation in 
such programs; according to the 1960 census, nonwhites ac 
counted for only 2.5 percent of the total, but by 1975 they 
made up about 17 percent. Women remained but a tiny por 
tion, approximately 2 percent of the total. 13
Table 6-2









Source: Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, Table F-14, p 274, and
1979, pp. 56-57.
*New nationwide data system introduced January 1, 1973.
The reasons for the limited progress are clear enough: in 
slack labor markets particularly, neither employers nor ex 
isting journeyman groups are likely to be willing to extend 
apprenticeship programs to new, hitherto excluded, 
categories of workers. Nor, given the institutional limita 
tions affecting their preparation and attitudes, are minority 
applicants and women likely to have the qualifications for 
entering such programs, assuming they even know of their 
existence. A sustained government effort on both fronts 
could yield significant results if job prospects become more 
favorable.
A feature of apprentice and less formal recruitment pro 
cedures that has become the center of much controversy is
13. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, pp. 67-68
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whether entrance or hiring qualifications in certain career 
lines are kept unnecessarily high, with the effect of excluding 
most minority and women applicants. Some apprentice plans 
require as much as six years of training before journeyman 
status is achieved, considerably longer than could con 
ceivably be justified on grounds of skill acquisition. In cer 
tain crafts where belonging to a union is a prerequisite for 
entering a trade, training requirements are set in such a way 
that membership is largely limited to relatives or personal 
friends of existing members. Employers sometimes also 
establish educational or intelligence test requirements which 
largely rule out minority or women applicants for certain 
jobs. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has gone a 
long way toward prohibiting such barriers to job openings. 
Whether more aggressive government action would have a 
significantly greater impact is debatable. In the 1971 Griggs 
case, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII "proscribes not 
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in 
form, but discriminatory in action." 14 Thus, pre- 
employment tests that were not job related were ruled illegal, 
since they were likely to exclude minority applicants; also 
tests were barred that operaate to disqualify nonwhite ap 
plicants at a substantially higher rate than white applicants 
or tests relating to a job formerly filled only by white 
employees as a matter of company policy.
This aspect of employer and union employment practices 
is crucially important in any broad effort to reduce labor 
market discrimination, but whether it could ever serve as a 
major strategy in reducing structural unemployment is 
doubtful. Except in extreme cases it is frequently very dif 
ficult to show that failure to hire particular workers was not 
based on differences in experience, ability or some other 
"objective" hiring criterion. In view of the legal complex-
14. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 124, March 9, 1971.
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ities and pitfalls which have come to surround pre- 
employment testing since the Civil Rights Act, many firms 
have moved away from using formal test procedures 
altogether. Whether legal limitations on such procedures 
could be applied in such a way as to have an observable im 
pact on structural unemployment is questionable. In any 
event, the overcredentialing problem tends to disappear as 
expansions broaden and labor supplies become tighter.
Chapter 7 
Strengthening Educational Opportunities
In any discussion of barriers to employment confronting 
certain groups in the working population, the role of public 
education must be given central attention. It falls to the 
country's elementary and secondary schools to provide the 
basic skills that underlie all lines of work; since many 
workers among the structurally unemployed do not possess 
the essential skills needed to meet minimum employable 
standards, the country's school system must play a central 
role in any national effort to overcome their deficiencies. 
The following discussion is addressed to the federal govern 
ment's part in such an undertaking.
Strengthening Educational Opportunities
When attention was first drawn in the 1960s to the 
paradox of high unemployment in periods of prosperity and 
the persistence of poverty in an affluent society, the idea 
gained wide currency that if basic education programs could 
be fashioned to the particular needs of potentially hard-to- 
employ groups, the way would subsequently open to their 
getting more and better work opportunities. This was in line 
with the approach pursued by immigrant groups in earlier 
decades to gain entry into the mainstream of American 
economic life and it fitted well into the country's tradition of 
education for all. Strong efforts were accordingly made dur-
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ing the decade of the 1960s to develop special educational 
programs which would widen existing and future job oppor 
tunities of the disadvantaged among youth, women, blacks 
and nonblack minorities.
These special efforts grew out of the much more inclusive 
educational systems that had been developed for the public 
at large. While bearing many of the same characteristics, the 
programs designed on behalf of disadvantaged groups were 
heavily weighted on the side of career preparation or re 
entry: acquisition of essential comprehension- 
communication abilities, development of at least some 
rudimentary work skills, and personal help in discovering 
and pursuing career interests. Special emphasis was placed 
on providing the extra professional and personal attention 
required to help these groups overcome the educational and 
related barriers associated with their disadvantaged 
backgrounds.
The high optimism with which this aspect of the War on 
Poverty was undertaken in the early 1960s gave way to an 
equally deep pessimism in the early 1970s. 1 Here again, the 
disappointment felt towards these special programs for the 
disadvantaged was paralleled by a disillusionment with 
educational programs generally. While more dramatic and 
tragic in its implications, the inability to deal effectively with 
the educational deficiencies of the disadvantaged was match 
ed by a mounting criticism of the nation's entire educational
1. The change in viewpoint regarding education was first spelled out in James Coleman et 
al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington- Government Printing Office, 
1966) A most influential study in the same vein was Christopher Jencks et al., Inequality: 
A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York 1 Basic 
Books, 1972) For an early critique of this viewpoint, see Charles S. Benson (director), 
Final Report to the Senate Select Committee on School District Finance, Vol. 1 (Sacramen 
to, CA: The Committee, 1972, processed). The most serious weakness of the Coleman 
Report, one that Coleman himself has recognized, is that limitations of data obliged his 
group to consider only physical resource differences among schools and not such things as 
how teachers organize their classrooms.
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structure and practices its costs, methods and even overall 
direction.
As for governmental efforts aimed at improving the 
cognitive skills of disadvantaged students, particularly those 
in inner-city ghettos, the major findings of investigators dur 
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s, findings which continue to 
have considerable influence today, were set forth by one 
scholar in the following terms:
The most comprehensive review of the literature on 
this subject concludes that [compensatory] education 
programs on the average have not been successful in 
improving the relative performance of disadvantaged 
students, and studies of educational effectiveness offer 
little basis for optimism that the schools can be used to 
create such impacts. 2
Similarly with respect to special efforts to lengthen the 
schooling period of disadvantaged students, the same 
scholar concluded:
To summarize, the strategy of alleviating poverty 
through programs that encourage disadvantaged per 
sons to obtain more schooling seems to have been 
characterized by two shortcomings. First, it does not ap 
pear that the programs were very successful in raising 
educational attainments [i.e., lengthening the schooling 
of disadvantaged students]. Second, it does not seem 
likely that increasing educational attainments of the ex 
isting poor would have reduced the poverty class in a 
society where there are simply an inadequate number of 
jobs at wages above the poverty level to absorb all job 
seekers. 3
2. Robert A. Haveman, ed., A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs (New York. 
Academic Press, 1977), p. 158, citing Harvey A Averchetal , How Effective Is Schooling? 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology Publications, 1974).
3. Ibid., p 170
118 Educational Opportunities 
Promising Approaches
Contrary to the earlier investigations by Coleman and 
others, a number of recent studies indicate that differences 
among inner-city schools and, perhaps more significantly, 
differences among individual classrooms, determine whether 
disadvantaged students succeed or fail in acquiring fun 
damental skills. The more important of these studies were 
conducted by Ronald Edmonds and John Frederickson of 
Harvard, George Weber, formerly of the Council for Basic 
Education, and Michael Rutter of the University of London.
Current views about the federal government's Head Start 
program illustrates this change in outlook. This program was 
started in 1965 to provide a stimulating learning environment 
for preschool children from low income families on the 
assumption they would retain important long term educa 
tional benefits from the experience. Following the highly 
critical Westinghouse-Ohio Report issued in 1969, attitudes 
toward Head Start changed radically; according to the 
Report, any cognitive and affective gains from the program 
largely disappeared by the time children reached second and 
third grades.
More recent investigations, notably the 1974 HEW study, 
Lasting Effects After Preschool, indicate that the benefits of 
Head Start have proven much more lasting after all. This 
study pooled the research efforts of twelve investigators who 
had independently conducted experimental preschool studies 
and covered the school careers on a longitudinal basis of par 
ticipating and nonparticipating students who had reached 
the ages of 10 to 19 years of age. This relatively long term 
study concluded that the program did in fact yield long- 
lasting benefits in that participants were less likely than non- 
participants to require placement in special remedial classes,
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to be retained in grade, or to score poorly in standardized 
mathematics achievement tests compared to control groups. 4
A similar shift in viewpoint, though less clear-cut, has oc 
curred more generally among research scholars who have 
studied elementary and secondary compensatory educational 
programs for disadvantaged students. For example, a report 
to a presidential commission on school finance concluded 
that where conditions in the school environment are essen 
tially the same for disadvantaged as for nondisadvantaged 
students, the comparative ratio of progress among the two 
groups does not appear to be significantly different. 5 This 
finding is particularly significant in view of the fact that the 
school environment of disadvantaged students generally falls 
far short of the school environment enjoyed by students 
from nondisadvantaged backgrounds. Admitting the limita 
tions of dollar expenditures as a measure of differences in 
school conditions, it is nonetheless revealing that in a state 
such as New York, school districts spend on the average 
more than twice as much per student in elementary and 
secondary public schools as the average district in nine other 
states. More important, even after excluding a few of the 
very highest spending districts, per pupil expenditures within 
states vary even more widely. Furthermore:
. . . the districts with the highest expenditure levels in 
any state tend to be found in the wealthiest suburban 
areas. Central cities, which on the whole spend well 
above the statewide average, normally exceed by a slight 
amount the expenditure levels of the average district in 
the suburbs. At the bottom of the spectrum are the
4 United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Consortium for 
Longitudinal Studies, Lasting Effects After Preschool (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1976).
5. Harvey A. Averch et al , "How Effective Is Schooling? A Critical Review and Synthesis 
of Research Findings," Final Report to the President's Commission on School Finance 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1971), pp. 100-108
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school districts in nonmetropolitan areas, which spend 
considerably less per student that those in urbanized 
regions. 6
Where expenditure per student is relatively high in central 
cities, the result is more a reflection of relatively fewer 
students than of higher expenditures as such; in metropolitan 
areas like Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and San 
Francisco, public school enrollment as a percentage of total 
population is about 80 percent of its level in the surrounding 
suburbs. 7
A related finding, which is as widely accepted though 
harder to measure, is that the same educational outcomes 
would require substantially higher expenditures per pupil in 
central city districts and certain rural areas than in higher in 
come districts. Inner-city schools, for example, have to 
spend substantial sums just to protect themselves: vandalism 
alone cost the New York City school system $3.7 million 
even in 1971. The buildings in central cities tend to be much 
older than in many of the more recently developed new 
suburbs, and costs of maintenance and operation correspon 
dingly higher. Children who require relatively expensive 
special programs to achieve the same quality standards 
prevailing elsewhere are often concentrated in central city 
schools since they need special help to learn what middle 
class children learn at home; they also require more expen 
sive equipment since they have greater need of vocational 
and technical training. Thus it has been estimated that, ad 
justing for the quality factor alone, New York City would 
have to spend $1,334 per pupil to provide the same schooling 
that would cost $1,000 in the nearby affluent community of 
Scarsdale. 8
6. Robert D Reischauer et al., Reforming School Finance (Washington- The Brookings In 
stitution, 1973), pp. 65-67.
7. Ibid , p 68.
8. Ibid , p 64, quoting estimates based on the National Educational Finance Project
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The thrust of these findings is clear: vigorous additional 
measures need to be taken to overcome the wide gap which is 
still keeping young people of disadvantaged backgrounds 
from getting an education that is anywhere near equivalent 
to the education received by students from more favored 
backgrounds. The argument that ''the poor deserve what 
they get" is suspect enough when applied to adults; to use it 
to explain why an inner-city elementary school child should 
receive a substantially poorer educational opportunity than a 
child of similar age in a nearby suburb seems patently il 
logical. If there is genuine concern over the overall cost of 
education, cutbacks should be confined to the upper income 
areas when students are least in need of expensive-type pro 
grams. Exactly where and how the relative increase in expen 
ditures on low income area programs should be introduced is 
admittedly unclear, but that the gap in "equivalent" dollar 
expenditures should be narrowed much further is hardly con- 
testable.
Estimates of the cost of overcoming such disparities vary 
widely, depending on the assumptions used. The one thing 
all such estimates have in common is that the dollar totals in 
volved are quite astronomical. Just to bring each state up to 
the median spending level of all states by means of a flat 
federal grant of about $500 per student in 1972 would have 
cost roughly $23 billion annually. To have gone further and 
removed most intrastate disparities in 1972 would have cost 
another $8-9 billion annually. 9 If the only groups involved 
had been disadvantaged students in inner-city districts and 
certain rural areas, the cost would have been considerably 
less, but political realities would have made it difficult to 
limit the grant system in this way. There is no denying that 
effective action in this direction would place a heavy strain
9 Charles L. Schultze et al , Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget (Washington: 
The Brookmgs Institution, 1972), pp. 348 and 351
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on the federal-state-local tax structure or, alternatively, on 
the allocation of government expenditures to other public 
needs.
Policy Proposals
Assuming substantial progress is made to equalize educa 
tional opportunities along the above lines, what directions of 
change would most likely contribute to more stable work 
histories of disadvantaged students in their later careers? The 
literature is replete with ad hoc insights and proposals for 
change, but there does not appear to be any single strategy 
commanding general support. The underlying difficulty, as 
emphasized in the 1966 Coleman Report and repeatedly 
stressed in subsequent investigations, is that many disadvan 
taged students come from, and look forward to, en 
vironments which destroy any motivation a student might 
have to progress academically, to move towards a career 
choice and develop the skills required to implement such a 
choice. This is simply to say that a person from an unstable, 
deprived home environment, living in an impoverished, 
crime-ridden neighborhood, attending an overcrowded, in 
adequately equipped school, who sees no likelihood of get 
ting a good paying, stable job after finishing his or her 
education or entering a worthwhile career of any sort, is very 
apt to be scholastically unmotivated. The astounding fact is 
how many students from this type of background complete 
their programs successfully.
At the same time it is important to realize that students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds vary widely with respect to 
their educational interests, motivations and capabilities, 
much more widely than between the disadvantaged and non- 
disadvantaged considered as two contrasting groups. The 
same generalization holds for both: there is no single course 
of study or philosophy of learning which can be said to be 
most effective (however the latter term may be defined) for
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either group. The chief difference in practice is that the re 
quisite degree of educational differentiation has been carried 
considerably further for the nondisadvantaged than the 
disadvantaged. The former are more likely to have the 
necessary background to be able to choose among different 
avenues of study; they have a better chance to translate their 
study interests into long term careers; and their immediate 
school environments are more likely to permit or encourage 
this kind of selective choice and experimentation. Under 
these conditions, the assumption that individual students can 
move ahead as far as their motivation and ability will permit 
is wholly appropriate, but where these conditions do not 
hold, the assumption makes little or no sense. Again, if the 
schools are to have any meaningful impact on structural 
unemployment and related problems of the disadvantaged, 
the characteristics and conditions of their programs must 
parallel those available to the nondisadvantaged.
This is the major thrust of the recent report on the coun 
try's high schools by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies 
in Higher Education. In the words of that report:
It is clear that many high school students and junior 
high school students as well are getting little out of 
school, because they simply do not see the relevance to 
their future lives of what the school is attempting to 
teach them. We believe that school might become more 
meaningful to them if there were more options available 
for combinations of school and work experience. 10
Given this important caveat, recent investigators have un 
covered certain characteristics of compensatory educational 
programs which appear to explain their relative effec 
tiveness. The theme of their studies is that in a successful 
compensatory program, the school's principal and teaching
10. Giving Youth a Better Chance (San Francisco- Jossey-Bass, 1979), p 107.
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staff have managed to develop a general atmosphere where 
students have come to accept learning as the focus of their 
school experience. According to Ronald Edmonds and John 
Frederickson of Harvard University, the characteristics of 
successful inner-city schools are:
1. Strong leadership by the principal.
2. Clearly understood teaching objectives.
3. A school climate that is safe, orderly, attractive and 
serious.
4. High expectations for all students.
5. The use of standardized tests to measure progress and 
to make plans for what to do next.
As Edmonds, who also is assistant to the New York City 
Chancellor for instruction in the public schools, 
acknowledges, these five characteristics could be more ef 
fects rather than causes, but he asserts:
What we are claiming is that these schools as 
organizations have consistent and observable dif 
ferences. 11
This same position was expressed earlier in a Brookings In 
stitution report:
For the most part these successful compensatory pro 
grams featured tightly structured approaches with con 
stant supervision and guidance from a staff that had 
been trained well and had engaged in considerable plan 
ning. 12
Another major finding of scholars working in this area is 
that students from disadvantaged backgrounds are in special 
need of bridging-type relationships between their school ex-
11. New York Times, December 26, 1979. Roughly similar findings have been reached by a 
number of other scholars including Richard J Murnane of Yale, George Weber, formerly 
of the Council for Basic Education, and Michael Rutter of the University of London
12. Schultze et al , Setting National Priorities. The 1973 Budget, p 358
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perience on the one hand and their home background, job 
requirements and community environment on the other. In 
any given case, one or more of these relationships may be 
seriously crippling, rendering any meaningful school ex 
perience quite impossible. Hence, close working relations 
will have to be developed between home, school and com 
munity to take account of this factor, whether to build on it, 
alter it in some crucial respect or act to offset its negative im 
pact.
Further, special procedures will have to be devised to link 
the learning experience of disadvantaged students to dif 
ferent job and career possibilities without cutting them off 
from the more general aspects of educational preparation. 
While account will need to be taken of different interests and 
aptitudes, some direct exposure to work situations will be 
essential for students from disadvantaged backgrounds and, 
incidentally, for many nondisadvantaged students as well. 
Finally, close ties will have to be established between schools 
and major community institutions health, recreational, 
correctional systems, churches, economic development agen 
cies and the like so that community services can be drawn 
on when and where required. Unless explicit provision is 
made for carry-over procedures in all three of these relation 
ships home, career and community the barrier which 
schooling now poses for many of the disadvantaged will re 
main largely unbreached.
No single set of procedures can be identified as the most 
effective way to achieve this three-way linkage. The 
availability of qualified and informed personnel is probably 
the most crucial element, persons with the time and ability to 
work closely together at both ends of each of these three rela 
tionships and even more closely with those students who can 
put such outside supportive relationships to good use. Ex 
perience does not suggest that the schools should attempt to 
take over the functions normally performed by the home or
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community institutions, but rather to provide the major 
coordinating leadership with respect to students still in 
school whereby the resources of such institutions can be 
drawn on more effectively. Unless adequate provision is 
made for qualified staff at each institutional base, little im 
pact is to be expected.
In terms of the specific job and career needs of disadvan- 
taged young people, the crucial institutional relation is apt to 
be the tie between the schools and the federal-state Employ 
ment Service offices. Other public and private bodies can 
also be effective in helping such students find job and career 
openings but chief emphasis needs to be placed on develop 
ing close working relations with these offices. In some com 
munities considerable progress has been made in this regard 
but in many, probably most, little more than perfunctory ef 
forts have been made along this line.
While current thinking among investigators of compen 
satory school programs has shifted in the direction just 
described, controversy continues over program specifics. Of 
the various issues already noted, including development of 
fundamental academic skills, improved study habits and 
greater interest in school work, none is more important than 
the question of how far should direct vocational training be 
brought into the programs of the secondary schools, a ques 
tion to which attention turns next. In discussing particular 
compensatory programs, however, it is important to keep in 
mind that before any special support measures are 
withdrawn from students from disadvantaged backgrounds, 
there must be convincing evidence that they have made 
necessary progress in the first place. Proposals for putting 
these students more on their own, holding them to essentially 
the same standards as nondisadvantaged students, and 
rewarding or penalizing them on basically the same terms, 
contain much merit, but only as the conditions surrounding 
the schooling and postschooling prospects of both groups of
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students come more closely together. The system of in 
dividual incentive, skill acquisition and self development is 
applicable to the disadvantaged only when the assumptions 
of the system regarding opportunity to choose, plan, and 
personally develop are at least remotely approximated. For 
large numbers of students from disadvantaged backgrounds, 
this crucial requirement is yet to be met.
The Role of Vocational Education
All the approaches to structural unemployment discussed 
to this point policies to reduce mismatching in job markets, 
wage and related cost barriers, nonwork incentives of in 
come support programs, discriminatory employment prac 
tices and basic educational deficiencies tend to be both 
long term and roundabout in character. Each has a general 
though ill-defined contribution to make with respect to this 
problem and the need for more immediate and direct 
measures is clear. Among the latter, vocational education 
has long played a prominent, if rather disappointing, role.
The critical questions with respect to the structural 
unemployment problem insofar as vocational education is 
concerned are: first, what contribution can this branch of the 
country's educational system be expected to make to resolv 
ing this problem, and second, should federal funding for 
vocational education be greatly increased? Historically, 
training for specific skills in this country has largely been left 
to private employer initiative. For workers already 
employed, skills are still mostly acquired informally on the 
job. Many larger firms, however, have established formal 
training programs, especially with respect to jobs unique to a 
given company. Similarly, apprentice programs have provid 
ed training in various skilled occupations, notably in the 
building trades. Private employer sponsorship and financial 
support have also been crucially important to the numerous 
private vocational schools and institutes which have been
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established to provide formal training in a number of special 
fields such as electronics, printing, textiles and the various 
clerical skills.
Government supported skill training programs have, until 
recently, been extremely limited and such efforts as have 
been made have been chiefly undertaken by state and local 
governments. Thus the rise in vocational training associated 
with the recent rapid expansion of community and junior 
colleges is based only in very small part on federal funding. 
The first significant support from the federal government 
came in World War I, but until 1963 federal action was 
largely limited to occupations in agriculture, home 
economics, and a few other lines of work. Even in the mid- 
seventies more than 80 percent of total public expenditures 
for vocational education came from state and local govern 
ments. 13 The 1963 legislation broadened the range of occupa 
tions for which federal training funds could be used and ap 
propriations increased fivefold over the next three years, but 
no widening in the range of occupations was stipulated, ex 
penditures specifically directed to the disadvantaged were 
miniscule, and the focus of vocational education, except for 
the addition of office occupations, was still largely limited to 
the same few fields as before.
In an effort to put vocational education on a broader 
basis, Congress passed the Vocational Education Amend 
ments of 1968. Provision was made for earmarking of 
grants-in-aid funds designated by the Congress, specific ex 
penditures for training the disadvantaged were allotted, sup 
port for cooperative work-study programs was mandated 
and the definition of vocational education was widened to
13 The total bill for all education in 1973-74 was $96 billion of which public education ac 
counted for $79 billion; in 1972, $2 7 billion was spent on publicly supported vocational 
education of which state and local governments accounted for 82.5 percent (Levitan, 
Mangum, and Marshall, Human Resources and Labor Markets, p 233)
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include newly emerging, as well as already existing, occupa 
tions. Again, much of the thrust of the new legislation has 
been lost, this time because of the limited support provided 
in the 1969 Johnson budget and the subsequent Nixon 
budgets. True, the fiscal year 1971 and 1972 budgets ap 
propriated nearly $500 million for vocational education, 
nearly double that of 1968, but this was considerably below 
the $870 million authorized for 1971. After 1975, federal ex 
penditures on vocational education rose markedly and in the 
1976-1978 period reached the $725 to $750 million range; 
even so, the federal share in total public spending on voca 
tional programs remained well below the 29 percent level 
reached in 1966. 14
Assessments of Effects
Assessments of the effects of public-supported vocational 
educational programs, whether viewed in terms of the needs 
of broad sections of the population or, more narrowly, in 
terms of the needs of seriously disadvantaged groups, have 
yielded mixed to mildly positive results. In a careful review 
of the best available studies comparing college preparatory, 
vocational, and general curriculum graduates of secondary 
schools, Michael E. Carbine concluded:
The conflicting findings are nonetheless sufficient to 
indicate that, based on the national studies, vocational 
education apparently yields positive returns to 
students. . . . Thus, we would judge that vocational 
education has a small effect on earnings vis-a-vis the 
secondary academic and general curricula. With one ex-
14. Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 172 and U.S. Office of Education, 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Annual Reports of the Commissioner of 
Education (Washington Government Printing Office, 1978 and 1979). For a general review 
of the shifts in vocational education, see Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall, Human 
Resources and Labor Markets, pp 230-243.
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ception, money benefits among the studies range from 
over $200 to over $800 per year, with most estimates 
centering around $400 to $600. 15
The same studies show somewhat higher rates of employ 
ment, on average, among young men whose high school 
background was in the vocational curriculum as compared 
with those in the academic or general curriculum. One study 
of three cities, for example, showed that high school 
graduates from the vocational curriculum experienced 5 to 
10 percentage points more time employed during a six-year 
follow-up period than did the graduates of the academic pro 
grams who did not attend college. 16
As to the effects of vocational education programs on 
unemployment rates and earnings of disadvantaged, hard- 
to-employ groups, the findings are less favorable or at least 
more ambiguous. Historically, these programs were largely 
built around farming and homemaking skills. The propor 
tion of total enrollments in these two fields has declined 
markedly as emerging occupations in fields like health, 
distribution, and "trades and industries" have received more 
attention. Since the early 1960s, however, the proportion of 
total enrollments in these latter occupational lines, with the 
notable exception of office occupations, has not increased 
appreciably. Of more significance, considerable effort has 
been expended in recent years to provide vocational educa 
tion opportunities to disadvantaged groups. While accurate 
data are unavailable, it appears that these groups accounted
15. Michael E Carbine, "Evaluations of Vocational Education," Ch 6 in Leonard A. 
Lecht, ed., Evaluating Vocational Education: Policies and Plans for the 1970s (New York: 
Praeger, 1974), pp. 79-80.
16 Lecht, ed., Evaluating Vocational Education, p. 7, citing Teh-wei Hu, et al., A Cost 
Effective Study of Vocational Education: A Comparison of Vocational and Nonvocational 
Education in Secondary Schools (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 
1969)
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for only a little over 2 percent of all enrollments in 1967 as 
against about 10 percent in 1974. 17 This shift in focus largely 
resulted from the legislative requirement that states set aside 
a minimum of 15 percent of their federal allotment for voca 
tional education for the disadvantaged. In 1975, total 
Federal Basic Grants to state and local governments came to 
$428 million of which nearly 18 percent was spent on pro 
grams for the disadvantaged; in addition $20 million was 
made available by the federal government on a nonmatching 
basis "to support programs and services for persons unable 
to succeed in regular vocational programs because of poor 
academic background, lack of motivation, or depressing en 
vironmental factors."' 8
Do vocational educational programs significantly improve 
the subsequent job market experience of disadvantaged 
workers and, if so, is the improvement worth the higher cost 
which, exclusive of home economics training, is about dou 
ble the average costs of general education? Judging from the 
few careful studies that have been made, the answer to both 
questions is somewhat more negative than positive and, in 
contrast to assessments of general compensatory educational 
programs discussed earlier, recent investigations have mark 
ed no shift from this view. True, the latter studies indicate 
that vocational graduates initially do better in terms of 
employment and earnings than nonvocational graduates, but 
over a five- or six-year period the advantage largely disap 
pears and in any event this finding does not bear directly on 
the experience of disadvantaged vs. nondisadvantaged
17. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Annual Report of 
the Commissioner of Education, Fiscal Year 1975. The proportion of blacks to total 
enrollments in vocational education programs comes to about 20 percent, whereas the 
percentage of blacks to the total population is about 12 percent.
18. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education, Fiscal Year 1975, p 112. As in 
dicated earlier, the definition of disadvantaged is unclear as is the identity of those who 
benefit from these special-aid programs
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students. 19 A group of investigators attempted to deal with 
this latter issue by allowing for differences in socioeconomic 
status, IQ scores and other personal factors of vocational 
and comprehensive education programs; their findings 
showed clear short term, and even some long term, benefits 
for vocational graduates but any long term gains have been 
questioned. 20 Merely giving greater weight to vocational 
education of disadvantaged students without strengthening 
this aspect of secondary school programs would serve little 
purpose. Thus, if the discussion were to end here the case for 
a major expansion in federal government efforts to 
strengthen vocational education as an approach to structural 
unemployment would not seem compelling. However, there 
are several considerations which give this proposal greater 
strength.
First, the positive effects of these programs on the job 
status of hard-to-employ groups show up most clearly in 
periods of prosperity when job vacancies are on the rise. 
Thus, the National Longitudinal Surveys (the Parnes study) 
dealing with young men in the 14-26 age group found no 
significant differences in the earnings of those graduating 
from different high school curricula in late 1966 when the 
unemployment rate was rising but significant differences in 
favor of vocational program graduates in late 1968 when the 
unemployment rate was falling and labor markets were 
tightening. 21 This accords with the common sense view that 
in periods of expanding business, vocational training
19. Michael K. Taussig, "An Economic Analysis of Vocational Education in the New York 
City High Schools," Journal of Human Resources, 3 (Summer 1968), pp. 59-87; Teh-wei 
Hu, Man Lin Lee, and Ernst W. Stromsdorfer, "Economic Returns to Vocational and 
Comprehensive High School Graduates," Journal of Human Resources, 6 (Winter 1971), 
pp. 25-47.
20. Haveman, ed., Decade of Antipoverty Programs, pp 173-175.
21. After controlling for a number of social and demographic factors, the study shows that 
vocational program graduates earned about $400 more a year than the academic program 
graduates who were in the labor force at the time of the survey. Lecht, Evaluating Voca 
tional Education, p. 7.
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becomes increasingly important as a means of opening up 
job opportunities for young people who would otherwise 
lack saleable labor market skills.
Second, vocational programs have long established ties 
with the nation's secondary school system and, in the form 
of institutes, junior colleges and the like, constitute a major 
element in the country's postsecondary educational system 
as well. The "establishment" character of these programs 
makes it difficult for vocational training to adapt to chang 
ing needs; witness the continued emphasis on home 
economics as but one example. Nonetheless, important 
changes are occurring. While admittedly systematic evidence 
is lacking that exposure to these programs encourages 
students to remain in high school or go on to college, 
nonetheless vocational education often does provide a foun 
dation for further schooling, with over one-half of voca 
tional high school graduates obtaining some additional 
education after leaving school. 22
The crucial assumption is that as vocational programs are 
extended to include a wider range of emerging occupations in 
the computer, health and service fields, and the relative over- 
supply of graduates with four-year college degrees becomes 
more apparent, the skill-training aspect of secondary and 
postsecondary education will become more generally ac 
cepted. This will doubtless induce more "advantaged" 
students to participate in these programs, too, thereby 
lessening the benefits in competitive terms accruing to 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Participation 
could be expected to be on a more equitable basis, however, 
than in general academic programs, especially if appropriate 
government safeguards are established.
Third, vocational training is the most effective bridge be 
tween school and work available to many students. It is the
22. Lecht, ed , Evaluating Vocational Education, p. 9.
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one aspect of the secondary school system which most direct 
ly concerns employers, as evidenced by the fact that a 
number of programs are based on close collaboration be 
tween employers and the schools. If carefully designed, these 
programs can provide entree to job opportunities for a wide 
variety of students, including those lacking in verbal or 
quantitative skills. Even though previous efforts to help 
students of the latter sort in this regard have been quite 
limited, some positive results have been achieved. More 
vigorous efforts, if carefully developed and implemented, 
would seem eminently justified.
There are certain aspects of vocational training with 
respect to reducing the amount of structural unemployment 
which are more promising than others. One is to give more 
weight to work-study arrangements which are carried out 
with the cooperation of individual firms or employer groups. 
Until recently, enrollments in these programs have hardly ex 
ceeded 300,000, but a goal of over a million would not seem 
excessive as broader acceptance by employers is achieved. In 
this connection the Carnegie Council Report referred to 
earlier recommended that:
Classroom vocational education at the high school 
level should be deemphasized in favor of training con 
ducted under employer auspices, apprenticeship, work- 
experience programs, cooperative [work-study] educa 
tion, and other programs to take the student into the 
community. 23
Following the lead of earlier work by Willard Wirtz and the 
National Manpower Institute, the Carnegie group also sup 
ported the establishment in major cities of community 
education-work councils through which school officials,
23. Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 141 The title of the 
chapter dealing with this subject is Vocational Education: Change Everything, Including 
the Name.
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employers, members of labor unions and members of the 
public engage collaboratively in developing and administer 
ing education-work programs. 24
Another proposal is to broaden the range of occupational 
lines for which training is available still further, particularly 
areas in which job opportunities are expected to multiply 
over the next 10 to 20 years. Some progress, as already 
noted, has been made in this direction, but much yet remains 
to be done. Similarly, there is need for more systematic 
screening, advising, and follow up of participants from the 
point of initial entry in a training program to placement in a 
job with at least some career potential. The lack of adequate 
guidance and progress assessment is especially costly in the 
case of students coming from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
These considerations chiefly apply to students in secondary 
schools and postsecondary schools offering other than 
general academic work but, with some qualifications, they 
apply to adults in vocational education programs as well.
Principal responsibility for moving vocational schools and 
programs in these directions lies with the federal government 
since it commands both the breadth of viewpoint and the 
source of funds needed to mount an effective strategy. 
Beyond the general lines noted above, there is little agree 
ment on specific next steps, so an experimental approach 
backed up by careful research and continuing appraisal 
seems the only prudent course to follow. This is not to say 
that vigorous federal efforts to strengthen and broaden voca 
tional education are not called for; to the contrary, a pro 
nounced increase in such efforts would mark an important 
step in dealing with structural unemployment and related 
problems.
24 Ibid , p 125.

Chapter 8 
Public Service Employment Programs
Government efforts to deal with unemployment by direct 
but selective job creation has a long history, but this aspect 
of public policy was largely forgotten as Keynesian ideas 
concerning aggregate demand management became more 
widely accepted. Thus, in the early 1960s, attention centered 
on expanding demand by such means as the 1962 investment 
tax credit and the 1964 personal and corporate income tax 
cuts. Subsequently, with preparation for the Vietnam War 
inducing a sharp rise in aggregate demand, a few selective 
measures were introduced which were aimed at providing not 
only training but some limited forms of work experience and 
public service employment. In 1967 the government launch 
ed the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) which 
sought to provide "one-stop" training and other services to 
disadvantaged workers in inner-city areas who were subject 
to the worst employment and income conditions and, addi 
tionally, to induce private employers to hire such workers 
from these severely depressed areas.
In 1968 a still more ambitious effort, the Jobs Oppor 
tunities in the Business Sector (JOBS), was undertaken to in 
duce private industry to hire disadvantaged workers. Under 
this program, which was administered by a group of national 
business leaders, the government covered any training or 
other special costs entailed in employing nonexperienced,
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nonskilled workers. Most of the employers participating in 
this program were large corporations and approximately 
two-thirds of the cooperating firms did so without any com 
pensation from the government. By the end of the 1960s 
there were nearly twenty federal programs, each constituting 
an individual category administered from Washington but 
all aimed primarily at the training and employment problems 
of the disadvantaged. 1
Public Service Employment Programs 
in the 1970s
After 1969 and the advent of the Nixon administration, 
the federal government moved to shift major responsibility 
for allocating funds among these diverse programs to state 
and local government units and to "decategorize" most of 
the programs. The basic legislation of this period was the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) 
passed in December 1973. Under Titles I and II of this Act, 
state and local governments were given federal financial 
assistance to undertake a wide range of manpower services 
including public service jobs for unemployed or 
underemployed workers in areas of substantial unemploy 
ment. Job creation was given little weight, however, until 
unemployment began to increase with the onset of the 
1973-1975 recession. In 1974, with the unemployment rate 
above 8 percent, Congress added Title VI to CETA which 
authorized a broad one-year countercyclical Public Service 
Employment (PSE) program. Unemployment fell only 
slightly in the subsequent recovery and, in passing the 
Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act of 1976 (EJPEA), 
Congress continued the Title VI public service job provision
1. William Mirengoff and Lester Rmdler, The Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act: Impact on People, Places, Programs. An Interim Report (Washington: National 
Academy of Sciences, 1976), p. in
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along with Title II which was aimed more directly at struc 
tural unemployment.
In designing the 1976 Act, Congress sought to resolve a 
number of difficulties experienced under GET A. First and 
most important, it was concluded that many of the workers 
who were eligible for aid under Title VI and even under Title 
II were from nondisadvantaged backgrounds. Second, there 
was considerable evidence that local governments were sim 
ply substituting CETA workers for regular employees to the 
point where there was little or no overall net job creation. 
Third, it was felt that many of the jobs secured under both 
titles were of too long duration and provided little or no 
chance of leading to regular employment in either the private 
or public sector. Finally, it was concluded that under CETA 
local sponsors enjoyed too wide a latitude with respect not 
only to public service employment but to other aspects of 
manpower training and development as well. Both on 
grounds of more efficient organization and clearer direction 
of policy it was decided that a move back towards greater 
federal control was indicated.
The Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act of 1976 was 
primarily aimed at the first of these four concerns. EJPEA 
required that prime sponsors limit hirings to AFDC recip 
ients, unemployment insurance beneficiaries and exhaustees, 
and other low-income persons unemployed 15 weeks or 
longer. This tightening of eligibility requirements reduced 
the pool of potential applicants for most new PSE positions 
from about 20 million to 4.5 million persons; as a result, the 
proportion of those hired for projects from disadvantaged 
backgrounds increased significantly. However, the tighter 
eligibility requirements applied not to Title II positions, but 
only to newly created positions under Title VI and to half of 
the regular, so-called sustainment jobs under this title; sus- 
tainment jobs accounted for about 40 percent of all Title VI
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project positions. Moreover, in actual practice, many in- 
eligibles were hired under the public service employment pro 
grams. Emphasis was placed on speedy expansion of pro 
grams and local sponsors were permitted to undertake pro 
jects that simply extended activities already in existence. As a 
result, little progress was made in reducing the substitution 
of federal for local outlays and in increasing net job crea 
tion. Nor were effective steps taken to shorten the duration 
of jobs under EJPEA, establish projects entailing 
transferable skills, or develop a more clear-cut set of policy 
priorities.
The Reauthorization Act of 1978 which extended CETA 
for four years was in large part addressed to these issues, but 
the changes were relatively minor. The tighter eligibility re 
quirements that had been limited to Title VI were extended 
to what was now designated as Title II-D, the permanent 
program combining public service employment with training 
for the structurally unemployed. The 1978 Reauthorization 
Act also lowered the average wage that could be paid par 
ticipants, presumably on the assumption this would lessen 
the substitution danger. Greater authority, in addition, was 
given the Department of Labor to enforce eligibility rules 
and prevent substitution. Under the new law, for example, 
prime sponsors were made clearly accountable for any mis 
spent funds. Finally, the reauthorization act required spon 
sors to assess the employability of each participant and pro 
vide employment counseling, training, or other services 
wherever necessary; while the funds provided for this pur 
pose are meager (5 percent of allotted funds received for 
training under Title VI after fiscal 1979), this could prove to 
be the single most important provision of the 1978 law. The 
changing relationships between the government's public ser 
vice employment and its various training programs during 
the 1970s are shown in figure 8-1.
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Figure 8-1
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In a number of respects, however, the 1978 statute loosen 
ed rather than tightened eligibility requirements and project 
terms. Targeting rules under Title II-D were broadened to in 
clude a long list of disadvantaged workers including women, 
single parents, older workers and persons with limited educa 
tion; eligibility requirements under Title VI were somewhat 
reduced and the formula for allocating funds under this title, 
in contrast to Title II-D, was made less restrictive in that it 
did not combine income level with unemployment; only half 
of new Title VI participants were to be employed on pro 
jects, i.e., activities entailing newly created jobs, whereas 
before all new Title VI participants were so required. 
Moreover, the permissible duration of projects was 
somewhat lengthened. The broad intent of the 1978 
Reauthorization Act was to limit public service employment 
programs almost entirely to the long term, disadvantaged 
unemployed, but the specific provisions of the statute put 
this outcome in considerable doubt. The foregoing aspects of 
the 1973, 1976 and 1978 CETA legislation are summarized in 
table 8-1.
This brief review of recent developments in public service 
employment programs points to a number of specific 
changes which would strengthen federal policies in this area. 
For the most part these consist of proposals which would 
simply implement the changes in CETA just reviewed. The 
most important of these proposals are to (1) narrow the 
focus of PSE still further on the most severely disadvantaged 
workers, (2) give greater weight to jobs in these programs 
which would subsequently lead to regular employment in the 
private or public sector, (3) shorten the duration of such jobs 
for the same reason, (4) put more emphasis on training in 
skills and related work abilities as an aspect of PSE pro 
grams, (5) focus these programs more completely on newly 
created jobs so as to minimize the substitution of federal for 
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monitoring and enforcement controls to insure projected 
program results. On first consideration, changes along these 
six lines appear quite straightforward and virtually 
unassailable; on further examination, however, they pose a 
number of important, still-to-be-answered questions which 
warrant careful attention. These questions appear in quite a 
different light depending on whether they are viewed in a 
narrow or broad perspective.
Relationship to Other Types 
of Unemployment
One major unresolved issue is how PSE programs for 
dealing with structural unemployment can best be fitted into 
broader federal efforts to deal with other types of unemploy 
ment. In the various legislative phases for CETA, for exam 
ple, no distinction was initially drawn between structural and 
cyclical unemployment regarding PSE programs; next the at 
tempt was made to draw a sharp line between the former and 
the latter (Titles II and VI respectively); finally PSE was 
limited to structural unemployment alone, or more 
specifically to the severely disadvantaged unemployed or 
underemployed as a separate and distinguishable group.
The difficulty with this last formulation is that the extent 
and nature of structural unemployment varies with changes 
in the general level of economic activity and limiting PSE 
programs to a given group is likely to prove most difficult. It 
is safe to say that if unemployment rises much above 6 per 
cent, steps will be taken to provide public employment on a 
broadened basis in any case; the issue, then, is how such an 
expanded program can best be related to already ongoing 
PSE programs. 2
2 In this discussion, public service employment refers only to government employment 
programs aimed at providing jobs targeted on disadvantaged workers who face unusually 
serious structural barriers to employment; public employment refers to other government 
programs aimed at counteracting cyclical or longer term swings in employment on a non- 
targeted basis.
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The most promising approach is to distinguish between the 
kind of unemployment which requires relatively intensive 
support efforts and the kind that does not. As a practical 
matter, the greater part of unemployment resulting from 
marked cyclical declines or sustained downward trends in 
business activity cannot be dealt with on anything ap 
proaching an individual case basis; nor would this type of 
unemployment in any event call for such selective treatment. 
Adhering to a distinction of this sort would admittedly be no 
easy task; determining who would qualify for the targeted 
special support type of employment could not escape con 
troversy. On both practical and conceptual grounds, 
however, the distinction would seem altogether appropriate.
The same issue arises in even more extreme form regarding 
the long term increase in youth unemployment. In fiscal year 
1977, for example, federal aid providing jobs for young peo 
ple came to about $2.5 billion in fiscal 1977; in fiscal 1979 
the total (which included some training as well) came to over 
$4.5 billion and even in the face of subsequent budget cutting 
efforts this total is expected to increase sharply over the next 
few years. 3 The sheer scale of this effort would make it 
necessary to limit the more intensive, specially designed type 
of government employment program to the neediest young 
people confronting the most serious barriers to employment.
The important distinction underlying this approach to 
Public Service Employment programs is not between struc 
tural and nonstructural unemployment but within the struc 
tural category itself. Many persons, particularly younger 
workers, can properly be included among the structurally 
unemployed but certainly could not be classified among the 
most severely disadvantaged, no matter how broadly the 
term is defined. How far the government should attempt to
3. The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington: Govern 
ment Printing Office, 1980), p 235
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go in providing public created jobs for such less disadvantag- 
ed workers and on what terms is a separate issue, depending 
on what overall strategies are chosen for dealing with cyclical 
declines or other sources of unemployment. The essential 
point is that, to be effective, the type of public service 
employment needed by the most seriously disadvantaged 
among the structurally unemployed or underemployed 
should be sharply differentiated from government-created 
job opportunities for less needy workers.
Defining the Goal 
and Devising a Strategy
Once it is agreed that Public Service Employment pro 
grams, as opposed to other more general government job 
creation efforts, should be limited to the most needy disad 
vantaged workers, the requirements for effective public ac 
tion in this area begin to fall into place. Like most other 
measures designed to help those most in need, the aim of any 
PSE program of this sort can be defined as providing the 
most severely disadvantaged with practical, attainable op 
portunities to find and keep permanent, regular jobs. While 
differing in important respects from one individual and 
situation to the next, the most promising strategy for achiev 
ing this goal is to identify the steps which a person needs to 
take to qualify for regular work and to make sure that the 
steps are in fact made available. Persons would of course 
come in at different levels, but since the program would be 
limited to the severely disadvantaged, many would have to 
start at a relatively general and fundamental level. Subse 
quently, more advanced, specialized work experience and 
training would be made available. Chief weight, however, 
would need to be placed on giving every individual par 
ticipating in the program a genuine, clear-cut opportunity to 
move towards regular employment with definite incentives
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provided at each step in the process. Without the latter, the 
essential element of motivation would almost surely be lack 
ing.
The most ambitious effort that has been undertaken along 
these lines is the five-year program known as the National 
Supported Work Demonstration project which was launched 
in 1975 at a cost of $82 million by the federal government 
and the Ford Foundation. The project was aimed at helping 
four groups facing long-standing employment problems find 
stable jobs in regular work: long term recip 
ients of AFDC, ex-addicts who had been in drug treatment, 
ex-offenders who had been released from custody, and 
young school dropouts, some of whom had also been delin 
quents. The focus of the program was the assigning of par 
ticipants to temporary unskilled but specially structured jobs 
in such areas as housing rehabilitation, building maintenance 
and clerical work. Participants were placed in crews of their 
peers and were supervised by staff members who were 
familiar with their backgrounds and work histories. Perfor 
mance standards were gradually increased through the par 
ticipation period until they matched conditions in the regular 
labor market. Prompt and steady attendance as well as good 
performance was rewarded by a system of bonuses.
A carefully designed cost-benefit analysis of the program's 
effects in 10 of the 15 demonstration sites was carried out by 
means of frequent interviews with 6,616 participants over 
varying periods up to 3 years. The results of this analysis 
were mixed. On the one hand, the program was found to be 
successful in enabling a significant number of welfare 
mothers find permanent employment after their subsidized 
work periods were completed; in their cases, from the 
perspective of society as a whole, long term benefits exceed 
ed costs by over $8,000 per AFDC participant. The members 
of the ex-addict group, while making less striking gains, also 
received long term benefits relative to costs, particularly with
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respect to lowered participation in property and drug crimes. 
With respect to the two other groups, however, the young 
school dropouts and the ex-offenders, no major progress in 
increasing employment was achieved. 4
The main policy implication of this project is that for cer 
tain groups facing long-standing employment problems, a 
carefully structured work experience resembling usual job 
conditions and work standards as closely as possible can 
mean the difference between unstable, low-level jobs and 
persistent unemployment on the one hand, and on the other, 
permanent jobs in the regular labor market. There is now 
substantial evidence that many disadvantaged workers have 
the necessary motivation and general qualities to meet nor 
mal job requirements if they are given the means to do so. 
For others, these same procedures do not suffice, but even in 
their case further efforts in this direction deserve serious con 
sideration.
The Demand Component
While the abilities and interests of participants are the ma- 
jor determinants of an approach to public service employ 
ment programs along these lines, the requirements and op 
portunities obtaining in the regular job market are hardly 
less important. Except as a stopgap measure, and an ex 
tremely expensive one at that, little would be gained from a 
PSE program for the severely disadvantaged if work oppor 
tunities adapted to the abilities and interests of participants 
were not subsequently available. Precise projections of 
regular job openings that would be available in a given 
locality or region for a year or two ahead would of course 
not be possible, but a rough matching of the future re-
4. New York Times, February 28, 1980 For details, see Peter Kemper et al., Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation, Summary of Findings of the National Supported 
Work Demonstration (Cambridge, MA: Ballmger Publishing Co., 1980)
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quirements of employers and the number of expected com- 
pleters of PSE programs would be feasible.
If any serious effort were made of this nature, something 
which for the most part has yet to be done, the implications 
for the design and implementation of these programs would 
be far reaching. In periods of strong business expansion, a 
shift in emphasis to meeting the job requirements of 
employers in the private and public sector as job oppor 
tunities became more abundant would be especially impor 
tant. Even in these circumstances, it is by no means certain 
that specialized skilled training immediately demanded by 
particular employers would be the proper focus for a given 
PSE program if for no other reason than that the 
backgrounds, abilities and interests of program participants 
would vary so widely. Nonetheless, if finding regular work 
remains the crucial test, the dependence of PSE on accep 
tance by employers and therefore on their needs is evident. 
Viewed in this light, a program of subsidized employment 
which culminated in a apprentice training opportunity would 
seem highly desirable. In this sense at least the job prepara 
tion needs of severely disadvantaged workers are no dif 
ferent from other long term but less disadvantaged 
unemployed or underemployed persons.
Still another implication is that if the number of subsidiz 
ed PSE job holders were limited by the number and composi 
tion of regular job openings, public service employment 
would presumably be sharply restricted in most localities. 
Not only would this call for a further tightening in eligibility 
requirements in determining who should be included in the 
severely disadvantaged unemployed and underemployed 
pool of workers, but local authorities would also need to be 
able to set still tighter requirements if sufficient regular 
market job opportunities are not expected. In periods of 
strong business expansion this will be less of a problem than 
if unemployment is generally rising or has become
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widespread. In the latter environment more sweeping types 
of public employment programs would doubtless prove 
necessary; programs appropriate to such an economic en 
vironment, however, should be sharply distinguished from 
the kind of PSE program outlined here.
The Substitution Issue
Despite continuing efforts to minimize the substitution of 
federal for local dollars in public service employment pro 
grams, the danger of this occurring still exists. Earlier studies 
indicated that the substitution effect was quite high. In the 
1976 investigation by Alan Fechter, for example, this effect 
was said to be in the range of 50 percent; in the 1978 study by 
the National Research Council, on the other hand, it was 
estimated to average about 35 percent and in the 1979 survey 
volume, Evaluating Manpower Training Programs, George 
Johnson's estimate came to less than 20 percent. 5 While it is 
evident that the initial estimates were too high, the substitu 
tion question remains a serious one.
Both the Emergency Jobs Programs Act of 1976 and the 
CETA Reauthorization Act of 1978 were aimed at reducing 
the substitution effects of public service employment pro 
grams. Under this legislation, most new hires were to be 
employed in short-duration projects outside existing govern 
ment services, prime sponsors were encouraged to make con 
tracts with private nonprofit organizations and government 
agencies on the understanding they would undertake new ac 
tivities, the permissible average wage was set low enough
5. Alan Fechter, Public Employment Programs (Washington. The Urban Institute, 1976); 
National Research Council, CETA: Manpower Programs Under Local Control 
(Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), p. 179; Farrell E. Bloch, ed., 
Evaluating Manpower Training Programs (Greenwich, CN* JAI Press, 1979), essay by 
George E. Johnson, "The Labor Market Displacement Effect in the Analysis of the Net 
Impact of Manpower Training Programs," pp. 227-254 It should be emphasized that the 
Johnson essay is confined to the effects of manpower training programs alone.
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($7,200 in annual terms in 1979) to induce greater participa 
tion by nonprofit organizations and, finally, the Department 
of Labor was authorized to establish new controls and en 
forcement procedures to prevent substitution by local prime 
sponsors.
As noted earlier, the CETA legislation now on the books 
undercuts these provisions in a number of ways, most 
notably by providing that only half of Title VI funds be used 
for projects as opposed to maintaining already existing ac 
tivities and, what is more serious, the term "project" is 
defined in such a way so as to include almost any kind of ac 
tivity. 6 Still further tightening along lines already taken are 
needed if the substitution danger is to be dealt with effective 
ly.
There remains the question whether changes of this sort, 
being limited to detailed features of the law and its ad 
ministration, would in fact significantly reduce the substitu 
tion effects of PSE programs. The chances are high they 
would not. Even with these changes, the sheer size and scope 
of these programs would almost certainly result in sponsors 
stretching the rules and substituting federal for local funds. 
The wider the range of skills and backgrounds of PSE par 
ticipants, the greater would be the inducement to use the 
federal monies in this way. This is but another example of 
the difficulties that will persist as long as PSE programs are 
aimed at groups other than those facing the most serious 
economic and social barriers to employment.
The other basic requirement for minimizing the substitu 
tion danger is to confine PSE to the kinds of work and train 
ing experience for which demand prospects are most promis 
ing and regular job openings most likely to exist. While the 
existing legislation embraces this general objective, provision
6. National Research Council, CETA: Manpower Programs Under Local Control, p 26
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for effective implementation is lacking. Indeed, the 1978 
Reauthorization Act marks a step backward in this regard in 
that subsequent to fiscal 1979, only 5 percent of funds are 
allotted to training as against the 10 percent limit that existed 
before. Unless PSE programs can help participants develop 
the specific and basic abilities required in job areas where 
vacancies are likely to occur, the problem of substitution can 
be expected to persist.
Individual Motivation 
and Career Entry
Much controversy remains over the question whether PSE 
enrollees generally lack the motivation necessary to find 
regular jobs. Such evidence as exists does not provide a con 
vincing answer to this question, the results being too mixed 
to yield a firm conclusion. It is possible, however, to identify 
some of the circumstances where individual motivation is 
likeliest to be positive. Perhaps most important, there has to 
be assurance that the PSE experience can be expected to yield 
worthwhile benefits in a reasonably short period of time if 
the individual meets performance standards satisfactorily. It 
is wholly understandable why many participants, given their 
prior backgrounds and experiences, would require more than 
promises of long term and necessarily vague benefits. Not 
even the likelihood of finding regular and satisfying work in 
a year or so could always be counted on to provide the 
necessary motivation to do well in a given PSE program. In 
deed, it seems quite incontrovertible that, lacking this pro 
spect, the necessary motivation will probably not be forth 
coming. Unless the programs contain this element and do so 
in ways that are convincing to the average enrollee, expen 
ditures on the programs will be largely wasted.
The other side of the coin is that if participants cannot 
meet the performance standards of the programs successful-
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ly, employers can hardly be expected to take them on as ac 
tual or even potential regular employees. Just as these 
workers need confidence that regular jobs are in prospect, 
employers need confidence that in a reasonably short time 
new hires can meet minimum standards of performance.
These considerations underscore the importance of a ma 
jor theme of this study: workers facing serious barriers to 
employment cannot be dealt with effectively in large 
homogeneous groups; fully individualized treatment in all 
cases is of course out of the question, but since account has 
to be taken of differing needs and plans, reasonably close 
track must be maintained of the progress of each worker. 
Lacking this, neither current participants nor potential 
employers are likely to have sufficient confidence in the pro 
grams to keep them on a solid basis. Admittedly, not even 
this approach will assure favorable results, but at least it will 
heighten the chances for success.
The specific features of a possible approach to PSE along 
these lines were outlined earlier in this chapter. The key con 
sideration was to provide participants with a series of clearly 
defined steps whereby they could qualify for regular, unsub- 
sidized work in either the private or public sector. In this 
way, emphasis would be placed on enlisting individual 
worker effort to achieve regular job status—public policy 
would provide the opportunity in successive phases but the 
initiative at each level would be left to the individual. Any at 
tempt to put a program along these lines on a mass basis 
could hardly escape failure.
The principal element in an approach built along such 
highly restrictive lines is the kind of training which should be 
provided. Thus, the government's public service employ 
ment programs have to be viewed in the context of its 
broader responsibilities in the training area, the subject to 
which attention now turns.
Chapter 9 
Government Training Programs
The emergence of government training programs in the 
1960s as the principal means for reducing structural 
unemployment squared with both popular views and logical 
analysis. In an environment of high employment, what bet 
ter way to help the hard-to-employ than to equip them with 
essential skills and sufficient work experience to enable them 
to find worthwhile jobs?
The first major legislation of this period, the Manpower 
Development and Training Act (MDTA) passed in 1962, was 
primarily designed to retool workers who already had job ex 
perience but whose skills had become obsolete. This focus 
quickly shifted, however, when business conditions improv 
ed and it became apparent that the unemployment problem 
was largely confined to persons who lacked any marketable 
skills or any sustained work experience, notably teenagers, 
minority workers, and the "permanently" unemployed or 
grossly underemployed. An early instance of this change in 
emphasis came in 1963 when MDTA was amended to permit 
the youth training category to increase from 5 percent to 25 
percent of total enrollments. With some temporary shifts 
and even reversals in policy, the government moved still fur 




Other trends in the development of government training 
programs during these two decades were less clear-cut. As 
long as business conditions remained buoyant, as during 
much of the 1960s, emphasis centered almost exclusively on 
training in specific skills as the means for opening up jobs to 
the hard-to-employ. Even during this period, however, it 
became evident that many workers faced major barriers in 
the search for regular employment. As a consequence, ef 
forts were made to couple training with related services such 
as counseling, job placement and temporary work ex 
perience. By the mid-1970s, as indicated in the preceding 
chapter, more emphasis had come to be placed on providing 
temporary jobs than on providing training, first as a way of 
dealing with structural unemployment and then with cyclical 
unemployment. At the end of the 1970s somewhat greater at 
tention was once again being given to training in specific 
skills, but this was primarily viewed as an element in sub 
sidized work programs, with the chief emphasis still placed 
on providing the disadvantaged among the unemployed with 
temporary job opportunities.
The decline in support of training programs was largely 
due to mounting skepticism about their effectiveness. While 
the necessary data for definitive evaluations were not 
available, most of the studies completed by the early 1970s 
yielded quite unfavorable conclusions, with estimates of 
benefit-cost ratios running close to zero. Ironically, as the 
focus of public policy shifted from training to jobs, more 
adequate data became available and later studies revealed 
that the training programs of the 1960s resulted in a modest 
but significant net increase in participants' earnings. 1 By the 
end of the 1970s, interest in training as an approach to the 
problem of hardcore unemployment somewhat revived.
1 Farrell E. Bloch, ed , Evaluating Manpower Training Programs, essay by George E. 
Johnson, pp 227-254, citing studies for the U.S Department of Labor by Orley 
Ashenfelter (1973) and Thomas F Cooley and Edward C. Prescott (1972)
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Looking to the 1980s, the principal questions confronting 
public policymakers will be much the same regarding govern 
ment training programs as those considered earlier regarding 
public service employment: What are the effects on these 
programs of changes in the overall level of business activity? 
To what extent should such programs be targeted to the most 
severely disadvantaged workers? Have the programs resulted 
in the displacement of other workers to a significant degree 
and if so, how can such displacement effects be minimized? 
How can government training programs most effectively 
promote entry of participants into regular work in the 
private and public sector? Finally, how can the programs 
most effectively contribute to improved motivation on the 
part of participants?
Policy responses to these questions can be expected to be 
hardly less tentative and controversial than in the case of 
public service employment programs, since the government's 
approach to training has shifted frequently over the past 
twenty years and the amount of scientific evaluation of 
results has been extremely limited. The few policy recom 
mendations that emerge from this experience and these 
studies, while differing in certain respects, follow the same 
general lines in both sets of programs.
The Effects of High Employment
In accordance with generally accepted views, government 
policy can be expected to shift from a job creation emphasis 
in periods of low employment to a skill improvement em 
phasis in periods of high employment. This follows from the 
fact that expansions in public employment are called for 
when the general level of unemployment is high but a 
broadening of manpower training is needed as labor supplies 
become scarcer. In good measure this was the story of the 
1960s and the 1970s; in the earlier decade, the trend in
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unemployment was downward and emphasis was ap 
propriately placed on training, whereas in the later decade 
the opposite trend occurred and emphasis was quite rightly 
shifted to job creation.
As a guide to policy, however, this distinction can easily be 
carried too far. For one thing, total employment can rise 
strongly but the unemployment rate remains too high to 
justify any such marked change in policy direction. Even if 
the overall jobless rate were to decline significantly, the job 
picture for many disadvantaged workers may remain very 
unfavorable and, for these workers, continuation of some 
special type of public employment program would be essen 
tial.
As to expanding government training efforts in periods of 
strong business expansion, a similar skepticism would be 
justified. To the exent such efforts were concentrated on the 
severely disadvantaged, the increased emphasis on training 
would be altogether appropriate since it is in these periods 
that special training opportunities for the hard-to-employ 
would be most likely to succeed. Responsibility for training 
other workers in these circumstances, on the other hand, 
could be largely shifted to private employers since, in periods 
of expanding business, greater reliance can be placed on nor 
mal market processes to fulfill the training and job place 
ment needs of most workers. The further point also needs to 
be kept in mind that government training programs, in large 
part in contradistinction to public employment programs, 
are designed to meet longer term requirements of workers 
and employers; once in place, sharp reversals in their scope 
and direction would not be desirable.
Training Program Links to Job Vacancies
The more relevant question to consider is whether there 
are some types of government training activities which are
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better adapted to periods of high employment than others, 
that is, to periods when job openings are multiplying and 
career prospects are generally improving. In such periods, 
training programs that are focused most explicitly on filling 
the labor-upgrading needs and longer term career openings 
of private and public employers are particularly appropriate. 
Unfortunately, a few of the earlier programs and even fewer 
of those in effect in the 1976-1979 upswing had this aim. On 
ly two of the programs, Public Service Careers (PSC) and 
Apprenticeship Outreach Program (AOP), were directly 
aimed from their inception at getting enrollees into career- 
related positions. PSC was designed
... to relieve shortages of professional personnel in 
human service activities [health, education, 
neighborhood redevelopment, etc.] to meet the need of 
the unemployed and underemployed for meaningful 
jobs with career ladder possibilities. 2
At first this program, then known as New Careers, was 
limited to human services jobs in the public sector, but in 
1970 it was expanded to include a wide range of positions in 
state and local government agencies. Under this program the 
federal government undertook, through grants and other 
means, to place disadvantaged adults and younger workers 
in permanent jobs in the public sector. The aim was to get 
them into positions with career potential and to this end 
federal funds were made available to help defray extra train 
ing costs of these workers.
The focus of AOP was on helping disadvantaged workers 
meet requirements for entrance into apprenticeship pro 
grams, chiefly in the construction trades. This has been 
achieved by allocating federal funds to such groups as
2 Manpower Report of the President, 1968 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1969), p. 102.
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building trades councils, the National Urban League and the 
Workers' Defense League which have agreed to provide 
guidance, training and other aids to minority group workers 
who otherwise would not qualify for or even know about ap 
prentice training opportunities. Such opportunities were 
already generally available in the less skilled lines of work 
such as the "trowel trades" in the construction field, but not 
in lines requiring considerable technical preparation such as 
the electrical, plumbing and mechanical trades. AOP, ac 
cordingly, has given special emphasis to helping workers 
from disadvantaged backgrounds gain access to these hard- 
to-enter careers.
Several other programs have sought to provide direct entry 
to jobs, chiefly in private industry, but they have placed little 
weight on longer term career elements. The Manpower and 
Development Act On-the-Job Training program (MDTA- 
OJT) was something of an exception in the latter regard; 
under this program, every participant has been given a job in 
a private company with the assurance of some training and 
at least the possibility of permanent employment. Other pro 
grams have also provided placement in specific companies, 
but in entry-level jobs only, with a bare modicum of training 
and no assurance of permanence. Both the Work Incentive 
Program (WIN, now known as Work Experience) and the 
Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) programs 
have made explicit provision for giving employment and 
training opportunities to disadvantaged workers but in 
neither case has the relationship been effectively im 
plemented.
In the case of WIN, beneficiaries under the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) are re 
quired to register for referral either to a job, to a training 
program, or to some other supportive service. At first the ef 
fort to combine work and welfare, which began in the early 
1960s, emphasized voluntary job search and participation in
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training, but the state and local welfare agencies were ill- 
prepared to handle the undertaking and the incentives pro 
vided enrollees to get off welfare and accept employment 
proved generally ineffective. A more basic difficulty was that 
job openings for these workers, even in the favorable en 
vironment of the 1960s, were limited and the training pro 
grams often did not qualify them for such openings. In the 
1970s, especially after the Talmadge amendments of 1971, 
the emphasis shifted from voluntary to required job finding 
procedures and from training and related supportive services 
to job placement and immediate job search aids. With this 
shift in focus, in the words of one survey,
. . . public policy has virtually abandoned earlier 
rhetoric about helping welfare recipients to achieve 
financial independence, opting instead to move 
beneficiaries into any job as soon as possible. 3
Viewed in short-run terms, this reorientation of WIN met 
with some success: by 1978, registrants in the program had 
risen to over 2 million and nearly 300,000 found jobs as 
against 1.2 million registrants and 137,000 job finders in the 
boom year of 1973. As an approach to the problem of struc 
tural unemployment, however, the difficulty was and still is 
that the unemployment-prone groups—blacks, young 
workers, women and older workers—were less often 
represented among job entrants than among program 
registrants by substantial margins. In fiscal 1978, for exam 
ple, there were 124,000 fewer job entrants among women, 
and 140,000 fewer among blacks, than registrants whereas 
job entrants exceeded registrants by substantial margins in 
the cases of men and whites. Efforts to induce employers to 
take on women and black registrants, much less the more 
severely disadvantaged members among these groups, by tax 
credits, intensive information campaigns, and the like, have
3. Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall, Human Resources and Labor Markets, p 337
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had few observable results. 4 Thus an effective approach to 
combining work and welfare still remains to be found.
Though the initial orientation of JOBS was very different 
from that of the WIN program, it too failed to establish ef 
fective links for participants between employment and other 
components of job placement. This occurred despite the fact 
that, from its inception in 1968, one of the guiding principles 
of JOBS was to integrate work opportunities for the disad- 
vantaged with on-the-job training. Under the slogan "hire 
now, train later," a much-publicized national effort was 
launched to induce major employers to take on disadvantag- 
ed workers and provide them with the training necessary to 
qualify for regular employment; firms signing appropriate 
contracts were to be compensated for the special training 
costs involved but only about one-third of the participating 
companies chose this procedure.
While adequate data are lacking, investigations of the pro 
gram reveal great variability among firms in the range of 
training and supportive services. In summing up the findings 
on this aspect of the JOBS program, the Wharton Industrial 
Research Unit study concluded:
Overall, the quantity and quality of training and 
other services appears to have been [relatively] superior 
in the contract segment of the program, but [even] the 
record of the contract participants in providing services 
contracted and compensated for was far from good. 5
The study notes that prior to 1970 there was some tendency 
among firms which signed JOBS contracts to provide a wider 
range of career-oriented job opportunities for disadvantaged
4. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, pp. 58-63, and Employment 
and Training Report of the President, 1979, pp. 53-54.
5. Charles R. Perry, The Impact of Government Manpower Programs in General and on 
Minorities and Women (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1975), p. 191.
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employees who would have been hired in any case but for 
whom little in the way of prejob training or supportive ser 
vices would have been provided; even among these 
employers, however, the benefits on this score were ap 
parently meager. 6
The factors leading to this generally unfavorable outcome 
are not altogether clear, but two considerations deserve men 
tion. First, since the JOBS program sought to provide mass 
employment to large numbers of disadvantaged workers on 
virtually a crash basis, the effort centered largely on entry- 
level jobs, despite any career planning pronouncements to 
the contrary. Second, the downswing in business and the 
sharp rise in unemployment that occurred after 1969 induced 
a number of key firms to withdraw from the JOBS program 
while layoffs at other firms blocked further efforts to pro 
vide even entry-level jobs to these workers.
Programs such as MDTA-Institutional and the Concen 
trated Employment Program (CEP) also developed few ef 
fective links with employment opportunities, much less 
longer term career opportunities for disadvantaged par 
ticipants; but since they provided specific skills they at least 
increased the potential for these workers to find regular 
employment. These programs operated on the assumption 
that if disadvantaged workers could acquire the qualities 
demanded by employers, additional job finding aids special 
ly designed for such workers would generally be un 
necessary; existing facilities provided by the Employment 
Service and other agencies were deemed generally sufficient 
once these workers had achieved job-readiness status. 7 
Studies of the post-training experience of MDTA-
6. Ibid., p. 195.
7. The Opportunities Industrialization Centers program (QIC) has a similar training em 
phasis but lack of data makes any generalization about its employment impact extremely 
hazardous.
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Institutional participants indicate that the program has 
helped enrollees, especially women, who were previously 
unemployed find work, but has done less for those already 
employed. Moreover, speaking particularly of disadvantag- 
ed participants, it is clear that the program has been largely 
limited to entry-level jobs. 8
The CEP program placed heavy emphasis on inducing 
employers to provide jobs for its participants, but its success 
in this regard has been very limited.This program was 
designed as a "one-stop" coordinating agency to help disad- 
vantaged workers in severely depressed localities, chiefly 
large inner-city areas, find job openings and secure the train 
ing and related services to qualify for such openings. Actual 
responsibility for meeting their training and other job find 
ing needs was left to subcontracting agencies, with CEP serv 
ing largely as a coordinating office. This organizational 
structure militated against achieving quick or easily 
demonstrable successes. Training was frequently not carried 
to the point where enrollees could step into any but the very 
lowest grade jobs and employers became increasingly reluc 
tant to take on workers from the program. After 1969, most 
of CEP's job placement and related functions were transfer 
red to the federal-state Employment Service and attention 
shifted to placing workers with more acceptable job 
qualifications. Today, general responsibility in this regard is 
vested in the local prime sponsors under the CETA legisla 
tion while immediate implementation of whatever remains of 
the "one-stop" system of referrals is largely performed by 
the Employment Service offices.
The record shows that only a few of the government's 
training programs are explicitly designed to promote a 
career-entry type of job placement, the kind of training
8 The Job Corps program, which also has a training focus, is discussed at a later point in 
this chapter.
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orientation that is best suited to a high employment environ 
ment. In periods of strong business expansion a shift in em 
phasis in this direction seems clearly warranted. However, 
several other issues need to be considered before deciding 
how such a shift can best be accomplished.
Career Entry and Worker Motivation
The two remaining questions that call for answers regard 
ing government training programs are, first, what policies 
would be most effective in making it possible for severely 
disadvantaged workers to find regular, stable employment 
and second, what policies would contribute most to improv 
ing the motivation of such workers to find and pursue satis 
fying careers? These two questions are so closely related they 
can best be treated together.
The main thrust of the preceding chapter was that 
policymakers should give equal emphasis to subsidized job 
opportunities and subsidized job training in dealing with 
severely disadvantaged workers—that both of these aspects 
of the individual's development need to be kept in focus, if 
not simultaneously then certainly sequentially. The finding 
of the present chapter, especially in the opening section, was 
that this joint work-and-training conception has received lit 
tle more than lip service by officials and as such constitutes 
the most serious gap in the government's efforts to deal ef 
fectively with the hardcore unemployed.
One of the most difficult aspects of developing stronger 
policies along these lines is that of reconciling the needs and 
expectations of the workers and employers involved, the 
recurring issue touched on at many points in earlier chapters. 
It can be safely assumed that many of the hardest-to-employ 
workers are those least ready to accept the discipline and 
standards of even entry-level jobs, much less of higher level 
positions. On the other hand, the reluctance on the part of
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even the most community spirited employers to take on 
workers with such serious deficiencies is to be expected 
whether they are subsidized or not. Experience with efforts 
to break through this economic-social stalemate by means of 
government training programs has yielded little in the way of 
specific guides for policymakers, but a few recommenda 
tions deserve mention.
In considering how government training programs can 
best be fitted into the job finding, career-development needs 
of workers facing the most serious barriers to steady employ 
ment, the experience under public service employment pro 
grams reviewed in the previous chapter highlights the 
policymaking issues involved: sorting out the individual 
worker's immediate job and longer term career interests; 
identifying the specific steps the individual would need to 
take to realize them; offering the training and related ser 
vices required; providing the subsidized employment oppor 
tunity most likely to contribute to this outcome; and 
strengthening the worker's motivation by providing rewards 
at frequent intervals during subsidized employment.
This is obviously an idealized view of how the problem 
posed by severely disadvantaged workers can best be ap 
proached but its use lies in indicating the general direction 
government training programs will need to follow. One of 
the key considerations is to make sure workers engage in 
training that has meaning in terms of their particular in 
terests and prospects. Training for the sake of training may 
provide a temporary kind of support but can hardly lay the 
basis for longer term benefits; the training has to be part of 
some career plan, however modest and limited, to enlist a 
worker's genuine involvement. At the same time, the train 
ing has to be structured in such a way that the individual sees 
quite immediate and concrete advantages in performing 
satisfactorily. This would mean breaking up the training into
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a series of well-defined steps with periodic evaluations and 
income adjustments at each stage.
On first consideration, an approach to government train 
ing programs along these individualized, intensive lines 
would seem hopelessly impractical. It is important to 
remember, however, that the most severely disadvantaged 
group, as defined in this study, comes to no more than 
500,000 to 750,000 workers in the country as a whole, so in 
any given locality, the number would be comparatively 
small. More important, within this group a considerable por 
tion could doubtless be assigned to relatively specific, short 
term training opportunities. Even narrowly defined, the 
severely disadvantaged constitute a wide diversity of 
abilities, motivations and outlooks, and for a significant 
number, a relatively brief period of training supplemented 
by only one or two related services could well prove suffi 
cient.
The other key consideration is the response on the part of 
employers to this type of government training, not only dur 
ing the period of subsidization but afterwards as well. As 
emphasized earlier, the active cooperation of both private 
and public employers is essential to the success of any such 
program, but their cooperation cannot be expected unless 
they have adequate knowledge about the abilities and related 
qualities of workers in the program. No set of procedures 
can fully provide this information in every instance, but a 
system of periodic evaluations of each participant's progress 
would surely help. Such a system, if properly designed, could 
be extremely useful in enlisting the active support of 
employers as well as providing a continuing incentive to the 
workers to move ahead in the program.
This view of the role of government training programs 
parallels the approach to public service employment 
developed in the preceding chapter with the two functions
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closely integrated with one another. Whether in a given in 
stance, training or job experience should receive major em 
phasis would depend on such factors as the participant's 
prior work history, educational level, degree of job readiness 
and general background. In most cases a rough kind of 
balancing would probably be appropriate with somewhat 
greater emphasis on one or the other at different phases of 
an individual's work and training.
Two national programs present striking contrasts in this 
regard: the Supported Work Demonstration project, which 
is primarily limited to work experience, and the Job Corps 
program, which is primarily limited to job training. 9 On 
average, the Supported Work participants spend slightly 
over 80 percent of their program days on work projects while 
Corps members spend somewhat less than 27 percent of their 
time on work activities. The other major difference between 
the two programs is that the Job Corps is largely a residential 
program and involves placing severely disadvantaged young 
men and women age 14-21 in urban and rural training 
centers away from their home and neighborhood en 
vironments. Both programs, nonetheless, follow the same 
approach in that participants receive comprehensive services 
on an intensive basis which it is hoped will subsequently 
enable them to find steady jobs in the regular labor market.
Experience under these two ambitious programs does not 
point unequivocally to one being superior to the other. With 
respect to young participants alone, the age groups which 
make up all those served by Job Corps but which constitutes 
only one of the four groups in the Supported Work project, 
neither program can be said to be a clear success. As in-
9. Manpower Research Demonstration Corporation, Summary of Findings of the National 
Supported Work Demonstration and Mathematica Policy Research, A Comparative 
Evaluation of the Benefits and Costs of the Job Corps After Seven Months of Postprogram 
Follow-Up, Office of Youth Programs Report No. 10 (Washington: U.S. Department of 
Labor, February, 1979).
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dicated in the preceding chapter, the sampling of the youth 
target group in the Supported Work program was no more 
successful in subsequently finding jobs than their control 
group counterparts. Participants in the Job Corps, on the 
other hand, were achieving roughly 10 percent higher earn 
ings seven months after leaving the program than non- 
enrollees. The principal difficulty confronting Job Corps is 
its poor retention rate: the average length of stay is only a lit 
tle over 5.5 months, with the rate declining from 5.9 months 
in 1977 to 5.6 months in 1978. The economic and 
noneconomic benefits of the Job Corps experience are 
directly related to the length of time an enrollee remains in 
the Corps. Thus only 65.6 percent of terminees who were in 
the Job Corps 4 to 6 months found jobs in fiscal 1978 and 
their starting wage was $3.06 per hour, while the employ 
ment rate for those in the program over 15 months was 79.5 
percent and their starting wage was $3.47 per hour. A closely 
related problem is the poor record with respect to placement 
of terminees in jobs; in fiscal 1978, only 27 percent had full 
time jobs seven months after leaving the program, though 68 
percent reported they had entered some kind of employment 
that year. More disturbing still, the record shows that only 
one of seven Corps members who enters the vocational train 
ing program ends up completing it and being placed, upon 
termination, in a job in the same cluster. 10
As in the case of the Job Corps the Supported Work pro 
gram achieved its greatest success with those participants 
who saw specific gains from doing well in the program and 
placed high value on realizing those gains. It was AFDC 
mothers with family responsibilities who had the best 
postprogram record in finding jobs in the study of the four
10 Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, pp. 120-174 and 179-182; 
Mathematica Policy Research, A Comparative Evaluation of the Benefits and Costs of the 
Job Corps After Seven Months of Postprogram Follow-Up, Office of Youth Programs 
Report No 10 (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, February 1979).
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Supported Work groups noted in the preceding chapter, 
followed by the ex-addict group. The two remaining groups, 
young school dropouts and ex-offenders released from 
custody, had the poorest postprogram employment ex 
periences. Both of these groups, it is worth noting, 
represented a relatively broad spectrum of work attitudes 
and general outlooks. Viewed in these terms, it appears that 
the most serious impediment to effective government action 
in dealing with unemployment among severely disadvantag- 
ed workers is the inability to establish adequate incentives 
that would induce the steps necessary to qualify for work in 
the regular market.
This leaves the critical question of employer response and 
cooperation still to be considered. Put in terms of incentives, 
the answer to this question turns on what inducements and 
circumstances would prove most effective in gaining 
employer participation. As developed earlier, formidable 
barriers stand in the way of achieving employer acceptance 
of workers from severely disadvantaged backgrounds, bar 
riers that are just as much the product of long-standing 
social attitudes as more strictly economic considerations. 
One of the most promising approaches to stronger employer 
participation is to provide monetary incentives which will at 
the very least give added strength to other inducements 
working in this direction. Unfortunately, little is known of a 
systematic nature about this issue, but whatever route is 
taken, it seems likely that some type of wage subsidy system 
will be adopted. A review of the general principles that 
would underlie such a system would therefore seem ap 
propriate.
Chapter 10
Wage Subsidies and Employment 
James R. Knickman*
A particularly disturbing component of unemployment is 
that found among low wage, unskilled workers. This 
unemployment, which is significantly more common than 
joblessness among higher wage workers, is especially serious 
because of the chronic difficulty of effectively decreasing the 
permanent rate of unemployment experienced by this sector 
of the labor market.'
In 1977 Congress passed legislation designed to increase 
private employment of low paid workers by providing tax 
credits over the following two years to employers who hired 
more of such workers. 2 This was to be achieved by granting
*Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University.
1. One method for determining unemployment rates for low wage workers versus high 
wage workers is to compare unemployment rates for demographic groups that are known 
to have varying average wage rates. For instance, in the third quarter of 1977, when the 
overall unemployment rate was 10 percent, the unemployment rates for adult blacks, 
teenage blacks, and white teenagers, three groups with lower than average wage rates were 
11 1 percent, 39.5 percent, and 15 percent, respectively. White males, between 25 and 55, 
by contrast, had an unemployment rate of 3.7 percent. These figures are from Lester 
Thurow, "Inequality, Inflation and Growth in The American Economy," The Economist 
(December 24, 1977).
2 The summary of existing legislation is based on the testimony of Arnold H. Packer, 
Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, 
before the Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Code, Committee on 
Finance and the Select Committee on Small Business, U S. Senate, July 18, 1978.
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employers credits equal to 50 percent of any increase in a 
firm's federal unemployment tax wage base over 102 percent 
of the previous year's base. Thus, a firm hiring an additional 
worker could receive 50 percent of the worker's first $4,200 
of earnings as a tax credit. The legislation set a ceiling of 
$100,000 on the amount of tax credits that could be received 
by any one firm in a given year. Limiting the credits to the 
first $4,200 of earnings meant that the percentage subsidy 
would be higher for low wage than for high wage workers.
Earlier, in 1971, Congress had passed similar legislation, 
subsequently amended in 1975, 1976 and 1977, providing tax 
credits to employers who hired enrollees in the Work Incen 
tive (WIN) and other welfare programs. Under this legisla 
tion employers could claim 20 percent of the first year wages 
of eligible workers. Both the WIN and welfare credits re 
quired minimum duration periods of employment. 
Employers also were restricted from laying off or reducing 
the hours of other workers eligible for the credits, and the 
maximum an employer could claim for any one tax year was 
$50,000 plus one-half of tax liability over $50,000.
The chief policy question posed by any tax credit or sub 
sidy scheme is how much reliance should be placed on this 
approach to reducing unemployment among low wage 
workers. If the goal is to increase employment among such 
workers by a million or more, a very substantial liberaliza 
tion of the tax credit and eligibility provisions of the 1977 
legislation would be required. A program along these lines 
suggested by Robert Eisner, for example, could be expected 
to incur a gross tax cost to the Treasury of as much as $20 
billion compared to $2.4 billion projected for 1978 under the 
present program. 3 An effort of this dimension would mean
3 Robert Eisner, "A Direct Attack on Unemployment and Inflation," Challenge (July- 
August 1978), pp 49-51. Allowance for savings on unemployment benefits and other in 
come maintenance expenditures as well as for increases in tax receipts from the increased 
employment would cut the gross tax cost by as much as a half.
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that the government has shifted from broad expansionary 
measures such as across-the-board tax cuts to a selective ex 
pansionary program aimed primarily at creating jobs for low 
wage workers in the private sector. The Carter administra 
tion has favored some action along the latter lines but not to 
the point of supplanting or even materially reducing broad 
expansionary measures; in fact, it has proposed to narrow 
the focus of the job tax credit program sharply by limiting it 
largely to disadvantaged youth between 18 and 24 years of 
age. 4
In this chapter, a general analysis of the likely labor 
market impacts of a wage subsidy is presented. The impacts 
that could be expected on the supply of low wage labor, the 
demand for low wage labor, and the rates of employment 
and unemployment are each discussed.
Types and Effects
Wage subsidies can take two forms: a subsidy paid directly 
to the employer based on the number of hours worked by 
low wage employees or a subsidy paid directly to the 
employee. In the latter case, a target wage is selected and 
then the government pays a subsidy that equals some percen 
tage of the difference between the earned wage of the worker 
and the target wage. This subsidy is paid on each hour work 
ed by the individual. 5
Kesselman has shown that the two forms of the wage sub 
sidy have identical labor market effects if the subsidy is paid 
to or for every worker earning less than the preset target 
wage. 6 If the subsidy is categorical in that only a subset of
4. See Packer, testimony before the Subcommittee on Administration.
5. For example, if a target wage of $4 is set and the wage subsidy is to pay 50 percent of the 
difference between earned wage and the $4 target wage, then an individual who earns $3 per 
hour would receive a subsidy of $.50 per hour (50 percent x [$4-$3] = $.50). Similarly a per 
son earning $2 per hour would receive a $1 per hour subsidy.
6. Jonathan Kesselman, "Labor Supply Effects of Income, Income-Work, and Wage Sub 
sidies," Journal of Human Resources (Summer 1969).
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low wage workers is eligible for the subsidy, then the two 
forms of the subsidy can have very different labor market ef 
fects. For example, a categorical wage subsidy paid to 
employers would likely cause employers to substitute eligible 
workers for ineligible workers (if their skills were the same) 
whereas this response is not as likely if the subsidy is paid to 
the employee directly.
Studies of wage subsidies in the past have focused 
predominantly on the antipoverty effects of this public 
policy. 7 To the extent that total wages (earned wage plus sub 
sidy) increase for subsidy recipients, a wage subsidy program 
would increase the income of the working poor, a group 
largely ignored by the current income support system.
In the following pages we focus on the potential employ 
ment and unemployment effects of a wage subsidy. 
Specifically, we are interested in whether or not a wage sub 
sidy would create more jobs for low wage, unskilled workers 
and how such a program would likely affect the measured 
rate of unemployment. A wage subsidy paid to workers will 
be considered first, followed by a short discussion of the 
likely effects of a wage subsidy paid to employers.
The Effect of Subsidies Paid to Employees 
on the Aggregate Level of Employment
To determine a wage subsidy's effects on employment, it is 
necessary to determine both its impact on the supply of labor 
and on the demand for labor. If the subsidy is paid to the 
employee, demand can be affected only if the subsidy first 
changes the total amount of labor supplied.
7. For examples of this literature, see Kesselman, "Labor Supply Effects" and John 
Bishop, The General Equilibrium Impact of Alternative Antipoverty Strategies, Institute 
for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 386-77, February 1977.
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The labor supply response is likely to differ across varying 
subgroups of the low wage labor market. Specifically, the 
labor supply of teenagers and women has been found to be 
more responsive to wage changes than the labor supply of 
prime age males. 8
In estimating the labor supply effects for prime age males, 
it is important to distinguish between aggregate and micro 
effects. Econometric studies have added weight to the 
hypothesis that employed, prime age males decrease their 
work effort, on average, as their wages increase. 9 Effective 
ly, the studies show that men who have jobs use the extra in 
come resulting from a wage increase to "buy" extra leisure 
time. They can earn as much (or perhaps more) income after 
the wage increase even if they work fewer total hours. 10 
These studies use disaggregated cross section data in con 
firming the existence of a "backward bending" individual 
labor supply curve.
The results do not imply, however, that the total amount 
of labor supplied at a given wage by all males in that wage 
class will decrease if the wage rate increases. An influx of 
former nonworkers into the labor force and the employment 
of workers formerly unemployed could more than make up 
for the decrease in annual hours among those actually work 
ing before the wage increases. In three studies which ac 
counted for changes in labor force participation along with 
changes in annual hours by those working, positive total
8. See Glen Cam and Harold Watts, eds., Income Maintenance and Labor Supply (New 
York: Academic Press, 1973)
9. Ibid
10. Wage changes cause both price (or substitution) effects and income effects on work 
hours. Labor supply studies indicate that the negative income effect is larger than the 
positive substitution effect for males.
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labor supply curves resulted from cross section disaggregated 
estimation.''
If males who have jobs reduce their total hours of work in 
response to a wage increase, jobs in the low wage labor 
market may be created just to keep aggregate labor supply as 
high as it was before the wage subsidy. Thus one wage sub 
sidy result, even if aggregate demand was unaffected, would 
be more individuals working with work hours per male lower 
than before the implementation of the wage subsidy.
Studies of labor supply among women and teenagers 
generally find a positive effect of wage increases on labor 
supplied by these groups at both the individual and aggregate 
level. Women and teenagers who hold jobs tend to increase 
their work hours when wage rates increase and, in addition, 
some nonworkers accept employment when wages increase. 
Thus, a wage subsidy would unambiguously increase the ag 
gregate labor supply of women and teenagers.
From a supply perspective, therefore, the likely impact of 
a wage subsidy paid to employees would be:
(1) an increase in the total number of workers offering 
labor services in the low wage labor market,
(2) a decrease in the average hours worked among male 
workers who held jobs prior to the wage subsidy, and
(3) an increase in average work hours among women and 
teenagers who held jobs prior to the wage subsidy.
The net impact of these three supply responses would be 
an increase in aggregate labor supply among low wage 
workers. This increase would likely cause the market wage
11. See Edward Kalacheck and Frederic Raines, "Labor Supply of Low Income Workers," 
Technical Studies, The President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs 
(Washington- Government Printing Office, 1970); Robert Hall, "Wages, Income, and 
Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force," in Cain and Watts, eds., Income Maintenance 
and Labor Supply; and C Russell Hill, "The Determinants of Labor Supply for the Work 
ing Urban Poor," in Cam and Watts, eds., Income Maintenance and Labor Supply.
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rate to fall and, therefore, the demand for labor to increase. 
This assumes that the elasticity of demand for low wage 
labor is negative as has been documented in most studies of 
labor demand. 12
Earth has simulated the impact of a wage subsidy on 
employment demand and supply with a simple three equa 
tion supply and demand model. 13 For various possible values 
of aggregate supply and demand elasticities, he computes the 
employment effects of a program with a target wage of $3.00 
per hour and a subsidy rate of 50 percent. 14 His results in 
dicate that employment would increase by 3.05 percent if the 
demand elasticity is -.4 and the supply elasticity is + .2. This 
employment effect is larger if either the actual supply or de 
mand elasticity is in fact larger than -.4 or + .2.
Bishop designed a more complex simulation model that 
accounts for substitutability of low and high wage labor in 
the production process and allows for occupational mobility 
among workers. 15 Although his results are not reported in 
the same form as those of Earth, Bishop does note that his 
results indicate that Earth's simpler model understates the 
employment effects of a wage subsidy.
These results suggest that a wage subsidy policy would in 
crease employment in the low wage labor market. The results 
do not determine, however, whether this increased employ-
12. See Daniel Hamermesh, "Econometric Studies of Labor Demand and Their Applica 
tion to Policy Analysis," Journal of Human Resources (Fall 1976) for a review of these de 
mand studies
13 Michael Barth, "Market Effects of a Wage Subsidy," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol 27, 1974 The three equations in Earth's model are a demand equation, a sup 
ply equation, and an identity that sets demand equal to supply.
14. Barth uses data from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity. A wage subsidy, if im 
plemented in 1980, would obviously have a substantially higher target wage than $3 per 
hour reflecting high price and wage levels.
15 John Bishop, "Impact of Antipoverty Strategies."
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ment would come from those who are unemployed during a 
period of full employment or from those who are not in the 
labor force prior to the wage subsidy. It seems likely, 
however, that at least part of the employment increase would 
be composed of formerly unemployed workers and formerly 
"discouraged" workers who had given up looking for work 
and thus were not counted as being unemployed.
Effects of a Wage Subsidy Paid to Employers 
on Aggregate Level of Employment
Rather than paying subsidies directly to employees, a wage 
subsidy program could make payments to low wage 
employers. This type of program is often called a wage bill 
subsidy. In essence, such a program would be analogous to 
investment credit programs that use tax credits to subsidize 
the use of capital. A significant advantage of a program that 
pays subsidies to employers is that the subsidies could be 
targeted at specific demographic groups that are characteriz 
ed by high unemployment rates. Thus, for example, the pro 
gram could be designed to pay subsidies only if teenagers 
were hired or, alternatively, only if household heads were 
hired.
Thurow argues that such a wage bill subsidy strategy is the 
most viable approach to decreasing unemployment rates 
among low skilled workers in an economy where unemploy 
ment rates differ across demographic and skill groups. 16 
Most other unemployment strategies cause a good deal of in 
flation in such an economy, according to Thurow.
A subsidy paid only to employers of selected demographic 
and skill groups would likely lead to increased employment 
among these groups for two reasons: first, the cost of this 
type of labor would decrease, thus making it efficient to pro-
16. Lester Thurow, "Inequality, Inflation, and Growth."
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duce more output using extra amounts of the subsidized 
labor; and second, subsidized labor would be substituted for 
unsubsidized labor because of the change in the relative 
prices of the two categories of labor.
It is not clear that the substitution of subsidized labor for 
unsubsidized labor would increase aggregate employment 
levels. It is likely that unemployment would merely decrease 
among groups of individuals eligible for a subsidy while 
unemployment would increase for nonsubsidized workers.
To the extent that output increases and labor demand in 
creases due to a wage bill subsidy, however, employment 
should increase in the low wage labor market. The 
magnitude of employment effects due to the decreased cost 
of subsidized labor depend on labor supply and labor de 
mand elasticities in the same manner as does the magnitude 
of employment effects related to wage subsidies paid directly 
to workers. The total increase in employment due to a wage 
bill subsidy will be smaller than the estimate presented in the 
last section to the extent that the wage bill subsidy is 
categorical and pays subsidies only to a portion of the low 
wage labor market. As mentioned before, if a wage bill sub 
sidy applies to all low wage workers, then the employment 
effects of subsidies paid to employers are identical to the ef 
fects of subsidies paid to employees.
Effects of a Wage Subsidy on the 
Measured Rate of Permanent Unemployment
Besides expanding the number of low wage jobs, a wage 
subsidy paid to the employee or the employer may also have 
an impact on the number of unemployment spells that the 
average low wage worker experiences. To predict a wage sub 
sidy's effect on the measured rate of unemployment, 
however, the causes of unemployment in the low wage labor 
market must be identified.
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One hypothesis for the cause of low wage unemployment 
is offered by the dual or segmented labor market theory 
which suggests that much of low wage joblessness in times of 
full employment can be viewed as a type of frictional 
unemployment. 17 Low wage workers change jobs frequently 
because their low wage makes the cost of job search 
minimal. 18 The existence of various welfare programs and 
nonlegal or other nonreported work opportunities reduces 
further the costs of taking time off.
As a result of this low return on labor, workers quit their 
jobs frequently, continually moving into and out of the labor 
force. At any point in time a certain number of individuals 
are attempting to move back into the labor force or to find 
jobs, having recently left other low wage jobs. These job 
seekers are counted as unemployed. Evidence indicates that 
the average duration of an unemployment spell is shorter for 
low wage than high wage workers, 19 and that in times of full 
employment jobs are available although they might not be 
desirable opportunities. 20
These unemployment spells, therefore, cannot be traced to 
deficient demand but rather are caused by a divergence of 
the wage return offered by available jobs and the wage 
return desired by the unemployed individual. If the wage of 
fer reflects the actual marginal productivity of the "search 
ing" worker, then the worker, after a finite, unsuccessful 
search, will either accept the low wage offer or leave the
17. See Peter Doennger and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower 
Analysis (Lexmgton, MA: D.C Heath , 1971) for a good survey of the segmented labor 
market theory See especially ch. 8.
18 Modern Job Search Theory emphasizes the need to take a spell of joblessness in order 
to look for a better job. See Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation 
Theory (New York: Norton, 1970), edited by Edmund S. Phelps et al.
19 See George Perry, "Unemployment Flows in the Labor Market."
20 See Peter Doennger, ed., Low Income Labor Markets and Urban Manpower Programs 
(Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1969).
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labor force in favor of public assistance or nonlegal earning 
opportunities. 21
Segmented labor market theorists argue that this instabili 
ty of labor supply has caused employers to structure jobs to 
accommodate frequent turnover. Low wage jobs are design 
ed so that little or no training is necessary, few work respon 
sibilities are given to the workers, and the normal incentives 
of advancement through an "internal labor market" are not 
offered to these workers. This structuring of jobs, in turn, 
results in boring, unappealing work conditions and causes 
even more quitting and instability of labor supply.
The process is dynamic, with the chain of causation often 
blurred. It seems clear, however, that an important link in 
this circular chain is the high quit rate prevalent in the low 
wage labor market. To the extent that the wage subsidy 
reduces the quit rate and increases stability of supply, the 
other characteristics of the low wage labor market should 
improve.
Numerous studies have shown that quit rates are negative 
ly related to wage rates. Ulman has shown that quit rates in 
low wage industries are significantly higher than in high 
wage industries. 22 Severn23 and Armknecht and Early24 came
21 An implied assumption in this analysis is that the desirability of a job is completely 
reflected in the wage rate of the job This is a standard assumption in economic theory, but 
not so clear from surveying actual jobs Besides work conditions, however, the wage also 
reflects the training, education, and skills required of the job The fact that low wage jobs 
look so unattractive can be explained by the fact that the amount of training or skills re 
quired for a job seems to be positively correlated with the perceived attractiveness of jobs. 
This does not contradict the assumption that undesirable or more difficult jobs within the 
unskilled class of jobs have higher wages than more desirable jobs
22 Lloyd Ulman, "Labor Mobility and the Industrial Wage," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 79, 1965
23. Alan Severn, "Upward Labor Mobility" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 82, 
1968.
24. Paul Armknecht and John Early, "Quits in Manufacturing. A Study of Their Causes," 
Monthly Labor Review, November 1972.
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to similar conclusions, showing that the relation between an 
individual's quit rate and the interindustrial relative wage is 
negative. Hall argues that the frequency of low wage 
unemployment is due to high turnover among unskilled 
workers. 25
Thus, one can tentatively expect that a wage subsidy, 
which increases the net wage paid to individuals, will result 
in less frequent turnover in the low wage labor market. 26 Ef 
fectively, the wage subsidy increases the wage return to a 
level that is closer to that desired by the low wage worker 
while leaving unchanged the wage paid by the employer. As a 
result, search becomes more costly and the return on search 
decreases because the relative wage differences between low 
wage and higher wage jobs tightens.
Any reduction in the quit rate among low wage workers 
could be expected to have numerous beneficial effects on the 
employment situation in this market. Primary among these 
improvements is that the increased stability of the low wage 
labor market should lead employers to invest in training and 
to restructure the work done by low wage workers so that the 
jobs are a part of the primary labor market. These changes 
could reverse the dynamic process in that a better structuring 
of jobs would have an independent negative effect on the 
quit rate and lead to further employment improvements in 
this labor market.
25. Robert Hall, Why is the Unemployment Rate So High at Full Employment, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 3 (1970).
26. The prediction must be tentative because the empirical results were obtained with ag 
gregated, industry-wide data. A micro study of the quit rate-wage relation has never been 
reported, probably due to the scarcity of longitudinal survey data with accurate measures 
of voluntary separations. A micro study would allow for more control of other 
socioeconomic factors that may affect quit ratesv. It is possible that such factors are cor 
related with wage rates, and that the aggregate studies may therefore overestimate the 
negative wage effect on quit rates.
Wage Subsidies & Employment 183
The above conclusions are based on a specific theory of 
low wage labor market processes. This theory is a segmented 
labor market theory which emphasizes characteristics of 
labor supply as the cause of the undesirable labor market 
structure in full employment periods. In contrast, other ex 
planations of low wage unemployment have emphasized de 
mand factors in this labor market. It may be argued that de 
mand for low wage labor is very unstable, either due to 
seasonality of work or the importance of favorable (and 
often cyclical) market conditions for profits in many low 
wage industries. It may also be true that the nature of the 
work is such that no training is necessary. One other possible 
explanation of the secondary labor market is based on racial 
discrimination. Minority groups, according to this theory, 
are largely restricted to the secondary labor market because 
other groups do not want to work with them.
To the extent that the structure of the low wage labor 
market is the result of unstable demand and racial 
discrimination, wage subsidies cannot be expected to change 
the structure of jobs. Unfortunately, neither empirical 
studies nor informed opinions have pinpointed the amount 
of accountability for the structure of the secondary labor 
market attributable to each of the three causal factors 
discussed above.
One final explanation for chronically high unemployment 
rates in the low wage labor market is the existence of social 
minimum wages and the development of varying wages 
among different firms for jobs requiring the same skill 
level. 27 Social minimum wages are wages that are above the 
level required to ensure needed labor supplies. Some
27. Wage differentials within the unskilled labor market may also result from differences in 
wages paid by competitive and noncompetitive firms. For a recent formulation of this wage 
differential hypothesis, see Steven Ross and Michael Wachter, "Wage Determination, In 
flation, and the Industrial Structure," American Economic Review (September 1973)
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employers pay this "above equilibrium" wage because of 
their desire to pay a "fair" wage and to avoid accusations 
that they pay "slave wages." If social minimum wages are 
paid by some but not all low wage employers, a wage dif 
ferential within the unskilled labor market develops. This 
differential increases the return on job search. Thus, for in 
stance, workers may quit a low paying unskilled job to find a 
"premium" wage unskilled job, such as a construction 
laborer, a mail carrier, or a garbage collector. Many such 
jobs, which require no special skills, exist and pay better 
than other less attractive, unskilled jobs.
As long as the social minimum wage exceeds the subsidiz 
ed wage, a wage subsidy should not alter these social 
minimum wage levels. The wage subsidy, however, would 
narrow the gap between the wages paid by competitive firms 
and those paid by social minimum wage firms. This would 
decrease the return on job search and should result in less 
voluntary turnover and, therefore, less measured unemploy 
ment in the low wage labor market.
Potential Problems of the Wage Subsidy
The predominant wage effect of a wage subsidy will be to 
homogenize the level of wages paid to unskilled workers 
earning less than the target wage. Postsubsidy wages will 
vary less than presubsidy wages. This homogenization of low 
wages might act to discourage job advancement. Just as the 
return for job search is decreased, the return on training and 
education will decrease because a $1.00 increase in market 
wage will result in a ($l.-r) increase in net wage, where r is 
the subsidy rate. This argument is valid only if job advance 
ment is determined by the actual net wage differential.
If it is valid to view the labor market as a ladder of increas 
ingly higher paying jobs and if passage to the highest paying 
jobs is only possible by proceeding one rung at a time, then
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the return on advancing from one job to another is not only 
the actual net wage differential but also the long term poten 
tial gains of moving further up the job ladder.
Also, if we consider jobs paying below the target wage to 
be exclusively in the "secondary" labor market, no advance 
ment disincentives will occur in the primary internal labor 
markets where most job advancement actually occurs. Thus, 
although the wage subsidy does have a negative effect on job 
improvement incentives, it is not clear how disruptive this ef 
fect, which is limited only to the relative wages in the lowest 
wage category, will be on overall advancement incentives.
The homogenization of low wages also may lead to some 
undesirable market results. Firms operating in expanding 
product markets signal their needs for additional labor by 
paying a higher than equilibrium wage. Labor flows from 
firms in other markets to the expanding firms until the 
nonexpanding firms reestablish the equality of wages. This 
process ensures efficient flows of labor from declining to ex 
panding industries. With the presence of wage subsidies, an 
expanding firm would have to raise the market wage by a 
larger amount than in the absence of wage subsidies in order 
to significantly change the net wage of workers so that they 
will change jobs and so that additional labor supply will be 
forthcoming. This may result in a less adaptable and, 
therefore, more inefficient economy.
A third shortcoming of the wage supplement program is 
the possibility that low wage labor will be used in place of 
higher paid skilled labor. If the market wage in the low wage 
market decreases, the relative price of labor will change 
while the relative efficiency of low versus high wage labor 
will remain the same. According to competitive economic 
theory, this should lead to a redistribution of labor inputs in 
favor of low wage, unskilled labor. The result would be 
counter to the general manpower policy goal of upgrading
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the level of jobs held by workers at the lower end of the wage 
distribution.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the likely market effects of a 
wage subsidy program that would subsidize low wage in 
dividuals' wage rates either directly or indirectly through 
employers. In general, a wage subsidy would have favorable 
employment and unemployment effects. More individuals 
would supply labor to the low wage labor market, more in 
dividuals would likely find employment due to the effects of 
the program on labor demand, and the measured rate of 
unemployment might decrease if the program made low 
wage labor supply more stable. Potential problems of a wage 
subsidy program include the possibility that the homogeniza- 
tion of wage rates in the low wage market will impede labor 
mobility and the likelihood that the program would weaken 
the demand for skilled labor due to the substitution of sub 
sidized manpower for nonsubsidized manpower.
Chapter 11 
Conclusion
This study has focused on the role of government in reduc 
ing the level of unemployment in periods of high employ 
ment. While differing in degree, the same three aspects of 
unemployment—cyclical, frictional and structural—must be 
addressed in periods of high as in periods of low employ 
ment. In both environments the most difficult issue to 
resolve is how to mesh short-run and long-run goals for the 
economy in choosing among public policy alternatives. 
When labor markets are generally loose, major emphasis 
shifts to short-run expansionary measures in aggregate de 
mand. Even then, however, account has to be taken of possi 
ble longer run destablizing consequences of such measures. 
Moreover, despite the shift in emphasis, the need to deal 
with both the frictional and structural aspects of unemploy 
ment is still present in periods of general slack and, con 
sidered in this light, essentially the same policy measures are 
called for as in periods of high employment.
Similar considerations apply in periods of prosperity. The 
unemployment which persists into such periods is 
predominantly frictional and structural in nature and calls 
for greater emphasis on longer run policies pertaining to sup 
ply allocation issues than when labor markets are looser. 
Nonetheless, there are important differences between in 
dividual periods of prosperity, as recent experience makes
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clear, so short-run shifts in demand management must still 
be held in readiness. Moreover, not all aspects of frictional 
and structural unemployment call for long term policy ac 
tions; shorter run measures, particularly with respect to de 
mand conditions for the structurally unemployed, are clearly 
needed even when the economy is getting close to its full 
employment potential.
A profile of the unemployed by the usual demographic 
characteristics is also frequently viewed in terms of these 
same three categories of unemployment—cyclical, frictional 
and structural—with white adult males predominantly af 
fected by cyclical influences, white youth and women by fric 
tional influences, and nonwhites generally by structural in 
fluences. While containing some validity, this view is a 
dangerous oversimplification. It would be closer to the facts 
to treat the nonwhite workers as vulnerable to all three types 
of influences, with white youth and women only somewhat 
less so, and adult white males subject largely to cyclical in 
fluences alone.
As a consequence, any shift from a sluggish to a buoyant 
economy results in major changes in the jobless status and 
prospects of these demographic groups, but the degree and 
even the nature of the change vary among the three groups. 
Adult white males face increasingly active bidding for their 
services as vacancies multiply; substantial numbers of white 
youth and women begin to move into stable job oppor 
tunities and away from high turnover, structurally limited 
lines of work; and nonwhites begin a similar movement 
though to a markedly less degree.
These considerations have a direct bearing on the dimen 
sions of the problem of prosperity unemployment as outlin 
ed in the opening chapter of this study and on the choice of 
public policies for dealing with the issues involved. While 
short-run shifts in aggregate demand management will con-
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tinue to be critically important in determining how low the 
level of unemployment can be pushed in periods of high 
employment, the aggregate fiscal and monetary approach 
has been severely undercut in recent years by the fact that in 
flationary outbursts can occur at relatively high as well as at 
relatively low levels of unemployment. Moreover, longer 
term trends in economic conditions, notably the rate of 
growth in productivity, the pace of technological develop 
ment and investment, shifts in international markets and ex 
pectations regarding the rate of increase in prices and wages, 
now dominate aggregate demand management. Overheating 
in the early phase of an expansion is quite as dangerous as 
overkilling later on. In today's environment, any changes in 
monetary and fiscal policies, barring wartime or similar 
shocks, will need to be kept within narrow limits.
The record of the 1970s, however, does not point to any 
precise nonaccelerating inflation level of unemployment to 
which a policy of aggregate demand expansion can be car 
ried. All that can be said with a fair degree of assurance is 
that the use of such a policy to go as low as the 5 percent level 
might well induce serious inflationary consequences. In these 
circumstances, a rise in government expenditures limited to 
certain targeted unemployed groups would not prove 
unstabilizing if it were matched by an offsetting decline in 
some other category of spending and/or by a rise in tax 
revenues. This, however, would mark a shift from aggregate 
demand to selective measures as the route to follow. 
Whether the government should decide under these condi 
tions to push unemployment below 5 percent would be as 
much a political as an economic choice.
The other dimension of the problem—frequent movement 
among unskilled, dead-end occupations, inability to secure 
career-oriented jobs particularly in the private sector, and 
lack of visible incentives to gain skills essential to more 
meaningful work—call for a sustained, coordinated public
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effort to give the hard-to-employ the means to find stable 
work opportunities. This would require in turn the careful 
tailoring of such an effort to the specific requirements of 
these groups, with the greatest concentration on the severely 
disadvantaged among the hard-to-employ. It would likewise 
require the careful tailoring of a system of strong in 
ducements to employers, especially in the private sector, to 
give these workers initial access to career ladder jobs. While 
the difficulties facing both undertakings are formidable, 
they would be materially lessened in periods of general 
business expansion.
In such periods the nature of frictional unemployment 
undergoes considerable change as more workers, including 
nonwhites as well as whites and lesser as well as more skilled 
workers, enjoy wider latitude in choosing among job open 
ings. For these workers, the job information facilities of the 
federal-state Employment Service and private employment 
offices, if put on a fuller, more detailed basis, should 
generally prove sufficient. With the step-up in business ac 
tivity, employers would find it increasingly to their advan 
tage to do more of their hiring through the Employment Ser 
vice, especially if the Service's referral system could be put 
on a more informative, i.e., detailed, and objective basis. 
For a limited group of job seekers, however, the movement 
between jobs would remain at a bare, limited-skill level even 
in periods of prosperity and for these hardcore unemployed 
or underemployed a much more intensive, carefully designed 
structure of job finding aids would be essential.
Workers subject to such structural as opposed to frictional 
unemployment confront one or more of the following im 
pediments: noncompetitive wages or other cost barriers, 
welfare assistance and other work disincentives, 
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices, deficiencies 
in basic educational and vocational preparation, and lack of 
any regular job experience or specific skill training.
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Each of these barriers has generated public policy 
responses of varying degrees of intensity and effectiveness. 
The review of these responses in the preceding chapters 
underscores the need to put the different policies towards the 
structurally unemployed into a single, integrated framework 
with a view to adapting the various policy responses to the 
particular needs of each subgroup within the structurally 
unemployed and to make sure that successive-stage linkups 
between schools, employers and community are in place as 
needed by individual workers. While the underlying purpose 
of these policies is to make it possible for structurally 
unemployed workers to find and hold stable jobs, dif 
ferences among such workers require distinctly different, 
though closely interrelated, policy approaches.
A critical element in an integrated policy framework along 
these lines would continue to be the government's training 
programs, but these programs need to be tied in much more 
closely than they are now with actual job experience in 
private firms or government agencies. Admittedly, for many 
workers merely providing relatively brief training and work 
experience opportunities of this sort has proven inadequate, 
but for those who have achieved a certain job-readiness 
status, this approach has proven highly successful; while 
reliable data are lacking, it seems likely that if the economy 
achieves a 6 percent level of unemployment, there would be 
as many as a million workers who, though still structurally 
unemployed, would be in this job-ready category. Two re 
quirements, however, would have to be met: first, the level 
of training and job experience would have to be high enough 
to be seen as likely to lead to permanent jobs and longer term 
careers; and second, the inducements to both the par 
ticipating workers and employers would have to be great 
enough to make sure that career entry and progression can 
occur. The single most serious weakness in existing govern 
ment and public service employment sponsored programs
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appears to be the low rates of post-training program 
placements in regular, stable jobs.
Viewed in broader and more long-run terms, major 
changes in the nation's public school system are needed if the 
structural unemployment problem is to be effectively attack 
ed. Of the various conditions that call for redress, two bear 
most directly on the issue of structural unemployment. The 
first is the gross difference that exists in terms of per student 
dollar outlay and comparative quality of programs between 
upper and lower income communities or districts. The sec 
ond is the failure of the schools, notably in the latter areas, 
to provide meaningful work experience opportunities to 
students who desire them and could put them to good use. In 
many institutions, particularly in our inner-cities, large 
numbers of students find themselves on a mechanical, boring 
and deadening treadmill which leads away from, rather than 
toward, any worthwhile job or meaningful career.
For structurally unemployed workers who are less job- 
ready, and the more severely disadvantaged, elements other 
than specific skill training and work experience would also 
have to be provided. While primarily affecting younger 
workers, adult workers can be subject to essentially similar 
deficiencies too. These more seriously disadvantaged 
workers form a far smaller group, perhaps between 500,000 
to 750,000 in total number, than those in the job-ready 
category, and thus add only about a half of a percentage 
point to the nation's overall unemployment rate.
A much broader, and at the same time much more inten 
sive, effort than has been expended to date would be 
necessary if any significant progress is to be made in their 
case. Training periods would have to be lengthened, work 
support assignments would have to be more carefully design 
ed and monitored, more individual counseling and help with 
personal needs would have to be made available, and during
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initial job assignments, much fuller, even daily, cooperation 
of supervisors and fellow workers would have to be secured.
Even if such an intensive effort could be carried through, 
however, only limited results would probably be achieved, 
with numerous outright failures occurring since for many 
such workers these aids would not reach the fundamental 
difficulties involved. In their case, in addition to these direct, 
individualized measures, much broader and more costly 
measures would have to be undertaken including, in some in 
stances at least, greatly improved housing conditions, far 
better crime control, more adequate recreational facilities 
and other like measures essential to viable neighborhood and 
community environments. As already indicated, a key ele 
ment in any such far-reaching effort would be to adapt the 
country's primary and secondary school system more fully to 
the needs of disadvantaged students generally and, through a 
parallel program in work experience education, to give them 
some kind of a future career foothold. This would be 
especially important for students from the most severely 
disadvantaged backgrounds. Lacking a sustained effort 
along these lines, the many opportunities which high 
employment conditions afford even workers of severely 
disadvantaged backgrounds are likely to be largely lost.
The other major barriers involve even more difficult and 
intractable issues, so much so that insofar as structural 
unemployment is concerned they can only be approached in 
very long range terms. Noncompetitive wages, including 
government determined federal minimum wages and other 
market interferences, potentially pose real threats to job 
seekers among the hard-to-employ but, practicalities aside, 
whether a concerted move to break down these market bar 
riers would have an observable effect on the employment of 
such workers seems doubtful. Similarly, it is important to 
take steps to prevent a weakening of work incentives of 
lower paid, lower skilled groups as a result of the spread of
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welfare programs and other income support systems, but 
there is little evidence that any such tightening would 
materially affect the extent of unemployment, structural or 
otherwise. Finally, there is wide agreement that 
discriminatory practices, many rooted in long-established 
mores and institutional patterns, lie behind many of the 
more specific barriers confronting the structurally 
unemployed. There is no less widespread agreement that the 
task of breaking down these practices will be long and ar 
duous. Ultimately, any solution of the structural unemploy 
ment problem will require unremitting efforts in this direc 
tion; meanwhile, the more direct attacks already discussed 
give greater promise of success.
Can the level of unemployment that persists into periods 
of prosperity be reduced to minimal proportions, as low 
perhaps as 5 percent or less, in the next five or ten years? No 
one can speak with assurance on this question; if substantial 
progress is made, however, it seems likely that it will come as 
a result of public policy actions along the general lines 
recommended in this study.
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